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This study begins by seeing what is involved in the notion
of identity and then moves on to argue that the problem of
personal identity is an empirical problem. From here an attack
is launched on Butler's and Reid's idea of a persisting self
which is strictly identical over time. Other attempts to
support this view of personal identity, such as those of
McTaggart, Madell, and Chisholm are also taken to task. The
next targets are the memory theory of Locke and the
psychological theories of Quinton and Parfit. All of these
ultimately fail, it is argued, because they ignore the
structure of experience and continue to cleave to the model of
strict identity. Proceeding to the bodily theory we find both
Williams' and Penelhum's effort to disparage the possibility of
bodily transfer are of no avail. Williams' further attempt to
acclaim the bodily theory on the grounds that to love a person
is basically to love a body proves no better. The final reason
for the collapse of the bodily theory is because it overlooks
the first-person perspective on the body. With this we turn to
the no-self account which, being an eliminativist rather than
a reductive view, is a rejection of the idea of personal
identity. Hume's doctrine is shown to be such an account and
is defended against Penelhum, Noxon, and Ashley and Stack.
This involves an appeal to the Buddhist theory of the two
levels of truth which, it is argued, is already implicit in
Hume. To defend Hume against Kemp Smith's charge of
inconsistency a phenomenological enquiry into the nature of
the constructed or condensed self-image is carried out. The
study ends by suggesting the path that related ethical
enquiries might pursue.
If you think the mind
That attains enlightenment
Is 'mine'
Your thoughts will wrestle, one with
the other
These days I'm not bothered about
Getting enlightenment all the time
And the result is that
I wake up in the morning feeling
fine!
Bankei Zenji
( 1 622- 1 693 )
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PREFACE
This study is an attempt to address one of the central
issues in philosophical psychology: the problem of personal
identity. This problem is often said to be one of accounting
for what it is that gives persons their identity. However, once
the problem has been construed in these terms it is plain that
too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is
just that persons do have an identity. To the philosophers
who approach the problem with this supposition firmly ensconced
in their minds the possibility that there may be no such thing
as personal identity is scarcely conceived. As a result the
more fundamental question - whether or not personal identity
exists in the first place - remains unasked. The inadequacy of
one theory of identity is then taken as evidence for the truth
of another theory, rather than as evidence for the rejection of
such identity altogether. And this devotion to the idea of
identity persists even when all of the competing accounts turn
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out to be clearly inadequate.
One of the reasons for this tenacious clinging to the idea
of personal identity is perhaps the (philosopher's) belief that
the ordinary (non-philosophical) person has some sort of deep
conviction concerning his own identity. This supposed 'common
sense' view is then revered as the ultimate court of appeal in
which each philosophical theory must finally present its case.
It shall be my contention, however, that the idea of a common
sense commitment to this or that theory of personal identity,
or even to the idea of personal identity itself, is nothing but
an offspring of the philosopher's imagination. For not only do
ordinary people disagree and argue about the nature of identity
(just like ordinary philosophers do), but many such people
openly dismiss the idea as sheer nonsense.
» «
In what follows, therefore, my concern shall not be with
the question of which theory of personal identity is correct,
but rather with the question of whether there is personal
identity at all. This approach has the added benefit of freeing
us from the urge to invent a principle of identity where none
can be found.
First, however, a word about my use of the third-person
singular pronoun is in order. In discussing a topic like
persons it is difficult to avoid using these pronouns. Where
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the gender of the person is left unspecified one therefore has
to make a choice between the masculine, the feminine, or the
masculine/feminine disjunction. To avoid both awkardness of
style and non-standard English I have decided in such cases to
stick with accepted usage and, except where it reads better ,
to employ the masculine pronoun generically to indicate both
male and female. I am of course sensitive to the inadequacies
that this involves but hope the reader will accept my good
faith in this matter.
Although many people have helped me with this research,
there are some who deserve special acknowledgement. First, I
would like to thank my supervisor Geoffrey Madell for our many
meetings and discussions, for all his help, and especially for
his sense of humour. Without his guidance this work could not
have been completed. Thanks also are due to John Llewellyn and
Peter Lewis, both of whom gave freely of their time and
learning whenever I was in need. John Llewellyn's comments on
Chapter Four were particularly helpful. I would also like to
express my appreciation to Vincent Hope for both the interest
he took in my work and his constant support. I learned much
from him over our numerous cups of tea at Buccleuch Place. A
special thanks must go to Timothy Sprigge who was always
willing to see me and help me out of the philosophical
quandaries in which I would often become enmeshed. I owe much
to him because he took the time to read these pages and offer
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his comments and encouragement. Here too I must give my thanks
to Mairi McLeod whose knowledge of Eastern thought and the
selflessness of all things has been a continual inspiration to
me. I would also here like to thank Andrew Brennan for kindly
agreeing to be my external examiner. Finally, I must express my
gratitude to the University of Edinburgh and the Committee of
Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities and
Colleges of the United Kingdom, both from whom I received the
scholarships that made this research possible.
CHAPTER ONE
THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
Like many problems in philosophy the problem of personal
identity arises from a discrepancy between what at first
glance seems to be a reasonable belief, and the results of
careful examination of that belief. It is one of our apparently
reasonable beliefs that each of us is in possession of a
personal identity, that is, something which distinguishes us
from others and imparts some form of unity to our existence.
Yet, when we bring this belief into the open air and begin to
examine it, strangely enough, it seems a belief with little
foundation. To appreciate the difficulties here let us begin
by seeing what is involved in the notion of identity.
The first thing to notice is that to assert the existence
of identity is to assert the existence of a cetain type of
relation. But a relation must relate something to something.
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Thus to say that there is an instance of identity is the same
as saying there are certain things that have the relation of
identity to one another. But what sort of relation is
identity? To this we can only answer it is the relation of "one
and the same*. And so to say that one thing is identical with
another is to say that one thing is one and the same as
another. But no sooner has this been accepted than we realize
we have come upon a peculiar problem. For if the two items at
either end of the identity relation are one and the same thing,
then in fact there are not two items at all but only one. And
if there is only one item, then it seems we cannot have
relation; for as we have just said a relation must relate
something to something.
Some philosophers have tried to deal with this problem by
saying identity is the relation that every object has to
itself. But this will get us no further. For what could it
possibly mean to say 'This object is identical with itself"?
If we consider that the function of the word 'itself' is to
automatically refer to the same thing that was just mentioned,
then 'this object' and 'itself' will obviously refer to the
same thing. And as is evident, if the idea referred to by the
word 'object' is undistinguishable from the idea referred to by
the word 'itself', then the statement 'This object is
identical with itself' is empty, i.e. it says nothing. (1)
Another way of putting this is to say that such a statement is
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little more than an obvious variation of 'This object is
identical with this object', which is not really an identity-
statement because it is not really a statement at all. It is
easy to be fooled here and think that statements of this form
are genuine statements; they do after all display the typical
structure of a statement where information is conveyed by
predicating something of something else. But, as is clear, in
this type of statement there is no something else. As a
result, 'this object is identical with this object' conveys no
information. This is corroborated by a moment's reflection;
for if we think about what it is we learn from being told that
this object is identical with this object, we must confess we
have learned nothing. This is not to say that formulas like
'A=A' do not have a function to fulfill in certain systems of
logic, but only that whatever function they have it cannot be
2
one of conveying information.
We are not, however, stranded. For in translating 'This
object is identical with itself' into 'This object is identical
with this object' I made use of the fact that 'itself' is
obviously referring to the same thing as 'this object'. But
what if the second term in an identity statement is not
obviously referring to the same thing as the first term? What
if, for example, we make the claim 'The Vernal Equinox is
identical with the 20th of March', or 'Renoir's favourite
renaissance sculptor is identical with the sculptor of the
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reliefs of the Fountains des Innocents', or again ' The city
whose heart is Dam Square is identical with the Venice of the
North'? In such identity statements it is not obvious that the
two terms refer to the same thing. This is because the two
terms on either side of the identity relation display a
different sense from each other, i.e. what Frege describes as a
different 'mode of presentation'.(3) We might also say, they
are two different ways of denoting the same thing. Thus
because the term 'The city whose heart is Dam Square' has a
different sense from 'The Venice of the North', we learn
something when we are told that the city whose heart is Dam
Square is identical with the Venice of the North.
But what sort of thing is it we learn? To answer this we
must look to what it is that distinguishes identity statements
of this sort from empty claims like 'This object is identical
with this object'. And what distinguishes them, as we have
noted, is that in the former case the terms of the identity
have different senses. What we learn therefore is that two
terms with different senses apply to the same thing. But if
this is what is conveyed to us by such identity statements then
it seems they teach us little more than how we are to use
certain terms. That is, they do not convey to us anything
about an instance of identity existing in the world.
This is a point well-made by T. L. S. Sprigge.CH
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According to Sprigge, identity statements of the form we are
now considering fall short of being full-blooded identity
statements for two reasons. First, they are creatures of
language who owe their existence to the linguistic fact that
there exists more than one term to denote the same thing.
Secondly, their sole purpose is to dispel ignorance which, once
being done, leaves us with no interesting fact of identity to
contemplate. Thus says Sprigge, if 'x is identical to y' is a
statement of this form, the only reason for making it is
because people do not or might not be aware that x and y are
two different ways of denoting the same thing, say z. However,
once this is realized then there is no longer any identity
relation to report. The natural way of reporting the fact
contained in this statement then becomes 'z alone is x and z
alone is y' or 'z alone is both x and y'. And here there is no
fact of identity, only the fact that one thing plays two
different roles. Applying this analysis to one of the above
examples we can say that once the relevant ignorance has been
dispelled about Amsterdam, i.e. once we know that the city
whose heart is Dam Square is identical with the Venice of the
North, the natural way of expressing this is not to make an
assertion of identity but merely to say 'Amsterdam alone is
both the city whose heart is Dam Square and the Venice of the
North' .
•
There is of course the possible protest that the term
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'alone' conceals an implicit identity relation. So even if the
statement 'z alone is both x and y' does not display an overt
assertion of identity, such an assertion will become explicit
once the statement has been analyzed. Sprigge's reply here is
simply that any such analysis will be artificial. For to hold
that the statement 'Jane alone is the woman in the room' is
really an identity statement we will have to invoke a
logician's analysis and say something like "for every x, x is a
woman in the room if and only if x is identical to Jane'. But,
as Sprigge remarks, this suggests our recognition of some
individual's having a unique property involves our recognizing
of every single thing that it has that property if and only if
it is identical with that individual, and this is plainly what
we do not do. What we recognize here is that this individual
alone has a certain property.
So once again we are no further ahead in understanding
just how identity can be a relation and yet involve only one
object. Sprigge's solution to this dilemma is to point to the
existence of identity statements that involve the notion of
pattern or quality recognition. An example of this type of
statement might be 'The colour of my jacket is identical with
the colour of your scarf'. What is asserted here is the
identity of a quality (a colour) which appears in two different
instances (my jacket and your scarf). Statements of this sort,
says Sprigge, are genuine statements of identity because,
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first, they assert a real identity, secondly, they are not
vacuous, and thirdly, they are not merely ignorance dispelling;
that is, even when we have been suitably enlightened there is
still something of interest we can contemplate.
I agree with Sprigge that these sort of statements are
neither vacuous nor merely ignorance dispelling, but I am not
so sure that they assert a real identity. That is, I am not
convinced that statements of pattern or quality recognition are
not merely asserting an exact similarity rather than a real
identity. On this view the word 'identical' in the statement
'The colour of my jacket is identical with the colour of your
scarf" would have the same meaning as it does in the phrase
'identical twins'. For identical twins are not really
identical (i.e. one and the same), they are only exactly
similar. Consequently, the above statement would only be an
assertion of an exact similarity of colour, not of a real
identity of colours. Anyway, to hold that pattern or quality
recognition statements do assert a real identity would be to
commit ourselves to the existence of universals that manifest
themselves in particular instances. I think, however, there
is another way out of this impasse which enables us to avoid
making such commitments. And this is by appealing to the idea
of time. For once we introduce the idea of time into the
discussion, then it becomes clear how identity can be a
relation which nevertheless involves only one thing. For now we
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can say that the relation of identity is what occurs when an
object at one time is identical with an object at another
time.(5) Were we to make a statement about such a relation we
would have an identity statement that is neither vacuous nor
merely ignorance dispelling. We would have instead an
assertion of a real instance of identity. An example of such a
statement might be 'The sundial now in the garden is identical
with the one put there last year". Here we have a reference to
only one object (the sundial in the garden) and yet, because of
the introduction of a temporal dimension, two genuinely
different contexts (now and last year) in which the same object
can be said to exist. It is clear therefore why this statement
is not vacuous: it is making a definite claim about the world
which may or may not be true. Further, it is not merely
ignorance dispelling: for the two terms of the identity, namely
'the sundial in the garden now' and 'the sundial in the garden
last year', are not merely different ways of referring to the
same thing, rather they refer to genuinely distinct contexts in
which the same thing is said to exist.
We can conclude then that what makes an identity statement
a statement about a genuine fact of identity is that it refers
to an instance of identity over time. The problem of personal
identity then becomes the problem of what, if anything, makes a
person at one time identical with himself at another time.(6)
This does not mean that questions about non-temporal aspects of
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persons will have no bearing on the issue of personal identity
over time. For if we can show that what we call a person is at
any one moment merely a collection of related parts, then it
will prove more likely that a person considered over time is
merely a succession of related parts. And this in turn will
have implications about whether or not a person has identity
over time. It is because of this point that, in what follows,
we will have occasion to examine the doctrine of the unity of
consciousness, i.e. the view that consciousness is, at any one
instance, necessarily a unified entity.
Before, however, we press on to these issues there remains
a preliminary question that must be addressed. And this is the
question of how the problem of personal identity ought to be
regarded. For the most part, philosophers have tended to
regard the problem as a conceptual one to be solved by
conceptual analysis. This approach would involve analyzing the
concept of personal identity in the hope of discovering whether
it is a basic concept, or whether it is built up from or
dependent on simpler concepts. Thus it might be found that
concept of personal identity is dependent on the concept of
memory. If this were the case, it would mean that statements
about personal identity would logically entail statements about
memory, and consequently, it would be argued, that personal
identity is somehow constituted by memory.
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8ut this sort of approach cannot but leave us
dissatisfied. For if we are genuinely concerned about the
problem of personal identity, then arguments that invoke
premises about concepts and language will only appear to us as
so much mist before our eyes. What we want to know is how
persons undergo their existence and whether they experience
themselves as possessing an identity through time; and here the
analysis of concepts will be of little avail.
What I am claiming then is that the issue of personal
identity cannot be divorced from the issue of psychology. This
claim, no doubt, will be met with dismay from various
quarters. The problem of personal identity, it will be said,
is the problem of what entitles us to apply identity- terms to
persons. And this question is to be solved by discovering the
criteria we employ in making statements of identity about
persons, not by conducting psychological enquiries. The
difficulty with this sort of response, however, is that it
ignores the fact that the problem at hand is one which deals
with the nature of persons. Why, we ought to ask, is there a
problem about personal identity in the first place? Why has
this particular problem been ear-marked as worthy of a
separate enquiry in the way that other problems of identity -
e.g. the identity of stones - have not? The answer to this, it
seems, is that although persons, like stones, have a physical
form, they nevertheless, undergo their existence in a way that
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things like stones do not. That is, persons have awareness,
memories, beliefs about their own identity, and so on.
consequently, any enquiry into the nature of persons - such as
an enquiry into whether they have identity over time - will
have to come to terms with the way in which persons experience
themselves. It will be no good to assure someone that his
identity is maintained, for example, by the existence of a
persisting self or the continuity of his body if he has no
experience of this. For this puts the principle of his
identity beyond the realms of his own awareness. But for a
theory of personal identity to have any relevance to a person's
life it must address itself to the way in which a person is
aware of himself, i.e. it must address itself to his
existential situation. A theory which makes no attempt to do
this is one that has lost its point of contact with the world.
• <
A perfect example of this type of ignoring experience in
favour of applying criteria is displayed by P. F.
Strawson.(7) After claiming that there is no principle of
unity or identity which any of us employ to decide whether a
certain contemporary experience is ours or someone else's,
Strawson goes on to say that he is not denying that someone
might have doubts about his own identity. A person might, he
admits, be uncertain about whether a particular history was his
own. In this case, says Strawson, a person can resolve the
doubts he harbours about himself in the same way that others
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would resolve similar doubts about him: he would merely apply
to himself the ordinary criteria for personal identity. Thus if
someone else was unsure about whether it was me he saw at he
opera last night he would set about solving this problem by
enquiring into where my body was last night, testing the
accuracy of the memories I have of last night, and so on.
Likewise, according to Strawson, if I have doubts concerning
whether I myself was at the opera last night, I merely find out
where my body was last night, test the accuracy of my memories,
and so on.
But there is something eminently odd about me trying to
satisfy my doubts concerning my identity by carrying out such
investigations. And what is odd about it is this: if I am
unsure of whether it was me who was at the opera last night,
then the discovery that my body was in fact there, that my
apparent memories of being elsewhere are delusive, and any
number of other findings, is hardly going to settle things for
me. This is simply because no matter what I discover from the
application of these criteria to 'myself', the fact remains
that within my experience I lack a sense of identity with the
person who was at the opera last night. It is possible, of
course, that after contemplating the results of this
'application of criteria" I might eventually come to acquire
the 'feeling' that I had been at the opera last night. 8ut it
should be clear that such a feeling, whether correct or not,
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would be a delusive one; that is, it would not have sprung from
my direct awareness of having been there.
The upshot of this is that the theory of personal identity
cannot proceed in isolation from how we experience ourselves.
Thus our lodestar throughout this study will always be
experience itself, and, as a result, our enquiry will be
foremost a phenomenological one. This approach, however, does
not make the way that lies ahead an easy one. For
the more we look to our experience the more we shall see the
foundations for the belief in personal identity dissolving
before our eyes. One of the first figures in Western thought to
appreciate the immense difficulties that beset the notion
of personal identity was the Eighteenth-century Scottish
philosopher, David Hume. When Hume looked into himself all he
could find was some perception or other, never anything which
could be called a self. Within the mind, Hume was led to say,
there is never any simplicity at one time nor identity at two
different times. One of his conclusions, therefore, was that
personal identity was a fiction; that is, something which we
can only mistakenly attribute to ourselves. We shall return to
the ideas of Hume, but for now let us embark on an examination
of the view that each of us is in possession of a personal
identity.
Those who defend the notion of personal identity tend to
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support either a strict non-reductive view: one in which
personal identity is something simple and indefinable, or a
reductive view, where our identity is analyzable into various
empirical features such as memory or bodily continuity. We
shall start by having a look at the strict view.
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also philosophicaly unnecessary. This is because at the level
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nouns like 'I', 'self', 'one', etc.) are merely grammatically
convenient devices that need carry no metaphysical
implications. We shall return to this point in Chapter Five.
7. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics
(London, 1971), pp. 133-134.
CHAPTER TWO
THE INDEFINABLE SELF
One of the most famous statements of the strict theory of
personal identity comes from the writings of The Bishop of
Bristol, Joseph Butler. Although Butler is well-known for his
views on personal identity, he is also remembered for a
somewhat singular remark that G. E. Moore chose to quote on the
fly leaf of his book Principia Ethica. This remark of
8utler's is "Everything is what it is and not another thing".
Although we may doubt whether this is a genuine statement, it
nevertheless serves to convey the anti-reductionist attitude
that is so much part of Butler's philosophy. This 'statement'
is made by Butler in the preface to his ethical sermons and is
meant to 'explain' to us why ethical notions cannot be reduced
to non-ethical notions. And yet, such a remark would not, as we
shall see, be out of place in Butler's discussion of personal
identity.
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In a brief dissertation appended to The Analogy of
Religion (1736) Butler says that although any attempt to
define personal identity will end in perplexity, the notion is
nevertheless easily understandable. For by reflecting on myself
now, and myself of twenty years ago, I can readily perceive
that they are not distinct but identical selves. However, says
Butler, we should not conclude from this that consciousness of
personal identity is the basis of personal identity; for 'one
should really think it self-evident that consciousness of
personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute,
personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case,
can constitute truth, which it presupposes'.(1)
The origins of this 'wonderful mistake', Butler suggests,
might be that since being conscious and being a person are
inseparable notions, one might be led to the conclusion that
consciousness is the essence of personal identity. And Butler
admits that our consciousness of our present feelings and
actions is undoubtedly necessary for our being the person we
are now. But he does not allow that our memory of past feelings
and actions is a necessary element in our being the same person
who once had those feelings or did those actions. My
remembrance of myself performing a certain action twenty years
ago is not a necessary element in my remaining, twenty years
on, one and the same person who performed that action.
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This persisting strict identity that informs a person
throughout his existence is something which is lacking in
plants. It is true that we often talk about a tree as though it
were the same tree over the many years of its life, but
strictly speaking this is incorrect. "For when a man swears to
the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place,
he means only the same as to all the purposes of property and
common life, and not that the tree has been all that time the
same in the strict and philosophical sense of the word' (pp. 100-
101). This is because he does not know whether any particle of
the present tree is identical with any particle of the earlier
tree. And if they have no parts in common, then they cannot,
strictly speaking be the same tree. Thus Butler concludes the
sameness of the tree over time can only be sameness in a 'loose
and popular' sense. In the 'strict and philosophical' sense,
nothing is the same that changes.
It is in this latter sense that the notion of sameness is
applied to a person throughout his life. This is one of the
reasons why, for Butler, personal identity cannot consist of
consciousness; for consciousness is ever-changing. And if a
person's consciousness is at every moment different than it was
before, then that person is never, from moment to moment,
strictly the same. Still one might reasonably wonder what is
wrong with not being strictly the same from moment to moment.
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If we accept that consciousness is continuously changing, why
cannot we accept that personal identity itself is continuously
changing. Sutler feels that the best way of refuting this view
is simply by making explicit its implications. For on this
view, asserts 8utler, it must follow that what happened to us
yesterday, and what will happen to us tomorrow, is of little
concern to our present self: 'for if the self or person of
today, and that of tomorrow, are not the same, but only like
persons, the person of today is really no more interested in
what will befall the person of tomorrow, than in what will
befall any other person' (p.102). And the same, it would
appear, holds for our present self's concern with our self of
yesterday. With this much concluded, Butler thinks it plain
that anyone who accepted the implications of the
consiousness,or memory, theory of personal identity could only
do so 'owing to an inward unfairness, and secret corruption of
the heart'.
The first thing one notices about this account of personal
identity is its lack of any positive arguments. It is true
that, in addition to his mere assurances of the certainty we
harbour regarding our own identity, Butler also produces some
interesting criticisms of the memory theory. And to be sure,
herein lies his fame. But other than this he does little to
support his own theory. One reason for this omission is
probably because he sees the memory theory and his own view of
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identity as being jointly exhaustive. Thus all that is required
to establish the strict theory is to demonstrate the
inadequacies of the memory theory. Such an assumption is, as
can be noted from Hume's rejection of personal identity,
premature. Another reason for Butler's non-productivity here
seems to be his belief in the obviousness of his own doctrine.
So self-evident is the strict theory of personal identity that
all Butler need do is to appeal to the certainty we have
concerning our own identity. And so, proclaims Butler, 'when
any one reflects on a past action of his own, he is just as
certain of the person who did that action, namely himself, the
person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the
action was done at all' (p.104). This, however, as a moment's
reflection will show, is plainly false. It is a common
experience that we may be certain of the occurrence of a past
action but not certain of its authorship, even if it was our
action (assuming for now that actions do have authors). Thus I
can clearly remember a particular story being told over lunch
six years ago, but I cannot recall whether it was Mary who told
the story to me or I who related it to her. It might be thought
that such instances are too minor to offer a serious challenge
to our sense of identity. Whether or not this is so, it must be
admitted that there are instances in which the uncertainty of
one's identity is more than a secret corruption of the heart.
And with this admission we have exposed what might be called a
fracture in the structure of personal identity.
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A possible reply here could be that such occurrences do
not present a problem because they are merely errors of memory,
not errors of identification. This is the line taken by Sydney
Shoemaker in his paper on 'Persons and Their Pasts'.(2) Here
Shoemaker says that although it is possible to misidentify
other persons, and even in some instances oneself, there
remains an important class of first- person statements that are
immune to error through misidentification. Thus were I to say,
on the basis of a full and accurate memory, 'John shouted X' it
is still possible that my statement could be false. For it
might be that I have misidentified someone else as John,
(either when I first heard the shouting, or later when I
subsequently recalled it). That is, although I might remember
that the person who shouted X exactly resembled John, it is
possible that he was nevertheless someone else. However, were I
also to claim on the basis of a full and accurate memory 'I
shouted X", here it is not possible that I could be wrong.
Shoemaker grants that I could make an error if I happened to
misremember the incident, but this would be an error of memory
not of misidentification.
Still, not all first-person claims, even if correctly
remembered, enjoy this immunity from error. If, for instance, I
make a claim about myself on the basis of what I see in a
mirror (e.g. 'I went red'), it is conceivable that the person
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whom I took for myself in the mirror was in fact someone else,
say, my identical twin or double. This would be a case of
misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun.(3)
Unfortunately, Shoemaker gives us no precise way of
deciding which first-person claims are immune to the error of
misidentification and which are not. All we are told is that
'In general, if at some past time I could have known of
someone that he was ip, and could at the same time have been
mistaken in taking that person to be myself, then the
subsequent memory-claims I make about the past occasion will be
subject to error through misidentification with respect to
first-person pronouns'. But, Shoemaker continues, if I could
not have been mistaken this way in the past, then my subsequent
memory-claims will be immune to the error of misidentification
with respect to the first-person pronoun. This could be
expressed, says Shoemaker, by stating that 'where the present-
tense version of a judgement is immune to error through
misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns
contained in it, this immunity is preserved in memory'.
Let us start by asking whether it makes sense to say that
I can have a full and accurate memory of something that never
happened; that is, whether I can veridically remember that John
shouted X when in fact he did not. Shoemaker thinks it makes
sense because of his alleged distinction between misremembering
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and misidentifying. He thinks it is possible that I could have
the veridical memory 'John shouted X' when in fact the person
that shouted X was not John but only someone whom I took to be
John; that is, someone whom I misidentified as John. But if the
person who shouted X was not John, then it is patently false to
say I have a full and accurate memory of John shouting X. This
is because I cannot have a veridical memory which is at the
same time a delusive one. Of course I may have a veridical
memory that someone who exactly resembled John shouted X, but
that is not the same as having a veridical memory that John
shouted X. This is evident from the fact that memory is, among
other things, a knowledge of the past. And just as I cannot
know P if P is false - for one of the conditions of knowing P
is P is true - likewise I cannot remember P if P is false. And
as it is senseless to say that I can have a full and accurate
knowledge that John shouted X even if John did not shout X, so
it is senseless to say the same of memory.
Shoemaker has become misled, it seems, because he thinks
that the process of identification can be prised off from the
process of memory. To see the untenability of this procedure
consider my memory 'John offered Jane a piece of cake in the
cafe'. Now, let us say that this memory involves the
misidentification of not only someone else for John, say Paula,
but also the misidentification of Peter for Jane, 'threatening
with a revolver' for 'offering a piece of cake', and the bank
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for the cafe. On Shoemaker's account it would make good sense
to say that I have the full and accurate memory "John offered
Jane a piece of cake in the cafe' even though the memory is
fraught with misidentifications and what really happened is
"Paula threatened Peter with a revolver in the bank'. But if
this is what really happened, it then becomes absurd to insist
that my memory is in any meaningful sense full and accurate.
For what is it that I am supposed to be fully and accurately
remembering?
One response here might be to claim that although I may
have misidentified the various elements of my memory, my memory
could still be said to be full and accurate so far as I
correctly remember one person doing something to another. 8ut
even this is too much; for it still depends on my identifying
something as a person, something else as an action, and so on.
And all these could turn out to be misidentifications. What
this objection needs to be sustained is for my memory of the
event to be devoid of any identifications, i.e. for me to
remember the event without identifying any of the elements of
my memory. But if I do not identify any of the elements in my
memory, then I cannot know what it is I am remembering; for to
know what it is I am remembering I at least have to identify
what I am remembering. And since to remember P is at least to
know P, it seems to follow that memory is dependent on the







I can have the full and accurate memory
I was mistaken in thinking the person who
If we now turn to Shoemaker's claim that if I were to say
on the basis of a full and accurate memory 'I shouted X', I
could not be in error relative to 'I', we see this is true not
because of any special status of the first-person, but simply
because full and accurate memory-claims cannot be false.
It might be thought that although first-person memory-
claims lack the special status that Shoemaker imputes to some
of them, an immunity from error through misidentification of
'I* is still to be found in a certain class of first-person
present-tense claims. Thus were I to say on the basis of a
present experience "John is shouting X' it is possible that I
may have misidentified the person shouting X as John and so
have made a false claim. But were I also to say on the basis of
a present experience 'I am shouting X' there seems to be no way
in which I could make an error of misidentification with
respect to ' I'.
Yet I can see no reason why I could not make such an
error. Imagine a situation in which other people are shouting
and screaming so much that were I to shout I would hardly be
able to hear myself. Further, imagine that just before I
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attempt to join in the shouting at this noisy gathering I am,
unbeknownst to myself, suddenly struck with a type of aphasia
which renders vocal production impossible. Now when I attempt
to shout X it just could be that someone near me shouts X at
exactly the same time. And because of my faulty hearing, or
because of the profusion of noise, I may think the 'X' being
shouted by someone else is in fact being shouted by me. That
is, I could make an error of misidentification relative to the
first-person pronoun.
It might still be that there exists some special class of
first- person claims that enjoy the sort of immunity to error
that Shoemaker is arguing for. All we can say, however, is that
Shoemaker has given us no reason to believe in their existence.
Returning now to Butler's criticism of the memory theory,
we see it is aimed at John Locke, an early proponent of the
view that personal identity consists of the ability to be
conscious of, or remember, the past experiences of one's life.
Butler's charge, which is one of circularity, is often put in
the following way: to have a personal identity through time I
must have memories of myself experiencing certain events in the
past. But this implies the previous existence of my personal
identity. Therefore memory cannot be the basis of personal
identity.
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This argument is generally accepted as having dealt a
fatal blow to the memory theory. It is only fatal however if we
are not careful about how we interpret the theory. In his
Essav Concerning Human Understanding (1694) what Locke
proposes is that if I who am writing now had the same
consciousness when I saw the Thames overflow last winter as I
did when I saw Noah's flood, then I who am now writing must be
the same person as the one who saw the Thames overflow, and as
the one who saw Noah's flood.(4) If this begs the question it
is because Locke might be interpreted as saying "I remember
mvself seeing the Thames overflow' and "I remember mvself
seeing Noah's flood'. But there is no need to insert the
'mvself' in either case. All that need be said is I who am
now writing remember seeing the Thames overflow and remember
seeing Noah's flood. It is not necessary that my memory-claims
involve any reference to 'I', or, as 8utler says, to a
consciousness of personal identity.
There are those who would no doubt protest that memory
experiences are not had in an impersonal way, and that part of
what it is for me to remember witnessing a past event is to
remember that it was I who witnessed it. But this is simply
dogmatic. For we do have memories in which the self does not
appear. I know that many of my memories, especially those of
childhood, are of this sort. I can, for example, remember some
children playing in a field, but have no memory of myself being
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there at the time. To this it could be objected that if I do
actually remember children playing in a field, then I must have
been there to see it. 8ut whether or not this is true, the fact
remains that I have no memory of myself being there.
A defender of 8utler, however, would not give in so
easily. For even if it is true, he would continue, that our
memories are not necessarily remembered in a personal way,
there remains the problem of what distinguishes a veridical
memory from a delusive one. And this distinction, it will be
proclaimed, can only be made by reference to the presence of an
I. Thus if I claim to remember some children playing in a
field, what renders my memory veridical rather than delusive is
that, in the former case I was actually present to witness the
event, while in the latter case I was not. And so we see that
Butler's charge of circularity - that memory presupposes
personal identity - holds after all.
It is curious that this argument has held sway over so
many philosophers; for it easily collapses under a little
scrutiny. Of course if we were to accept that what makes a
memory veridical is that the person who has the memory was
actually there to witness the event he claims to remember, then
to assert that personal identity is constituted of memory would
indeed be fallacious. 8ut why do we need to accept this?
Plainly, such an account of the verdicality of memory can do
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nothing but support the strict theory of personal identity, and
for us to acquiesce to it would be to jump straight into the
trap. A less partisan account of what makes a memory veridical
is therefore in order.
What makes my memory of some children playing in a field
veridical, I propose, is simply that it is causally connected
in the proper way with a veridical perception of children
playing in a field. What I mean by 'proper way' is something
like this: that after the initial occurrence of the veridical
perception, the perception is transferred directly to the
sensory-buffer, then to short-term memory, and from there to
long-term memory from where it is directly retrieved to now be
experienced as a memory. This is, it will be allowed, a rough
scenario from which there may be various deviations, e.g. some
perceptions may bypass short-term memory and travel directly to
long-term. The important point is that for a memory to be
veridical, the causal chain must run from the veridcal
perception to the memory experience in accordance with the
principles of the psychology of memory: it must not include
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tomorrow, than he is in what happens to someone else. What
Butler is saying is that since I do care more about both my
past and future selves than I do about others, the memory
theory must be false. But this is like saying because people
behave as if God exists, atheism must be false. Our inclination
to embrace or discard a theory does not thereby render that
theory true or false. For plainly there are many reasons for
being inclined towards or against a particular theory which
have nothing to with its truth or falsity. What Butler should
have said is if the memory theory is true, then people ought to
be no more concerned about their past or future selves than
they are about someone else. And this may well be true, but
once put this way it is no longer a criticism of the memory
theory. Rather, it is merely an observation about what sort of
behaviour would be rational under certain circumstances. It
could always be argued that it would be impossible for us to
act in a way that placed our self of tomorrow on the same level
of concern as another person. But even if this argument were
feasible, and I doubt that it is, it would still miss the mark.
All it would show is simply that were the memory theory true,
we could never live up to it.
Despite the inadequacies of Butler's account, Thomas Reid,
a contemporary of Butler's, thought it to be wholly correct.
Reid's work on personal identity, differing little from
Butler's, is therefore not terribly original, much of what he
says being merely a re-phrasing
Nevertheless, he does give us a
strict theory than does 8utler,
notice.
of his mentor's ideas.
more detailed exposition of the
and is therefore worthy of our
For Reid personal identity is something which is simple,
indefinable, and admits of no degrees. A person is thus either
identical with his earlier self or he is not; he is never more
or less the same. Personal identity "implies the continued
existence of that indivisible thing which I call
mvself'.(5) I am not my thoughts, actions, or feelings,
says Reid, for these being merely successive have no continued
existence. I am that permanent self to which these thoughts,
actions, and feelings belong. The belief in this identity, we
are told, is so deeply rooted that it is beyond the possibility
of being seriously questioned; 'The conviction which every man
has of his own identity, as far back as his remembrance
reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it; and no
philosophy can weaken it, without first producing some degree
of insanity' (p.107). It should be noted, however, that like
Butler's assurances of our sense of identity, this assertion is
not an argument for personal identity. The fact that I may
cling tenaciously to a particular conviction in no way
demonstrates the truth of my conviction. And indeed, as is
commonly known, most deeply held convictions - prejudices most
of all - are quite immune to the assails of philosophy.
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Further, if Reid's claim about the insanity of disbelief in
personal identity is to be philosophically interesting, it must
be the case that because someone goes insane upon the loss of a
particular belief, that belief must be true. And this of course
is false. I may well believe, for example, that the one whom I
love also loves me, and upon coming to see the falseness of
this belief fall into despair and go insane.
It might be felt that I am perhaps being unfair to Reid
and that assertions like the one I am now attacking are to be
taken in a rhetorical rather than a straightforward way. I do
not think this is so. Reid is after all the philosopher of
common sense, and quite often he sees a position's deviation
from common sense as being sufficient grounds for its
dismissal. In saying this, however, I am not agreeing that the
belief in one's own personal identity is a matter of common
sense, I am only saying that Reid himself takes such a belief
to be common sense. The reason I do not think the belief in a
strictly persisting personal identity is one of common sense is
simply because I find that surprisingly few people hold it.
When I ask the ordinary person if he is the exact same person
he was twelve years ago, the most common answer I receive is an
unqualified 'No'. Now as a philosopher it might be easy, and
perhaps satisfying, to convince myself that my interlocuter has
not fully grasped the depth of my question. But even after I
have clearly explained that what I am asking is not whether his
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ideas, feelings, or plans are the same, but rather, whether the
person to which these belong is the same, I still frequently
receive a 'No'. I admit, of course, that there are those who
upon hearing the fuller version of the question see me as
asking about what they call their 'Inner Being" or 'True Self"
and reply that yes this is something that has never changed.
But the person who gives this sort of answer is certainly no
more common than the one who quite firmly stands behind his
claim to be essentially a different person than he was twelve
years ago. None of this is to say that the ordinary person
believes himself to be lacking in selfhood. Most people, it
would seem, do seem to believe themselves to be in possession
of some sort of a self. However, from my various discussions I
have come to see that there is no one particular conception of
the self which is commonly held. All the reader need do to
confirm this for himself is'nlterely ask those around him. He
will quickly see that while for one person the self is the
personality, for another it is the brain, while yet for another
it is a glowing mass of energy that somehow surrounds the body.
Just why there is such a diversity of views here is difficult
to say. One reason however might be that, as Andrew Brennan has
suggested, we simply have no clear conception of what a person
is. As a result, each person is free to construct a notion of
himself in the way he chooses. This has the interesting effect
of even allowing us to entertain quite inconsistent views about
ourselves, leaving us, as Brennan puts it, at the mercy of
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somewhat inconsistent expectations.(6)
Fortunately, however, we need not linger on this issue,
for Reid does supply us with an argument for the non-reductive
view of personal identity. Asking himself why he thinks there
is a permanent I, Reid gives the answer that it is remembrance
which is the proper evidence. Thus referring to a dialogue of
twenty years ago, he says 'I remember several things that
passed in that conversation; my memory testifies not only that
this was done, but that it was done by me who now remember it.
If it was done by me I must have existed at that time, and
continued to exist from that time to the present" (p.110). It
is important to see here that Reid is not claiming memory to be
the basis of personal identity, for this would be the Lockean
thesis. Rather, he is only holding memory to be the evidence
for personal identity.
At first glance it might seem that Reid's argument is a
plausible line to take. But upon looking further some
intolerable difficulties become apparent. First, there is the
question of how it is that my memory testifies that a certain
thing was done by me. As Reid himself says, I am not
thought, action or feeling. But what is it then that I
remember when I remember that something was done by me? Is it
the permanent and indivisible self that I remember? Certainly
such a self must come into the memory in some way, or how
- 39 -
could I remember it was done by mvself. And yet for my self
to enter into my memory it must enter in some form. 8ut as
just mentioned it cannot take the form of thoughts, feelings,
or actions. So what is it I am supposed to be remembering
when I remember myself? Reid's only reply here would seem to
be that such a memory cannot be analyzed any further due to
the simplicity of the self - I just remember myself doing
something and that is the end of it. But if this is the
nature of my remembrance of myself, then remembrance cannot,
without begging the question, be used as evidence for the
existence of the self. Far from providing evidence for a
strictly identical self, it already assumes such a thing.
A second problem with Reid's argument is that even if we
waive these difficulties and accept that I do in fact have a
veridical memory of myself having a conversation twenty years
ago, it in no way follows that I must have existed from then
till now. For it is possible that after my conversation I
ceased to exist for twenty years, and only now have started to
exist again. Indeed, I may be something whose very nature is
to slip in and out of existence at various times.
Reid's reply here is that the concept of identity
presupposes an uninterrupted continuance of existence. To
allow otherwise, says Reid, would be to suppose that something
could exist after it has ceased to exist, and also that
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something could exist before it came into existence, which are
"manifest contradictions'. I do not feel Reid is being fair
here. It is certainly true that once something has ceased to
exist forever. it cannot start to exist again. But I see
nothing in the notion of ceasing to exist that implies that the
cessation must be forever. If such an implication was carried
in the notion of ceasing to exist, then it would be a
contradiction of terms to say that something has ceased to
exist for twenty years. I do not see that it is a
contradiction. Indeed, I can clearly imagine a state of
affairs in which someone suddenly vanishes from the face of the
Earth only to reappear sometime later with no awareness of what
transpired in the interm. For us to approach such a person and
assure him that because of his one-time cessation of existence
he can no longer be the same person, seems little more than a
metaphysical prejudice. Likewise, to take the other route and
assume that because he is the same person he must have somehow
existed during his absence, is equally unfounded.
Despite the failure of Butler and Reid, there are
nevertheless some philosophers who uphold the idea of strict
personal identity. One such philosopher is John McTaggart.(7)
Although McTaggart has similar views to Butler and Reid on
personal identity, his argument for his position is quite
different. Borrowing Russell's distinction between knowledge
by acquaintance and knowledge by description, McTaggart argues
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that because I can judge that I am aware of certain things, and
because I can know the meaning of judgements containing the
word I, I must know I. And because I cannot be known by
description it must be known by acquaintance, that is, I must
be directly aware of it. McTaggart's reason for thinking I
cannot be known by description is simply that no matter how
extensively I describe any fact about myself I am never
entitled to conclude that the description refers to me. For if
I do not know myself by acquaintance, the only thing I can know
about the person who makes the judgement is just 'the person
who makes the judgement', I can never know that the person who
makes the judgement is me.
This is an interesting argument and it appears to arrive
at the same conclusion as Butler and Reid while avoiding their
difficulties. Nevertheless, the argument is still confused. The
first thing to notice is that there are at least two
interpretations of the conclusion. In concluding that I must
know I by direct awareness, does McTaggart mean I must at every
moment of awareness be aware of I, or does he mean only that at
least sometimes I am directly aware of I? If he means the
former, then he is standing on dubious ground; for there are
many instances of awareness which do not contain the awareness
of I. Take, for example, my awareness in the activity of
reading. It is often the case in reading that one is engrossed
enough in the story to be quite unaware of oneself. And reading
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is hardly an exceptional case. Other activities, such as day¬
dreaming, playing chess, and making love, all provide instances
in which one can go on being thoroughly unaware of oneself. If,
on the other hand, McTaggart means only that I am at least
sometimes aware of I, then he has allowed that self-awareness
is not a necessary component of awareness. But now there arises
the question of what it is that entitles me to say an
experience, which does not involve a direct awareness of I,
belongs to me. I cannot know by description that such an
experience is mine: for as McTaggart has shown, no matter how
extensively I describe the experience, I will never be able to
conclude that it is mine. And yet I cannot know by direct
acquaintance that it is mine; for the experience in question
involves no direct acquaintance with I. McTaggart could always
reply that none of this affects his argument because he is only
referring to those moments of awareness in which I do judge
that I am aware. However, from the fact that one need not be
aware of oneself in order to be aware, I shall eventually be
drawing some far-reaching conclusions. I shall, for example,
argue that the self, not being a necessary element in
experience, is something which experience itself has
fabricated. This fabricated self therefore has no actual
identity and is merely a collation of transient images. It
seems that McTaggart himself is cognizant of the possibility of
the self being a fabrication. This is intimated at the outset
of his argument where he says that the establishment of our
- 43 -
perception of the self would not alone prove selves exist, but
only that something was perceived as being a self. This is,
however, to anticipate. For now we will continue in our
appraisal of McTaggart's argument.
The error that has been exposed in McTaggart's reasoning
is one which is easy to overlook. This is because the way the
argument is presented makes it seem as though the fundamental
issue is whether we know the self by acquaintance or by
description, and not whether we know the self at all. And so
McTaggart spends page after page showing why the self cannot be
known by description, but only a line or two in arguing that
the self is known in the first place. This is, I think, merely
symptomatic of depth of McTaggart's belief in of personal
identity. When one is under the spell of such a conviction, the
possibility of the non-existence of the self is barely
raised. Even McTaggart's commentators do not seem to have
noticed this shortcoming. Thus Geoffrey Madell, a recent
exponent of the non-reductive view, says of McTaggart's
argument, 'To put it another way, since no description of any
body or experience can entail, or otherwise support the claim,
that it is mine, the property of being mine is
unanalysable'.(8) Clearly, there is an important premise
missing here. For this argument can only go through if we
assume there i_s a property of being mine: the claim that no
description of any body or experience can demonstrate that what
- 44 -
is being described is mine is perfectly compatible with the
view that there is no self, i.e. there is no property of being
mine. Indeed, it is just what one should expect in a world
where selves do not exist.
A more general complaint that can be lodged against
McTaggart is that although he is hoping to establish an
empirical conclusion, i.e. that we are directly aware of the
self, his method of reasoning is a priori. Thus, rather than
turning to experience itself to see if and how we know I,
McTaggart argues that we must know I because we know the
meanings of certain judgements, and further that because we
cannot know I in one way we must know it in another. This
sort of a priori arguing about what experience must be like
seems somewhat dubious to say the least. If we were directly
aware of I, it seems hardly likely that we would need to
deduce this awareness from some purported fact about our
knowledge of meanings. One wonders why McTaggart does not
simply direct our attention to this perception of the self
which he claims we all have. If such an awareness did exist
then plainly there would be no difficulty in us knowing
immediately what McTaggart was referring to and acknowledging
his point. And yet what we find is McTaggart trying to
convince us of a direct awareness by an indirect argument. If
we remind ourselves here of Hume's attending to his own
experience only to discover the complete lack of anything that
could be dubbed the self, then it becomes all the more
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understandable that McTaggart does not appeal to experience to
establish his conclusion. And yet his failure to do so can only
raise our suspicions. For the final test of whether or not I
am directly aware of my self will always be an examination of
my own awareness, and if such an examination turns up negative,
then no amount of a priori arguing will prove otherwise.
There have, however, been recent attempts to argue for a
persisting self by referring directly to awareness. Thus to
the question of how we acquire the concept of a self, Roderick
Chisholm answers that we acquire it in the same way we acquire
the concept of sadness: by having it. This is because both
sadness and being a self are 'self-presenting properties'. A
self-presenting property, we are told, is one which is such
that, 'if while having it, you consider your having it, then
you will believe yourself to have it'.(9) But this only
explains how once having a self we come to believe we have it,
namely by considering it. It says nothing about the self
itself or how we have it (which is why, of course, Chisholm
underlines 'consider' and 'believe', but not 'having').
Chisholm seems to think he can tighten-up his case for the
existence of the self by establishing a relationship between
self-presentation and certainty. He does this by asserting
that if certainty is the 'highest degree of epistemic
justification', then a person's self-presenting properties are
objects of certainty for that person. But this amounts to
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little more than a needlessly verbose way of saying a person is
certain of his self (which is, unhelpfully, a mere repeat of
Butler's assurance). And so we are back at the beginning. For
even though I now know I am supposed to have the highest degree
of epistemic justification of my self-presenting property of
having a self, I still do not know what this self is, what the
nature of my having it amounts to, or where it exists in my
awareness.
From here Chisholm moves on to the problem of the unity of
consciousness. Many philosophers have thought that the unity of
consciousness is something beyond dispute. Thus the problem was
seen to be how consiousness, with all its perceptions,
thoughts, and feelings, is unified. But even to try to answer
this question is already to cast one's vote in favour of the
unity of consciousness. Chisholm is an example of someone who
does not seriously question the doctrine of the unity of
consciousness. In response to the question 'Is it possible that
what I call my experience has several subjects?' (i.e., one
subject who hears, one who sees, and so on), Chisholm quotes
with approval a passage from Brentano - a passage which makes
the bare assertion that when a person is aware of seeing and
aware of hearing, he is also aware that he is doing both at the
same time, and then goes on to conclude that the two
perceptions 'must belong to the same real unity.' Chisholm then
asks if we could settle for less. Could it be, for example,
that a person who is aware that he sees something and aware
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that he hears something, is aware of his seeing and hearing as
being "parts of the same consciousness' or perhaps as being
'compresent in consciousness"? Chisholm's defense here is
merely 'I think not. What could it mean to say they are 'parts
of the same consciousness' or 'co-present in consciousness,
other than that the same person is aware of both?'(10)
It should be clear that this is not acceptable as an
argument. All Chisholm has done is to quote the assertion that
consciousness must be a unity, and then make the unsupported
claim that to describe two perceptions of a person's
consciousness as being 'parts of the same consciousness' or 'co-
present in consciousness' could mean nothing other than 'the
same person is aware of both'. In all of this Chisholm has left
untouched the most basic contention: Is consciousness a unity?
Lest it be thought that Chisholm's remarks do constitute a
viable argument for the unity of consciousness, it is perhaps
worthwhile to point out some confusions they contain. We can
start by examining Brentano's assertion that when a person is
aware of seeing and aware of hearing, he is also aware that he
is doing both at the same time. The apparent reasonableness of
this claim dissolves as soon as we turn to specific instances
of awareness.
Now although Brentano is referring to perceptions of a
second order, that is, awareness of seeing and awareness of
hearing, rather than simply seeing and hearing, it will
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nevertheless be useful for us to start by examining perceptions
of the latter sort. Let us say I am sitting at the beach
watching the waves break on the shore. It is true that I am
seeing the waves, and it is true that I am hearing them. I am
not, however, performing any complex cognitive activity. I am
not, for instance, trying to be aware of my observing the
waves. It is therefore false that in seeing and hearing the
waves I am aware that I am both seeing and hearing at the same
time. To be so aware I would have to make the conscious move to
enter a reflective state of awareness: I would have to start
being aware of my process of observing the waves. To make this
point in another way, let us consider a pigeon who is also
aware of seeing the waves, and aware of hearing them. Because
this animal lacks the ability to enter reflective states of
awareness, it would be wrong to maintain that it is or could be
aware that it is both seeing and hearing the waves at the same
time. 8ut now let us say I suddenly become aware of seeing the
waves and aware of hearing them. According to Brentano, I must
now be aware that both these perceptions are being had by the
same person. But how is it the the notion of 'the same person',
or of any person for that matter, suddenly sneaks in here? All
that has changed is now I am aware of seeing and aware of
hearing rather than merely seeing and hearing. In order for me
to be aware that it is me who is both aware of seeing and
»
hearing, I must first have an awareness that there is a me,
that is, a self who is doing both the seeing and hearing. But I
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have no such awareness. And Brentano, at least in the passage
upon which Chisholm relies, has no argument to offer in favour
of this awareness. Rather, it is quite clear that the existence
of self-awareness, and so of a self, is assumed throughout.
It is pertinent to note that even if the awareness of
different perceptions somehow guaranteed the awareness that it
was the same person who was having these perceptions, we would
still be faced with those acts of perception (which are by far
the vast majority) which are not themselves objects of
awareness. What is there to unify consciousness here? One could
always reply that it is the possibility of becoming aware of
the different acts of perception that bestows a unity on
consciousness. 8ut this would not do for various reasons.
First, it implies that where such a possiblity is absent, so is
the unity of consciousness. By this rule, then, pigeons, dogs,
and horses - any creatures who do not have the ability to
reflect on their own states of awareness - all fail to pass the
test. But this should arouse our suspicions. For if a dog has
no unity of consciousness, it certainly does not suffer from
its handicap. It sees, hears, and goes about its life quite
happily. It even performs complex goal-directed behaviours
which depend on, among other things, the ability to both see
and hear at the same time. Of course it cannot discuss the
question of its own identity, but I doubt this can be blamed on
a disunified consciousness.
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Secondly, we are bound to ask 'What is it that determines
whether or not it is possible for an act of awareness to become
an object for my awareness?'. For the reply now under
examination is plainly dependent on the tacit supposition that
only certain acts of awareness - namely, those which are called
mine - could ever become objects of my own awareness. But why
could not those acts of awareness which are called yours become
objects of my awareness? Why could I not suddenly start
perceiving your perceptions? To say that they would then be
mine is unhelpful because it makes the issue of what is mine
and what is yours into a logical point: any perception of which
I am aware is, by definition, mine. In doing so, the claim that
'it is the possibility of my becoming aware of different acts
of perception that makes them mine' becomes a mere stipulation
about how the word 'mine' is to be used, and not, as it ought
to be, a statement about the nature of the unity of
consciousness.
There is yet a further confusion in this reply, a
confusion which takes us straight to the heart of what is wrong
with the doctrine of the unity of consciousness. The problem
here arises from the illegitimate appearance of the word 'my'.
I cannot say that what makes my perceptions unified in
consciousness is the possibility of my becoming aware of them,
without having severely begged the question. For by calling
them mine I have already taken the liberty of assuming them to
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be unified in consciousness. This is why Kant's theory of the
original synthetic unity of apperception must ultimately fail.
If we turn to the section of this title in The Critique of
Pure Reason, we find Kant saying 'It must be possible for the
'I think" to accompany all my representations; for otherwise
something would be represented in me which could not be thought
at all, and that is equivalent to saying would be impossible,
or at least would be nothing to me'.(11) The problem here is
that even if it were not possible for the 'I think' to
accompany all my representations, they would still be something
to me as they would still be, as Kant himself calls them, my
representations. To make this point another way, if it is the
possibility of the 'I think' accompanying all my
representations which makes them mine, then "my
representations' just means 'those representations which it is
possible for the 'I think' to accompany'. Kant's claim is then
reduced to 'It must be possible for the 'I think" to accompany
all those representations which it is possible for the ' I
think' to accompany', which is manifestly, but uselessly, true.
It is tempting to think that this problem could be readily
solved by removing the word 'my', which Kant has, inadvertantly
no doubt, slipped into his proposition. But no sooner has this
alteration been made than we see the futility in such a tactic.
For in omitting to mention that the representations being
referred to are all my. representations, the proposition now
refers to all representations indiscriminately and so fails to
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provide a criterion for singling out, or, as we may also say,
unifying, one consciousness amongst others.
In addition to this internal confusion there are also
other considerations, such as the possibility of the splitting
of consciousness and certain mental 'disorders', which bar our
acceptance of the doctrine of the unity of consciousness.
However, so as not to lead us astray from our present purposes,
their examination will be postponed for later chapters.
We can now return to Chisholm's defense of 8rentano.
Chisholm's reason for accepting Brentano's thesis is that the
attempt to describe the different perceptions of consciousness
as being, say, 'parts of' or 'co-present in' consciousness,
must fail because such descriptions can only mean that it is
the same person who is aware of the different perceptions.
However, if one takes a moment to examine the descriptions in
question, it will readily be seen that they do not have the
same meaning. The description 'these two perceptions are parts
of the same consciousness' does not mean 'the same person is
aware of both' simply because 'consciousness' and 'person' do
not mean the same thing. Consciousness may be an aspect of
persons, but not all things that have consciousness are
persons. Pigeons have consciousness, but are not persons.
Further, this cannot be remedied by inserting 'human' in
front of 'consciousness'. For it is allowed that persons may
lack consciousness, such as when they are deeply asleep or in a
• ■*
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coma. But it does seem strange, if not contradictory, to say
that consciousness, even human consciousness, may lack
consciousness. One way for Chisholm to escape this difficulty,
it might seem, would be to exchange the term 'person' in 'the
same person is aware of both" for the term 'consciousness'. His
claim would then run: the awareness of seeing and the awareness
of hearing are 'parts of the same consciousness' or 'co-present
in consciousness' means the same as 'the same consciousness is
aware of both'. Although this gets round the difficulty of the
person/consciousness distinction, the identity of meaning
Chisholm desires would still not be achieved. If I am aware of
seeing at the same time that you are aware of hearing, then my
awareness of seeing and your awareness of hearing are co-
present. And, since both my awareness of seeing and your
awareness of hearing take place in consciousness, it may
rightly be said that both our instances of awareness are 'co-
present in consciousness'; which is not at all to say that 'the
same consciousness is aware of both'. This problem does not
occur with the first phrase suggested by Chisholm, i.e. 'parts
of the same consciousness', because here he has mindfully
inserted 'the same' before 'consciousness'. If he had done
likewise with the second phrase and had said 'co-present in the
same consciousness', then the charge we are now considering
could not be brought against him. Unfortunately, however, had
Chisholm said 'co-present in the same consciousness', he
would have exposed himself to a further charge, one which he
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already must face for having used "the same' in 'parts of the
same consciousness'. This is the charge of circularity. For in
saying that what is co- present in consciousness is co-present
in the same consciousness, or that the parts of consciousness
are parts of the same consciousness, Chisholm has already
begged the question in favour of the unity of consciousness,
i.e. he has allowed that there is such a thing as a
consciousness which, being the same, has a unity. With this we
can now see that Chisholm's purported lesser claims are not
lesser claims at all. Of course, the words "parts of' and 'co-
present in' have the appearance of describing a disunity, but
once it is granted that they are describing things which are of
or in one (i.e. the same) consciousness, then, because
consciousness is awareness, it immediately follows that the
same consciousness is aware of both.
• <
Luckily, the discussion does not stop here but moves on to
the nature of self-consciousness. According to Chisholm, there
is a sense of self-consciousness which means simply attributing
a property to oneself, or self-presentation. But the further
and supposedly more important sense, is where one must 'know
and believe that he, himself, is the one to whom he attributes
such properties'; he must recognize these attributes 'as. his
own'.(12) This later form of self-consciousness, says
Chisholm, is often referred to in literature as the discovery
of 'I am me'. As an example of this discovery he then quotes
the following passage from the German romantic Jean Paul
Richter:
I shall never forget what I have never revealed
to anyone, the phenomenon which accompanied the birth
of my consciousness of self rSelbstbewusstsein] and
of which I can specify both the place and time. One
morning, as a very young child, I was standing in
front of our door and was looking over to the wood
pile on the left, when suddenly the inner vision 'I
am a me' [Ich bin ein Ich] shot down before me like
a flash of lightning from the sky, and ever since it
has remained with me luminously: at that moment my
ego [X] had seen itself for the first time, and for
ever. One can hardly conceive of deceptions of
memory in this case, since no one else's reporting
could mix additions with such an occurrence, which
happened merely in the curtained holy of holies of
man and whose novelty alone had lent permanence to
such everyday concomitants.(13)
This discovery, says Chisholm, is the discovery that is
made when one first realizes that all of one's properties
belong to the same thing; that is, when one becomes aware of
the unity of consciousness. How does one realize this?
Chisholm answers that one only has to consider it to see it is
true.
Yet the passage in question is hardly a mere account of
someone's recognition that all his attributes are his own.
This is clear from Richter's lack of reference to anything
about attributes belonging to a self. Secondly, the episode is
described as something which was never revealed, a sudden inner
vision of 'I am an I' (14) which 'shot down before me like a
flash of lightning from the sky', something which happened in
the 'curtained holy of holies of man'. There is plainly
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something of a mystical experience going on here, something
which Chisholm chooses to ignore. Thirdly, Chisholm says that
one comes to see one's own unity of consciousness by simply
considering it. But there is nothing in the passage which
suggests that the young Richter is considering the unity of
consciousness at the moment of his vision; rather, he is simply
standing in front of his door looking at a pile of wood. We may
safely conclude therefore that Richter's childhood experience
is not, as Chisholm would have it, an instance of someone
recognizing all his properties as his own.
This, however, is not the end of the theory of strict
personal identity; for returning to the work of Madell we find
that there are other arguments to come. According to this
philosopher the case for a strict and unanalyzable account of
the self is powerfully supported by an investigation of the
imagination. He argues that since I can imagine a world in
which I possess totally different objective features than I now
have, and since I can imagine a world in which, rather than
myself existing, someone exactly similar to me exists instead,
my identity cannot be analyzed in terms of any objective
features of my existence, and therefore my identity must be
strict and unanalyzable.
Remarkably enough, the considerations which Madell here
adduces in support of his theory are the same ones used by
Bernard Williams to demonstrate the incoherence of that theory.
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In his 'Imagination and the Self'(15), Williams draws our
attention to the thought that 'I might have been somebody
else'. Now although this thought may intuitively seem to make
sense, once it is examined some important difficulties emerge.
If we turn, for instance, to the idea that I might have been
Napoleon, what we are imagining, says Williams, is that there
could have been a world exactly like this one except that I
would have been Napoleon. But in order to imagine that I could
have been Napoleon, I cannot imagine that I, with all my
properties and characteristics, could have been Napoleon; for
to be Napoleon I must have all his properties and
characteristics. Therefore the I of this imaginative exercise
can only be some sort of 'attenuated' or propertyless self
which I imagine to exist in the place of Napoleon's self. The
problem here, says Williams, is that there would then be no
real difference between this imagined world and the present
one. The imagined Napoleon endued with my self would be exactly
the same as the actual Napoleon.
Madell's reply to this is that, contrary to Williams,
there is in fact a difference between the two worlds; for 'in
the real world I possess a certain set of properties, while in
the imagined world I possess quite a different set". (16)
Madell admits that this reply would be unacceptable if the
notion of a propertyless Cartesian self did not make sense.
But, he is quick to add, Williams has not demonstrated this.
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Rather, in arguing from there being no real difference between
the imagined and the actual world to the incoherence of a
propertyless self, Williams has begged the question. That is,
Madell would say, in asserting there to be no real difference
between the two worlds, Williams has already assumed the
impossibility of there being a propertyless self.
I do not think this is a correct assessment of the
argument. For Williams has surely given us good reason to
dismiss the notion of a propertyless I; namely that when I try
to imagine myself being Napoleon, I am confronted with the
discovery that there is nothing I can bring to this imaginary
world that would be distinguishable from what is already there.
There is no question begging here. Madell's remonstration that
there is an intelligible difference between the two worlds;
that in one world I would have one set of characteristics,
while in the other world I would have another, is most
unilluminating. For what we want to know is just what this
difference amounts to. Madell's assertion does not explain the
difference, rather it is something which needs to be explained.
A further problem with Madell's argument is that, like his
restatement of McTaggart's position, it also ignores the
fundamental question: it assumes that I know what it is like to
have a self in the first place. How could I possibly imagine
myself as possessing a variety of different features if I do
not already know or have some idea of my self? Similarly, to
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be able to imagine a world in which rather than myself
existing, someone very much like me exists, is to already be
employing the concept of selves. I must have some awareness of
my self before I can start to imagine that self in various
circumstances. To this Madell might reply that the fact that I
can imagine myself in different possible worlds demonstrates
that I do have an awareness of my self. My rejoinder here is
simply that if you cannot show that we have an awareness of the
self in the present world - as the failure of both McTaggart's
and Chisholm's arguments demonstrates - turning to the
imagination will be of little avail. I admit quite happily that
it is possible to imagine a world very different from this
one. I can imagine, for instance, the existence of thoughts,
feelings, and actions which do not now exist. And, equally, I
can imagine the existence of thoughts, feelings, and actions
which are very similar to those that now exist, and, further, I
can imagine them existing instead of those which exist now.
But as Madell would no doubt agree, this hardly supports the
strict theory of personal identity. And yet, I fear, this is
all the imagination can show us.
Another reason for holding that personal identity is
unanalyzable is, according to Madell, because only on such an
account can we make sense of our concern for our future
selves. If we try to see personal identity as being composed
of, say, memory or psychological continuity, then we shall be
at a loss to explain why we should care about our future selves
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in the way we do. This is of course just Butler's allegation
against Locke, an allegation we have shown to be without
substance. Madell, however, seems to think a case can be made
for the strict theory of personal identity by turning to the
example of the fear of future pain. If I fear that I shall
suffer future pain, says Madell, what I fear is not that a
person with a certain psychological continuity will undergo
pain, but simply that the person suffering will be me. Madell
can see no reason why he ought to particularly care about the
fact that the one who is to be suffering will be the one with
just these memories and interests. To the response that I ought
to care simply because to have these memories and interests is
just to be me, Madell replies that he is left with the feeling
that no explanation has been offered.
There are some problems with this argument. First, It is
plainly false that the only way the fear of future pain can be
made sense of is by appealing to the strict theory of personal
identity. There is a multitude of other accounts, e.g.
socialization, conditioning, modelling, and so on, which can,
without making any reference to the strict theory of personal
identity, also explain this fear. Pigeons obviously fear future
pain, and will go into quite a panic if it is apparent that
they are to undergo pain. Madell would not, presumably, feel
the need to invoke the strict theory of personal (or even
pigeonal) identity here.
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Secondly, the premise of this argument in no way supports
the conclusion. I readily agree with Madell that there is
nothing in a person's having thus and so psychological
continuity that implies I should have a particular concern
about the pain that person will have. The reason I agree,
however, is because there is nothing in anything that implies I
should fear pain other than in pain itself. This is because
pain is an intrinsic evil. To say that what particularly
disturbs me about future pain is that it will be mine, is to
try to explain the the evilness of pain extrinsically. It is to
think that the evilness of pain resides not in the pain itself,
but rather in the fact that it is me who will be having it. One
reply that Madell might be tempted to make to this is that
the notion of a pain which does not belong to anyone does not
make sense, and therefore that pain is an intrinsic evil only
when it is had by someone. But he could only make this reply by
overlooking what we established in our critique of McTaggart,
namely, that the awareness of I is not a necessary element in
awareness, and, consequently, that experiences do exist which
are not had by an I. Pain, especially extreme pain, is, I
think, a good example of a state of awareness which does not
involve the awareness that it is I who am having the pain. What
one experiences in extreme pain is its sheer terribleness. In
such a state the various aspects of one's mental life are wiped
away and there is nothing in one's awareness*save the pure
agony of the moment. In the instance of extreme pain there is
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no room for the reflective and complicated awareness that it is
this I to whom the pain belongs. This view that pain (or any
experience for that matter) does not belong to anyone is one
which was recognized by Buddhist philosophers hundreds of years
ago. Thus in the Visuddhimagga Sutra we encounter the line
'Suffering alone exists, none who suffer". (17)
We have now come to the end of our examination of the strict
non-reductive theory of personal identity, a theory which, in light
of the above considerations, we must reject. This does not allow us,
however, to dispense with the notion of personal identity all
together; for it is still possible that an account of personal
identity can be formulated in terms of some non-strict criterion,
such as psychological or bodily continuity. It is to these
reductive theories that we shall now turn.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
In the last chapter we had occasion to touch on one version of
reductionism; namely, the memory theory of personal identity as
propounded by Locke. There we were able to show that Butler's
charge of circularity was without foundation. Once we are free
from this ill-starred criticism we find that the memory theory
makes some definite advances on the strict theory of identity.
A major feature of the memory theory, for example, is
because it defines the self in terms of memory it immediately
disposes of the problem encountered throughout the last
chapter; that is, the problem of locating the self within
experience. For according to this theory it is experience
which is located in the self, not the other way around. In
other words, the self is something whicfi is constructed out of
experience. Consequently, looking for the self within
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experience would be like looking for the gaggle within the
goose.
A corollary of this is that we also elude Reid's problem
of having to explain how I can remember that a certain action
was done by me without referring to any particular experience.
This is an intractable assignment for Reid because, as we have
seen, there is nothing to remember but some experience or
other. On the memory theory, however, it is just the ability
to correctly remember an action that makes me able to remember
it was done by me.
Although we may applaud these advances of the memory
theory, there are nevertheless some serious difficulties which
require examination. Before we look into these, let us return
to Locke to get a fuller picture of what this theory involves.
Locke starts his account by distinguishing three different
types of identity. These are the identities of substances,
biological organisms, and persons. He points out that the
notion of identity must be suited to the thing to which it is
intended to apply. Thus what counts as identity with regard to
substances will differ from the sort of identity that applies
to biological organisms, and also from the identity that
applies to persons. Consequently, Locke would reject Butler's
claim that because the particles of a tree are continuously
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For while, in the case of material substance, identity
depends on the unalterable persistence of particles of matter,
in the case of plants it will depend on 'the organization of
parts in one coherent body" which "continues to be the same
plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life
be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to
the living plant'.(1)
It is this same organized parts of a living body that
defines the identity of the human organism. Both this
'identity of man", as Locke calls it, and the identity of the
soul (i.e. finite immaterial substance) should be carefully
distinguished from the identity of the person. Because every
soul began to exist at a particular time and place, the
identity of the soul will be determined by its continued
relation to that time and place. The identity of a person,
however, is to be decided differently. For a person, according
to Locke, "is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking thing, in different times and places'(p.39). The word
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'thinking" is for Locke a generic term referring to such mental
functions as perception, sensation, cognition, and volition;
all of which, it is claimed, are inseparable from
consciousness. Since consciousness is the single connecting
thread which runs throughout our mental life, it is in
consciousness alone that our personal identity is to be found.
Consequently 'as far as this consciousness can be extended
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the
identity of that person' (p.39).
Although it is sometimes unclear exactly what Locke means
by 'consciousness', when he is discussing personal identity
over time, as in the above quotation, it seems evident that he
is equating the term with memory.For consciousness extended
backwards to a past thought is just my memory of a past
thought. He also speaks of consciousness as being an awareness
of present experiences, e.g. pleasure and pain. In these
instances the term 'consciousness' does not refer directly to
memory but rather to the experiences which will, should their
occurrence be recalled sometime in the future, become
memories. Locke concludes, therefore, that it is by this
consciousness, or memory, that 'everyone is to himself that
which he calls self; it not being considered, in this case,
whether the same self be continued in the same or divers
substances' (p.39).
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That the identity of a substantival soul has nothing to do
with one's personal identity can be seen to follow from Locke's
contention that substance is 'void of consciousness'. It is
true that Locke does sometimes speak of 'thinking substances'
or of a substance as being that which "thinks in" the person,
but his general position makes it clear that thinking itself is
not a substance, and that substance is only meant to function
as some sort of metaphysical basis for thinking. And if this
is the nature of substance, says Locke, then there is no
apparent absurdity in the suggestion that the substance which
supports my consciousness is in fact the same substance which
at sometime in the past supported the consciousness of some
other person. This however would be of no consequence to me as
a person. What is of consequence to me as a person is just my
consciousness and memories. And consciousness and memories are
indifferent to the particular substance which sdpfcorts them.
Thus my being informed with the substance of another person
would no more make me that person than would my having some
particles of that person's body in mine.
The reason why personal identity and the identity of man
are not to be confused is given in Locke's imagined case in
which the soul of a prince, bringing with it the memories of
the prince's past life, transmigrates into the freshly de-
souled body of a cobbler. In such a case, says Locke, it is
clear that the resulting person would be the prince, and so be
accountable for the prince's past actions. The resulting man,
however, would still be the cobbler.
Despite Locke's construction of the example, it should be
clear that the transmigration of the prince's soul - which is
said to bring his consciousness with it - is irrelevant for the
person of the prince to appear in the cobbler's body. For as
we have just seen, it is consciousness alone and not
consciousness plus the soul that makes the person. Locke's
introduction of the soul into his story is possibly the result
of a tendency to believe that if transmigration is possible, it
could not be consciousness alone that transmigrates; that is,
it could not be the prince's consciousness which enters the
cobbler's soul and body. Nevertheless, as we have seen, for
Locke there is no necessary connection between a particular
soul and the consciousness it supports. He therefore could
have just as easily supposed that it is the prince's
consciousness which transfers to the (unconscious) soul and
body of the cobbler. The resulting person would still, for
Locke, be the prince.
One of the most popular objections to this account of
personal identity is that people forget things. Thus if memory
is the sole criterion of personal identity through time, and I
forget the experiences of a certain part of my life, then it
follows that I am not the same person who once had those now
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forgotten experiences. And yet it may seem plain that this I of
today is the same I who had those earlier experiences whether
or not I remember them. Unbeknownst to many critics of the
memory theory, Locke is quite aware of this objection and,
accordingly, gives a reply. One must stop to notice, says
Locke, what it is that the term "I" here denotes. For in this
instance 'I' denotes the man and not the person. And so far as
the organization of my biology has continued from three years
ago till today, then I am the same man three years ago as I am
today even if I have forgotten what transpired back then. But,
Locke persists, if I have forgotten the events of three years
ago, I am no longer the same person.
Why then, one might ask, do we not allow the plea of
amnesia to exculpate someone from his crimes? For the inebriate
or somnambulist who cannot later, when sober or awake, remember
his actions is nevertheless still held responsible for them.
Locke's answer is that our holding someone thus responsible is
strictly a pragmatic affair. For although it can be shown that
someone has performed a certain act, it is not so easy to
determine whether a claim to not remember performing the act is
genuine or mere pretence. Although Locke concludes it is
therefore just to punish amnesiac offenders, he nevertheless
feels that, 'in the great day, wherein the secrets of all
hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no
one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing
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of"(p.48).
We see therefore that the point made by this objection,
i.e. that a person cannot have a persisting identity through
lapses of memory, rather than posing a problem for Locke, is a
welcome corollary of the memory theory.
A natural reaction here is to claim that if the memory
theory leads to such conclusions, then it is not an adequate
account of personal identity. For we do seem to allow that
persons forget things and yet maintain their identity. There
are at least two things that could be said to this. First, I
am not convinced that we do allow this in every case. In
situations in which someone has total or near total amnesia,
i.e. forgetting one's past, not recognizing one's husband or
parents, and so on; especially where the condition seems
irreparable, I think many people would agree that the person
after the memory loss is numerically a different person than
the one before. And if it is allowed that there is a critical
amount of memory loss that carries with it a loss of personal
identity, then it is allowed that memory plays some form of
constitutional role in personal identity. Of course, there are
others who would refuse to acknowledge a change of identity,
whatever the extent of memory loss. If I am right about the
discrepancy of agreement here, then this too would offer
support for my point made earlier; that there is no unified
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common sense view about the nature of personal identity.
Secondly, even if there were a general consensus that
personal identity continued despite the loss of memory, it is
not clear what this would show. It is true that some would view
such a common agreement as an argument against the memory
theory, but by the same rule we should allow the popular
belief in life after death as an argument against mortality. It
seems wiser, therefore, to not put too much stake in
conclusions drawn from any putative consensus of belief.
There is however a place where Locke's theory does come
upon some obstacles. And the root of this problem, as we shall
see, lies simply with his failure to make clear the
complexities of the theory and follow through their
implications. The objection with which we are concerned was
first proposed by Berkeley in Alciohon(2). and later
refashioned by Reid into the following example. Suppose, say3
Reid, that a brave officer who once captured an enemy standard,
was both flogged as a school boy for raiding an orchard, and in
later life made a general. Further, suppose that while the
general remembers capturing the standard as an officer, and
while the officer remembers being flogged as a boy, the general
has absolutely no recollections of the youthful flogging. On
Locke's theory, says Reid, the brave officer is identical with
the boy who raided the orchard, and the general is identical
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with the brave officer who captured the standard. Whereby it
should follow, by the law of transitivity, that the general is
identical with the boy who raided the orchard. 8ut as the
general has no recollection of the boy's orchard escapade and
subsequent flogging, he cannot be the same person as the boy.
Therefore, concludes Reid, 'the general is, and at the same
time is not, the same person with him who was flogged at
school'(p.115). And so it seems that Locke's theory is
inconsistent.
One solution to this paradox is proposed by Anthony
Quinton. Although it is Quinton's intention to defend the
memory theory, it should be noted that the account of the
theory which he presents is not strictly Lockean. For Quinton
suggests that it is not memory alone which determines personal
identity, but rather that it is determined by what he more
generally calls mental states, i.e. memory plus character.
This view, which is more broadly called the psychological
theory, is not so much a different theory from the memory
theory as it is an expanded and more thoroughgoing version of
it. For both memories and character traits are the same sort
of thing insofar as they both might be considered somewhat
persistent aspects of an individual's psychology.
Quinton starts by introducing the empirical concept of the
soul. Though the word 'soul' is normally used to refer a
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substantival and therefore non-empirical entity, Quinton uses
it here to refer to a temporal series of related mental states
He seems therefore to be using "soul" in much the same way as
Locke uses the word ' person'. Each moment in the life of a
soul will be made up of what Quinton calls a soul-phase; that
is, 'a set of contemporaneous mental states belonging to the
same momentary consciousness'.(3)
Two soul-phases belong to the same soul if they are
connected by a continuous path of character and memory. This
continuity between different soul-phases can either be direct
or indirect. Two soul-phases are directly continuous if, being
temporally contiguous, the character revealed by the
constituents of the latter is closely similar to the character
revealed by those of the former, and if the latter contains
some memories of elements of the former. Indirect continuity
occurs, however, when two soul-phases are connected through a
series of other soul-phases such that each of these
intermediate soul-phases is directly continuous with the soul-
phase immediately preceding it, and the original soul-phases
constitute the two end-points in the chain.
The way out of the brave officer paradox, therefore, would
be to hold that the general's inability to recall the school
boy's flogging does not permit the conclusion that he is not
identical with the school boy. For although there is no
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recollection of the elements of the school boy's soul-phase
within the soul-phase of the general, both of these soul-phases
are nonetheless connected by the relation of indirect
continuity. In other words, between the soul-phases of the
school boy and the general, there stretches a series of
intermediate soul-phases (one of which is that of the brave
officer) each bearing the relation of direct continuity to the
one immediately preceding it, In this case the school boy and
the general share in the life of the same soul, and so are
identical with one another.
But all this is to no purpose. For quite plainly our
psychology does not work in the way here described. It is not
true that each instance of consciousness necessarily or even
usually contains recollections of elements of the previous
instances. For this to be the case consciousness would have to
be continuously infiltrated by states of memory which would
inevitably hinder it from performing its multitude of other
functions. Of course in those rare instances when we are
engaged in some sustained goal-directed activity which depends
on our being aware of the immediate past, then something like a
relation of indirect continuity between two soul-phases may
occur. Examples of such activities might include solving a
mathematical equation or conducting a search. Fortunately,
however, most of our mental life is not composed of these sorts
of structured activities. And even on those occasions where we
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do engage in them, our engagement never lasts very long, if for
no other reason than we finally fall asleep. It is thus false
that the soul-phase of the school boy and that of the general
are related by Quinton's notion of indirect continuity.
Maybe, however, this is being too pedantic. For the
nature of the memory relation here under review seems to
suggest some form of indirect continuity, even if it is not
exactly of the Quintonian sort.
The difficulty with this manoeuvre is that the memory
relation in the case of both the general and the officer, and
the officer and the boy, differs from Quinton's account in an
important way; for here the relations lack, or at least could
lack, the requirement of the temporal juxtaposition or
continuity. The whole point behind Quinton's appeal to the
idea of indirect continuity is to enable him to discover a
'continuous character and memory path' which can be traced
through a series of temporally contiguous mental states. 8ut
nothing in the brave officer paradox suggests the existence of
temporally contiguous mental states. For all we know the
general may remember nothing else but the taking of the enemy
standard. Furthermore, this may be the only time since the
standard was captured that he has been able to recall the
event. And the same could be said mutatis mutandis for the
officer's recollection of the school boy's escapade. In this
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case it would become pointless to insist on the existence of a
continuous path which ran throughout the general's life. One
might feel, however, that where the relation of memory breaks
down at least there would be a relation of character. But it is
doubtful whether character by itself would be enough to confer
personal identity. For character cannot serve to individuate in
the way that memory can. Terence Penelhum makes this point
succinctly: 'I can have my father's character without being my
father: whereas I cannot have his memories, for to do so would
be to be my father'.U) Character therefore can only be a
supplementary consideration, serving to test or confirm the
ascription of identity where the veridicality of someone's
memories are in question.
Further, even if one could discover such a memory path, it
would still need to be explained just how this establishes a
relationship of personal identity, especially since memory is
supposed to account for the sense of identity. The initial
reason, it seems, why one might be tempted to invoke memory to
explain identity is because memory is a process which ties us
experientially to the past, i.e. it makes us aware of the past.
That the tie is an experiential one is important; for there are
numerous 'ties' to the past - such as digesting yesterday's
food, circulating previously oxygenated blood, conditioned
reflexes, etc. - none of which, in themselves, seem to give us
a sense of identity. But if this is the importance of memory,
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then the construction of a memory path of indirect continuity
is a pointless endeavour. For the ineluctable fact remains that
the general has no remembrance of the school boy's flogging.
And the existence of someone temporally between the two,
someone who remembers one and is remembered by the other, does
not fundamentally alter this problem.
We are thus forced to consider other possible escape
routes from the paradox. One way which naturally suggests
itself here is to accept that because the general has no memory
of the school boy's experience, he is not the same person as
the school boy. This, evidently, is the route Locke would want
to take. And yet the paradox is constructed in such a way to
eliminate this means of escape. For if the school boy is
identical with the officer who is himself identical with the
general, then it follows by transitivity that the school boy
and general are likewise identical.
The interesting thing, however, about this purported
identity between the boy and the general, is that it can only
be deduced because Locke has allowed his theory to resemble the
strict theory of personal identity. To see how this has come
about, let us return to the example mentioned in the last
chapter.
There we cited Locke's assertion that if I who am now
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writing remember both seeing the Thames overflow last winter
and remember seeing Noah's flood, then I who am now writing
must be identical with both the person who saw the Thames
overflow and with the person who witnessed Noah's flood. But
why, we might want to know, is my identity with a person of
thousands of years ago established just because I who am now
writing have a memory of a single experience had by that
person? Certainly the person who witnessed the Biblical flood -
let us call him Shem - also underwent a host of other
experiences during his life; say, the celebration of his tenth
birthday, the first meeting with his wife, or the felling of
cypress trees with which to build the ark. But apparently, so
far as Locke's theory goes, it is not necessary that I remember
all or even most of these experiences. All that is necessary is
that I remember just one of Shem's experiences. This will
suffice to determine my identity with Shem. For, says Locke,
'let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of
Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with Nestor"
(p.44). It seems, therefore, that Locke is expounding a view
which renders personal identity an all or nothing affair, in
other words a strict theory. Either I have a memory of someone
who witnessed Noah's flood or I do not. In the former case I
am identical with that observer of the flood, in the latter I
am not. This means that any memories of Shem's life which I
possess over and above the observation of the flood are
superfluous as far as defining my identity goes - not because
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there is anything particularly definitive about seeing the
flood, but only because all I have to do to be identical with
Shem is to have a memory of one of his experiences.
But why would anyone who thinks that personal identity is
constructed out of memory hold such a view? If it is my
memories that bestow my identify upon me, then it would seem
that the more memories I acquire, the more of an identity I
acquire, and equally, that the more memories I lose, the more
of an identity I lose. Consequently, personal identity,
according to its explanation in terms of memory, is not rightly
considered an all or nothing affair, rather, it is something
which proceeds by a matter of degrees. Thus having merely one
of Shem's memories would not entitle me to claim full identity
with him. But if, on the other hand, I could remember large
sequences of Shem's life, then the identity between him and me
would be of a greater degree.
Locke's failure to see this point - that under the
memory theory , personal identity is not an all or nothing
affair - would seem to be the result of an unintentional
commitment to the notion of an enduring self - the very notion
he is attempting to overcome. For the only way that my having a
single memory from Shem's memory life could render me identical
with Shem, as if memory were taken, as Reid has proposed, as
evidence for personal identity rather than as the stuff of
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which personal identity is made. On this story, if I have a
memory of some earlier person's experience, then I am identical
with that person; not because personal identity is defined in
terms of memory, but just because memory is always memory
belonging to an enduring self; a self which has memories, but
is not itself memories. And if I have the memory of an earlier
self, it can only be because the enduring self which is me is
one and the same with that earlier self. But if we adopt a
view of personal identity which explains the identity of the
self as constructed out of memories, then a memory cannot be
constructed as evidence for a self; at the most it can only be
part of a self. Therefore, if I have a memory of only one of
Shem's experiences, then the most I can hope for is but a very
partial identity with Shem.
We can now see the resolution of the brave officer
paradox. For the officer to be fully identical with the school
boy, he must be able to remember all of the school boy's
experiences. Plainly, however, such a feat will be next to
impossible. Thus although the officer recalls being flogged as
a school boy for raiding the orchard he will not remember all
the vicissitudes of the boy's life. And so his identity with
the school boy will only be a partial identity. The same holds
true for the general's identity with the brave officer. For
although the general remembers capturing the enemy standard, he
will not have a recollection of all the officer's experiences.
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Thus the identity which holds between the old general and the
brave officer must also be a partial identity. But if the
brave officer shares only a partial identity with the school
boy, and the old general shares only as partial identity with
the brave officer, it does not follow that the old general
shares any identity with the school boy. This is because the
relationship of partial identity is non-transitive. This is
evident from the fact that even if A is approximately equal to
8 and B is approximately equal to C, A might still be totally
unequal to C. And once we have pulled the carpet of
transitivity out from under Reid, he has nothing left on which
to erect his paradox. The paradox that the general is and at
the same time is not identical with the person who was flogged
at school, only gets going if we allow that the general is in
fact identical with the person who was flogged at school. 8ut
since the general has no recollection of the school boy's
flogging, his identity with the school boy must be established
by appealing to his identity with the officer, and then by
pointing to the officer's identity with the school boy. That
is, by making an illegitimate appeal to the law of
transitivity.{5)
There is, however, an objection to this method of escape
from the paradox. This is the objection to the notion of
partial personal identity. Reid himself tells us that 'The
identity of a person is a perfect identity, wherever it is
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real, it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a
person should be in part the same, and in part different'
(p.111). Reid's reason for thinking this is his belief in
indivisibility of the person:
A part of a person is a manifest absurdity. When
a man loses his estate, his health, his strength, he
is still the same person, and has lost nothing of his
personality. If he has a leg or an arm cut off, he
is the same person he was before. The amputated
member is not part of his person, otherwise it would
have a right to part of his estate, and be liable for
a part of his engagements. It would be entitled to a
share of his merit and demerit, which is manifestly
absurd. (p.109)
Although it is always good to come across instances of
light humour in the often weighty writings on metaphysics, in
this case it seems that Reid's irony has led him astray. As
far as I can see, Locke's theory nowhere suggests that a person
is composed of his estate, health, strength, or even of his
various limbs. It is true that Locke remarks that in the event
of one's little finger being amputated, were consciousness or
memory to leave the rest of the body and 'go along with" the
little finger, then it would be the little finger that would
maintain the personal identity, not the unconscious body.
Despite this apparent equation of a person with a body-part,
it is evident that what Locke means to say is that as it is
memory alone that bestows personal identity, it matters not
where the memory or personal identity is lodged, be it the body
or the little finger.
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This is analogous to the contention of Locke's described
earlier; namely, that the relationship between a person's
identity and an immaterial soul could only be a contingent one.
The same holds true for the relationship between a person's
identity and the body or body-parts.
So Locke, of course, will agree with Reid that the loss of
such trivial items as one's health or limbs entails nothing
about the loss of one's personal identity. However, were Reid
to have said the same about the loss of one's memory, then
Locke would have a call for remonstration. For the loss of
memory is just the loss of personal identity. The question
that comes to mind then is 'Why does Reid, who is after all
attacking the memory theory, point to the unimportance of
losing one's estate and limbs, but fail to say the same of
memory?'. A possible answer here is that Reid could forsee a
difficulty in persuading his readers were he to openly make
similar claims about the loss of memory. The claim that even
after a person has suffered a complete loss of memory he is
still the same person he was before, does not strike one as
indubitable. It is therefore safer to stick with remarks where
one is on surer ground - remarks about personal identity
persisting through the loss of one's estate and limbs - and
hope that people will think this implies a similar truth about
the loss of memory.
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Maybe the reason why Reid does not produce a serious
argument for his view, is because he thinks the absurdity of
'part of a person' is so manifest that one is not needed. I,
however, see nothing obvious in our notion of a person that
implies there can be no splitting into parts. We do allow, for
instance, that certain individuals lack qualities that are
considered central to the notion of being a person. Thus we
allow that someone who is criminally insane is not responsible
for his actions. Yet responsiblity for one's actions, i.e.
agency, is central to our idea of being a person. It therefore
seems reasonable to say of one who is criminally insane that he
is missing part of what it means to be a person.
Further, it will be recalled that Reid says a person is
not thought, feeling, or action, but rather is something which
thinks, feels and acts. But what, for Reid, is the nature of
the relation between thought, feeling, and action, and the
person who does them? Is it a contingent relation or a
necessary one? If it is a contingent relation, then it should
be possible for there to exist a person who lacks the ability
to think, feel, and act. But what sort of person could this
be? Such a person could have no sense of being a person, and
therefore no conviction of his identity: to do so he would have
to be able to think or at least to feel. Reid would no doubt
be the first to admit the manifest absurdity of such an idea.
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If, on the other hand, it is a necessary relation then the
ability to think, feel, and act become definitive marks of
personhood. That is, it will be essential for anything to be a
person, that it must at least be able to think, feel, and act.
But were Reid to accept this, he could no longer maintain that
a person is not to be identified with his thoughts, feelings,
and action. For by allowing that certain abilities are
essential aspects of a person he has thereby allowed that a
person is not something which can exist apart from those
abilities. A person would therefore consist of at least
thinking, feeling, and, action; all of which would consequently
be parts of a person.
One reply here could be to claim even if a person were not
able to exist without certain abilities, it does not follow
that a person is therefore to be identified with these
abilities even though they are necessary elements of
personhood. But just what sort of necessity would, in this
case, bind a person to the abilities of thinking, feeling, and
action, I cannot begin to imagine. For if a person is something
other than thinking, feeling, and action, then it seems we
should be able to conceive of a person without these abilities.
And if we can form such a conception, then the relation between
a person and these abilities is one of contingency, not
necessity.
- 88 -
Another way that we can arrive at the idea of a partial
person is by noticing that the characteristics of a person are
not themselves an all or nothing affair. Thus when Madell
tells us that a person has no essential qualities except
consciousness, already implicit within this remark is the
notion of a partial person. For consciousness is something
which comes in various degrees. At one end of the spectrum we
have the person who is fully alert, attending completely to the
flow of experience, while at the other we have someone who is
barely awake, bordering perhaps on the edge of a coma. In
between these extremities there stretches a gradient of varying
intensities of consciousness. So if consciousness is an
essential quality of persons, the less of consciousness there
is, the less of a person there is. And if someone gradually
loses consciousness over a period of time, then it follows from
what has been said that at the end of his decline he is only
minimally identical, if that, with the person he was before the
decline.
One might be tempted here to object that no matter how
little consciousness a person has, as long as he still has some
consciousness he is still a person. And, therefore, that
although consciousness may be something which is more or less,
being a person is still something which is all or nothing; for
either one has consciousness or one has not. The difficulty in
sustaining this objection is that it ignores the fact that
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persons are not the only things that are conscious. And
further, that one of the features that is meant to distinguish
persons from other animals, especially the lower animals, is
their degree of consciousness. Thus it seems reasonable to
expect that when a person has lost a specific degree of
consciousness, there would then be little to distinguish the
form his consciousness has taken from certain forms of non-
human animal consciousness. One could take exception to this on
the grounds that human consciousness is of a fundamentally
different sort than is non-human consciousness, but I do
not see any evidence to sustain such an objection. We interact
with animals and have little difficulty discerning their
desires, fears, intentions, and other conscious states. The
reason for this would seem to be that we recognize in them the
same sort of conscious states, and hence the same sort of
consciousness, that we experience in ourselves.
It is worthwhile to note that Reid (in agreement with
Butler) is quite happy to permit the notion of partial identity
with reference to physical objects. The identity, says Reid,
'which we ascribe to bodies, whether natural or artificial, is
not a perfect identity; it is rather something which for
conveniency of speech, we call identity' (p.112). So Reid's
objection is not with the concept of partial identity, that is,
with an imperfect identity which is non-strict and holds only
to a greater or lesser degree. Rather, it is with the
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application of this concept to persons. However, there is no
apparent reason why the idea of partial identity cannot be
applied to persons.
In light of this it does not seem that the brave officer
paradox presents an insurmountable difficulty for the memory
theory. There is, however, another objection to this theory, or
rather to the more expanded psychological theory, and here an
appeal to the concept of partial identity will be of no avail.
This objection is proposed by 8ernard Williams in
'Personal Identity and Individuation'.(5) Williams' attack on
the psychological theory starts with his imagining a situation
in which someone called Charles, wakes up one morning with a
totally different set of character traits and memories from
those he had before going to sleep. Previous to retiring for
the night Charles had been quiet, deferential, church-going,
and home-loving. Now he has suddenly become and continues to
be loud mouthed, blasphemous, and bullying. In addition to
this he can no longer recall any of the life he led before that
fateful night, and now claims to remember witnessing events and
performing acts that are totally at odds with what he earlier
claimed to remember. Upon investigation it turns out that all
of Charles new memory-claims point overwhelmingly to the life
of a particular historical person; namely, Guy Fawkes.
(Presumably, the newly acquired character traits also suggest
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those of Guy Fawkes, though Williams does not say). According
to the psychological theory we would be obliged to conclude
that Charles now has the identity of Guy Fawkes.
But this conclusion, says Williams, is premature. For if
it is possible that Charles should undergo this drastic change
of character and memories, it is equally possible that someone
else - Williams suggests Charles' brother Robert - should
undergo an exactly similar change. But what should we say if
this were to happen? They both cannot be Guy Fawkes, for then
Guy Fawkes would be in two places at one time. Further, if
they were both Guy Fawkes they then would both be identical
with one another. And both these implications, states Williams,
are absurd. One could try to elude this difficulty by saying
that one is Guy Fawkes while the other is exactly like him.
But this move, we are told, would be vacuous because there
would be no way of deciding which one is to be Guy Fawkes and
which one is to be exactly like him. All we could say
therefore would be something like both Charles and Robert have
mysteriously become like Guy Fawkes, or as Williams also puts
it, clairvoyantly knew all about him. And if that is all we
could say about both of them, then it seems that is all we
could say about one of them.
The reason for the psychological theory's inability to
establish an identity between Charles and Guy Fawkes, which
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Williams spells out in his further paper, '8ody Continuity and
Personal Identity',(7) is because identity is a one-one
relation, while the tendency to make sincere memory-claims is a
one-many relation. What Williams is saying here seems to be
this: in deciding whether any object of one particular time T1
is identical with an object of another particular time 12,
whatever criterion is used, it cannot be such that it allows
there to be more than one object at T2 which has the relation
of identity to the object at T1. It is the breach of just this
requirement that is the downfall of the psychological theory.
For although only one person at T2 can be identical with a
particular person at T1, and only one person at T2 can
correctly remember being a particular person at T1, it is
always possible that many persons at T2 can sincerely claim to
remember events which exactly match the life of the person at
T1 .
And this difficulty persists inspite of the fact that, for
the psychological theory, personal identity over time will be a
matter of degree. For it is perfectly possible that Guy
Fawkes, Charles, and Robert all have exactly similar sets of
memories. This, as we have seen, was different in the brave
officer paradox. There the school boy did not have the same
memories as the officer since he had not yet, among other
things, captured an enemy standard. Also, the general did not
have the same memories as the officer since he lacked, at
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least, the memory of stealing fruit as a boy. And it was these
discrepancies which allowed us to argue that the general could
only share a partial identity with the school boy. However, in
Williams' example there is nothing which guarantees any
discrepancies between the memory sets of the three characters.
Even if it turns out that Charles is only partially identical
with Guy Fawkes, i.e. he only possesses some of Fawkes'
memories, this will have no bearing on the possibility of
Charles and Robert having exactly similar memories. If this
much is true, then the psychological theorist will be obliged
to conclude that Charles and Robert are fully identical with
one another. And this would be a reductio ad absurdum of his
position.
What are we to say to this? Certainly we must agree that
identity is a one-one relation, and also that the tendency to
make sincere memory-claims is not. But need we agree that only
one person can correctly remember being a particular person in
the past? This issue is not so easily resolved; for it depends
how we understand the phrase 'remember being a particular
person'. If it is taken to mean 'remember being identical
with a particular person', then because identity is one-one we
will agree with Williams. 8ut if it is to mean that only one
person can 'remember the experiences of a particular earlier
person', i.e. be psychologically continuous with a past person,
then there is good cause to reject Williams' proposal. For
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there is reason to believe that psychological continuity need
not be a one-one relation; that is, that it is logically
possible for two persons, at the same time, to correctly
remember having the same experiences of one earlier person. One
of the reasons for this belief comes from the findings of
research on brain bisection.(8 )
It has been known for a while that the human brain,
partially composed as it is of two near-equivalent cerebral
hemispheres, can be surgically divided with only minor
impairment of its normal functioning. The original purpose for
this sectioning of the brain was to alleviate severe cases of
epilepsy by limiting the cause of the seizure to one half of
the brain. In their normal everyday life patients having
undergone this operation seem to have a full recovery, showing
nothing peculiar or disintegrated in their mental abilities or
behaviour. However, in experimental conditions it proved
possible to isolate the two halves of the bisected brain and so
induce each hemisphere to function independently of, and even
at variance with the other hemisphere. Thus, for example, when
a smell is presented exclusively to the right nostril - which
is connected to the right hemisphere - the split brain patient
will insist verbally (since language is under the domain of the
left hemisphere) that he smells nothing. Nevertheless, his
left hand, which like the right nostril is connected to the
right hemisphere, will at the same time obey the experimenter's
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instructions and pick out the object that is causing the
smell. Thus what we have seems to be two separate streams of
consciousness within the same person.
Not only does this state of affairs undermine the doctrine
of the unity of consciousness (two streams of consciousness are
not a unity), but, as David Wiggins realized, it opens a
Pandora's box for the problem of personal identity.
In his booklet on Identity and Spatio-Temporal
Continuity Wiggins refers to an operation imagined by Sydney
Shoemaker in which the brain of an individual called Brown is
transplanted into the body of someone called Robinson (this of
course is just the Lockean tale of the prince and the cobbler
in modern guise). Although the resulting individual - Shoemaker
calls him Brownson - would have Robinson's body, he would
nonetheless have Brown's personality and memories. Shoemaker
believes this would dispose us to identify Brownson with Brown
and not with Robinson. Shoemaker admits that Brownson would
have part of Brown's body, i.e. his brain, but nevertheless
sees it as an absurdity to equate personal identity with brain
identity.
Wiggins expands on this story and by drawing attention to
the research on brain bisection. Because of this research,
says Wiggins, rather than transplanting Brown's entire brain
- 96 -
into one body, we could easily imagine splitting Brown's brain
and placing the subsequent halves into two separate bodies.
The intelligibility of this suggestion is further enhanced by
the fact that one cerebral hemisphere seems all that is
necessary to carry a person through life. For human beings who
have suffered destruction of one of their hemispheres have been
known to recover without major disturbances to their
personality or mental functions.
It now becomes clear why 'being psychologically continuous
with a past person' need not be a one-one relation. For both
recipients of Brown's cerebral hemispheres will be
psychologically continuous with Brown: both will display his
personality and have his memories. Williams' objection that
two individuals cannot both be identical with an earlier
person, though true, must now lose some of its force. For we
cannot here, in Williamsian fashion, simply banish the memory-
claims of Brown's cerebral inheritors to the realms of
clairvoyance and mystery. For as Wiggins puts it, 'we
understand far too well why they have these memories'.(9)
Still, there is a major difficulty here; for if the two
recipients of Brown's cerebral halves are not identical with
Brown, we are bound to ask what has become of the person who
is identical with Brown. Has he ceased to exist? And if he
has ceased to exist, then it seems odd to say that the two
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persons with his hemispheres in their heads are, in any
important sense, Brown's psychological survivors.
This problem has been explored in some depth by Derek
Parfit.(IO) The work Parfit undertakes in this area, though
largely a bringing together of earlier ideas, is worth detailed
attention because it represents an interesting attempt to save
the psychological theory while at the same time allowing that
it is not fully equivalent to the idea of personal identity.
Parfit approaches this issue by pointing out that for the
person about to undergo cerebral fission and transplant, there
are only four possibilities: 1) I do not survive; 2) I survive
as one of the two people; 3) I survive as the other; 4) I
survive as both.
Unfortunately, says Parfit, each of these possibilities is
implausible. The first possibility is implausible because, as
Shoemaker has argued, I would survive if my entire brain were
successfully transplanted. Because of this, and because I can
survive with only half my brain it seems to follow that I would
survive the transplantation of only one of my hemispheres. But if my
survival is possible here, then why should I not survive the
instance in which both my hemispheres are separately transplanted?
In Parfit's words 'How can a double success be a failure?' (p.256).
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The reason for the implausibility of 2) and 3) is that
since both of my hemispheres are exactly similar, there is
nothing which could make me one person rather than the other.
Waking up after the operation with only one hemisphere, I might
well believe that I was the sole survivor of the fission and
transplant. But the person with the other hemisphere might
equally believe this of himself. Since both of us would be
recipients of exactly similar brain halves, there would be no
way to adjudicate between our rival claims.
The fourth possibility is rejected by Parfit because of
Williams' point; namely, that two individuals cannot be one and
the same person.
We thus seem to be left with a question which admits of no
answer. This puzzle, Parfit claims, arises because the
question of what happens to me after my fission is being
asked from the non-reductionist point of view. For only if we
think that the self is something which exists in addition to
psychological or bodily continuity will we think that the four
possibilities represent genuinely distinct options. However,
when we ask this question from a reductionist perspective the
problem disappears. 'On this view', says Parfit, 'the claims I
have discussed do not describe different possibilities, any of
which might be true, and one of which must be true. These
claims are merely different descriptions of the same outcome'
- 99 -
(p.259). The outcome is that after the operation there will be
two persons each of whom will be psychologically continuous
with myself before the operation. This is all there is to
know. For the person who persists in asking 'But what happens
to me after my fission?' Parfit replies merely that this is
an empty question. It is not empty however, in that it admits
of no answer, but rather that it simply gives different
descriptions of the same outcome. Nevertheless, Parfit feels
that description 1) I do not survive, is the best of the
competing descriptions. Parfit's reason for choosing 1) as the
best description is that 'I cannot be identical with two
different people, and it would be arbitrary to call one of
these people me' (p.262). And yet, because the four
descriptions do not represent distinct possibilities, the
important question is not 'Which is the best description?' but
is rather 'What ought to matter to me? How ought I to regard
the prospect of division? Should I regard it as like death, or
as like survival?' (p.260). Further, once it has been decided
what matters, says Parfit, then we will be able to decide
whether "I do not survive' is the best description.
For Parfit, what matters is relation R; that is, the
relation of psychological connectedness and/or psychological
continuity, with the right kind of cause. Psychological
connectedness refers to instances of particular direct
psychological connections, while psychological continuity is
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just the occurrence of overlapping chains of strong
connectedness. It is important that the connectedness of
psychological continuity is strong connectedness, because
connectedness is something which can hold by varying degrees.
I may have several direct psychological connections with myself
of yesterday, or I may have only one. In the latter case
Parfit feels the ascription of identity between myself of
yesterday and myself of today would not be justified. Strong
connectedness by itself, however, is not enough to justify the
ascription of personal identity; for identity is transitive,
strong connectedness is not. A, for example, can have strong
connectedness with 8, who can in turn have strong connectedness
with C. And still A may have no connectedness at all with C.
This is where the relation of psychological continuity comes
in. For if A is related by psychological continuity to B (i.e.
• <
by overlapping chains of strong connectedness), and 8 is
similarly related to C, then A is likewise related by
psychological continuity to C. In other words, psychological
continuity is transitive.
The last requirement of relation R is that psychological
connectedness and/or continuity have the right kind of cause.
On a narrow interpretation of the psychological theory of
identity, the right kind of cause refers to a 'normal' cause.
The purpose of stipulation that the right kind of cause be a
'normal' cause is to avoid the possibility of connections of a
- 101 -
delusive sort entering into the chain. I may, for example, seem
to remember as a child turning a garder snake loose in the
house; and it may be true that as a child I did such a thing.
However, my memory experience might be caused by my mother's
continuous reference to the incident, rather than by my actual
experience of the incident. That is, it would not be produced
by the right kind of cause. This, it might be recalled, is the
same sort of principle that we invoked in the second chapter to
obviate Butler's complaint concerning the circularity of the
memory theory. It is a way of demonstrating that reference to a
past person is not necessary to substantiate a present person's
memory-claims.
Parfit, however, rejects this narrow interpretation in
favour of a wider one in which the right kind of cause could be
any reliable cause, or even any cause. This is because he
wants to avoid an interpretation of the psychological criterion
of identity which refuses to acknowledge memories or other
mental states acquired in an abnormal way. This is Parfit's
way of allowing for the logical possibility of such things as
person replication. The example that Parfit has in mind is the
concept of 'teleportation' first discussed by Daniel
Dennet.(ll) We can imagine the case, says Parfit, in which a
scanner records the exact state of all the cells in my body,
destroys my entire body, and beams the information to another
planet where my brain and body are reconstituted by a
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replicator designed for such purposes. The brain and body of
my replica on the other planet would therefore be exactly
similar to my brain and body as they were on earth.
Consequently, my replica would be psychologically continuous
with me. However, since the psychology of this new
extraterrestrial person would be caused in an abnormal way,
i.e. by teleportation, my identity with this person could only
be asserted if we allowed that the cause of psychological
connectedness and continuity be any reliable cause.
Now, says Parfit, when a future person is R related to my
present self, and there is no other future person who is R
related to my present self, then my present self and that
future person are one and the same. However, when relation R
takes a branching form - as in the case of Wiggins' brain-
splitting operation - then, because there will be more than one
future person who will be R related to me as I am now, the
relation of identity between myself and these future persons
cannot hold. Thus personal identity is nothing more than a non-
branching instance of relation R.
But why should it matter to me whether my relation R takes
a branching or a non-branching form? Why should it be a worry
to me that I will be psychologically continuous with two future
persons, rather than with just one? Of course, neither of the




be me, but this is just something to do with the logic of
identity, and so is extraneous to the question of what really
matters; namely, the continued existence of relation R. Thus,
says Parfit, 'When we see why neither resulting person will
be me, I believe that, on reflection, we can also see that this
does not matter, or only matters a little' (p.263).
Coming back to the original question of what will become
of Brown once he has divided into two separate persons, we can
now give Parfit's answer: Brown will die, but since both his
psychological continuators will maintain relation R to Brown,
'this way of dying is about as good as ordinary survival'
(p.262).
It is important to remember, however, that for Parfit,
this answer is merely the 'best' of various descriptions: it
does not refer to an outcome distinct from the other answers.
This is because when the four possible outcomes are seen from
the non-reductionist point of view, i.e. as constituting
separate outcomes, each answer seems implausible. Oddly
enough, however, three of the possible answers turn out to be
just as implausible when seen from Parfit's point of view as
'merely different descriptions'. Thus, the reason why 2) I
survive as one, and 3) I survive as the other, are dismissed as
implausible outcomes, is because there is no way of choosing
between them: both of the post-operative individuals will have
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exactly similar character traits and memories. But this is the
same reason Parfit adduces for rejecting 2) and 3) as
candidates for the best description. Likewise, 4) I survive as
both, is said to be implausible as a distinct outcome because
of its logical incoherence: I cannot be one and the same person
as two different people. And, here again, it is for this same
reason that Parfit decides not to choose it as the best
description. But if the considerations which count against 2),
3) and 4) being plausible as outcomes also count against their
being the best of the possible descriptions, then I fail to see
the purpose of calling them 'merely different descriptions'
rather than outcomes. In fact, with 4) it is quite clear that
it makes no difference whether we call it an outcome or a
description; for being logically impossible as an outcome, it
will also be logically incoherent as a description. And a
• ■«
logically incoherent description is not merely a different
description of a particular outcome, for, being logically
incoherent, it describes nothing at all.
It might be thought that in construing the possible
answers as descriptions at least Parfit is able to come up with
one acceptable answer, i.e. 1) I do not survive, whereas when
they are seen as separate outcomes none of them is acceptable.
But now we must ask the following. If the reasons for
discounting 2), 3) and 4) as implausible outcomes are good
enough for discounting each of them as the best description,
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why is the reason for discounting 1) as an implausible outcome
not good enough for likewise discounting it as the best
description? Why Parfit thinks 1) is implausible as an outcome,
it will be recalled, is because since my survival is indicated
when only half of my brain is transplanted, it seems I should
also survive the occasion in which both my brain halves are
separately transplanted. And yet, if these are adequate
grounds for the dismissal of 1) as an implausible outcome, and
if the grounds on which an outcome is rejected are also
acceptable grounds on which to reject candidates for the best
description, then why does not Parfit also reject 1) as the
best description?
Parfit's acceptance of 1) is made all the more baffling by
his statement that once we have answered the question of what
ought to matter to me, or how ought I to regard the prospect of
my fission, then we can judge whether 1) is the best
description. For as it turns out, that which matters - relation
R - is something which fission cannot destroy. The prospects
for personal identity are less fortunate of course, but as
personal identity is not what matters, this is of no grave
concern. But if what is of most consequence to me passes
undisturbed through my fission, then clearly I ought not to
regard the prospect of my fission as though it were death;
especially since it is 'about as good as ordinary survival".
And if I ought not to regard it as though it were death, then
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"I do not survive', hardly seems the 'best' description. And
yet because Parfit rejects the possible descriptions in which
it is claimed that I do survive, there seems no other
description available to him. So Parfit with his descriptions
is now in no better a position than the non- reductionist with
his outcomes. Both have no answers.
One way of remedying these confusions, it might seem,
would be for Parfit to hold to the claim that everything about
the outcome of the operation could be known without choosing
one of the descriptions. This would seem to free him from the
hopeless task of choosing between four unacceptable
descriptions.
Unhappily, this is an escape route which Parfit himself
has already sealed off. For he expressly says that although
the question of what happens to me during my fission is an
empty question, it is not empty so far as it admits of no
answer. Some empty questions have no answer simply because any
answer we decide to give them runs the risk of being
arbitrary. Choosing an answer to such a question 'would be
pointless and might be misleading' (p.260). But the empty
question Parfit is considering is different. It is empty
because its possible answers are but different descriptions of
the same outcome. Since Parfit does not think it pointless or
misleading to choose one of these descriptions over the others,
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he must allow that the question of what happens to me during my
fission, although empty, does have an answer.
It is natural then to wonder why Parfit insists that this
question is the sort of empty question that has an answer;
especially since the answer which he chooses, according to his
own account of how I ought to view my fission, is at least
somewhat misleading. The reply here, I think, is that for
Parfit to accept that there is no answer to this question would
be, on his own admission, to accept that the choice of any
answer would be arbitrary. As we have seen, however, the
reasons which lead Parfit to his choice of an answer, e.g. the
logical incoherence of a rival answer, are far from arbitrary.
But this is just what is wrong with Parfit's whole account of
the matter. For if the possible answers to our question are
merely different descriptions of the same outcome (as according
to Parfit they must be if we are to avoid non-reductionism),
then there is a definite sense in which our choice of answer is
arbitrary. This follows from the banal truth that different
descriptions of the same thing, for all their difference, still
describe the same thing. Consider, for example, three
different descriptions all of which are answers to the question
'Who is Francis?' These are a) the person who lives above the
flower shop in Nicolson Street, b) the woman who works in the
reserve section of the library, and c) Mary's best friend. Now,
so far as my purpose is to answer the question 'Who is
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Francis?', then it is arbitrary which description I decide to
use as an answer. For they all refer to Francis. Of course,
there may be other factors which guide me in my choice of
description. For instance, the choice of c) might not be
apposite if the person asking me the question does not know who
Mary is. Also, there may be considerations, of completeness or
aesthetics which lead me to choose one description over the
other. For example, b) might be considered a more complete
description than either a) or c) because it at least tells us
the sex of the person being referred to. Or again, "living
above a flower shop' may seem a more poetic designation than
would 'working in a library*.
The considerations which guide our choice of description
a), b) or c), are not, however, of the same sort as those which
dictate Parfit's choice between descriptions 1), 2) 3) or 4).
For whether we choose a), b) or c), our response to the
question 'Who is Francis?' will be correct. We could make the
same point by saying that a), b), and c) are merely different
descriptions of the same person. Parfit, on the other hand,
has no such freedom of choice with answers 1), 2), 3), or 4);
for his choice, as we have shown, is bound by logical
considerations. It is this point which militates against
Parfit's claim that the possible answers to 'What happens to me
during my fission?" are merely different descriptions of the
same outcome.
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Does this mean we are forced back into the non-
reductionist's camp with its four implausible outcomes? Not
necessarily; for there appears to be another option. This is to
reject all the outcomes on the grounds that they depend on an
unsupported assumption; namely, the assumption that there i_s
an I which is there to undergo fission in the first place, and
of which, consequently, we must be able to give a post-
fissional account. If we do not allow this assumption, then the
question of what happens to the I does not arise: for the I
does not exist. Here then we are not saying that 1 ) - 4)
represent genuine outcomes, nor are we saying they are merely
different descriptions of the same outcome: we are rejecting
them as loaded answers to a loaded question. Parfit would no
doubt object here that he is not assuming the existence of an I
because on the psychological theory what we call the I is
nothing more than relation R. This is presumably what he means
when he says he could give a complete description of reality
without claiming that persons exist (p.212). But what if
relation R turns out to be just as spurious as the persisting I
that it was invented to replace? Let us have a closer look.
What strikes us first about this relation is that its
foremost components - psychological connectedness and
psychological continuity - are not altogether dissimilar from
Quinton's direct and indirect continuity. For both
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psychological connectedness and direct continuity refer to
instances of direct psychological connections, while both
psychological continuity and indirect continuity refer to
overlapping chains of direct psychological connections. One
difference is that while Quinton describes the relations as
holding between soul-phases, or 'sets of contemporaneous mental
states belonging to the same momentary consciousness', Parfit
refers to the relations as holding between persons on different
days. However, it is evident that, for Parfit, persons are
little more than constructions out of something very similar to
what Quinton calls soul-phases. Another difference is that, in
Quinton's account, the connections between the directly
continuous soul-phases that constitute the relation of indirect
continuity need not be strong. All that is required for a
relation of indirect continuity to obtain is that there occurs
a series of directly continuous soul-phases, each of which
contains 'some' connections with elements of the former. The
two end-points in this chain will then be indirectly
continuous. Parfit, on the other hand, requires that the
relation of psychological continuity (Quinton's indirect
continuity) be comprised of overlapping chains of strong
connectedness; with 'strong' referring to 'at least half the
number of direct connections that hold over everyday, in the
lives of nearly every actual person'(p.206). Since Quinton
does not specify what he means by 'some', when it comes to the
amount of connections required we cannot say just how different
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his criterion of identity will be from Parfit's. Admittedly,
'some' does have a weaker sound to it than does 'strong', but
this might merely be a function of Quinton's discussing
connections between sets of contemporaneous mental states of
the same consciousness rather than, like Parfit, discussing
connections between persons over each dav. If it does happen
that Parfit's account of continuity requires a greater amount
of connections than does Quinton's, this only means that, as
far as connectedness goes, it will be more difficult to qualify
for the ascription of personal identity on Parfit's account
than it will be on Quinton's. The nature of the psychological
connections and the role they play in personal identity,
however, remain the same on both accounts.
Since this is so, it follows that the criticisms which we
levelled against Quinton earlier will also apply to Parfit. For
here too we are bound to point out that our mental lives quite
clearly do not consist of 'overlapping chains of strong
connectedness'. If this was the fate to which we were all
condemned, consciousness would be perpetually filled to the
brim with memories of where we came from and intentions about
where we were going. Life would be like a relentless guided
tour from which we could not break free. Within consciousness
there would be no room for those events which are experienced
as instantaneous and unconnected, as for example when we have a
flash of insight, a revelation, a moment of terror, or when we
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are merely sitting quietly doing nothing.. Such events, by
their very nature, instantaneously clear consciousness of all
its connections. When I am in such a state of consciousness I
am completely absorbed in the moment. And when I am thus
absorbed, there is no place where memories, intentions or
desires could exist within my awareness without destroying my
absorption. In moments like these, which infiltrate
consciousness through and through, there is no chain of
connectedness to which I belong.
One could always object here that even if there are
unconnected moments of consciousness this need not ultimately
interfere with the existence of a chain of connectedness. For
even though my consciousness may at that particular moment
exist as unconnected, in the future it need not. That is,
although I may be absorbed in the present at this particular
moment, sometime in the future I might be able to look back
upon the unconnected event and so bring it back into connection
with the rest of my mental life. This of course is true. The
problem, however, is that my identity at the moment in which I
am unconnected is then to be decided by a future event, i.e.
my eventual recalling of that moment. This means that during
the time I am unconnected I have no identity. We thus have the
curious situation in which my identity at various instances -
which are by no means rare instances - is floating about
waiting to be determined, i.e. is waiting for the future
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occasion in which I might (or might not) recall my
unconnectedness. Quinton, it seems, was aware of this problem
and tried to steer clear of it by arguing that each moment of
consciousness has a similar character to and contains some
memories of the immediately prior moment of consciousness. And
this would seem to be Parfit's reason for alleging the
existence of overlapping chains of strong connectedness: each
moment of consciousness is strongly connected to prior moments
through overlapping chains. If this were true, it would avoid
the present difficulty. But it is not true.
Parfit tells us that when he used to believe in non-
reductionism he felt his life was like 'a glass tunnel, through
which I was moving faster every year", however, when he changed
his view to reductionism 'the walls of my glass tunnel
disappeared' (p.281). But although Parfit may have shed his
glass tunnel, it is debatable whether he is any better off; for
now he lives his life in chains - overlapping chains of strong
connectedness.
Another criticism we had of Quinton was that even if
indirect continuity did hold between me and an earlier person,
this would still not explain why I should be considered
identical with that person. And the same can be said of
Parfit's relation of psychological continuity. Of the two
relations of psychological connectedness and psychological
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continuity, Parfit says that psychological connectedness is the
most important. Psychological connectedness, however, is not a
transitive relation, and so cannot represent a relation of
identity. This is the reason for the introduction of
psychological continuity which, like identity, is a transitive
relation. But many relations are transitive. Being a relative
of someone or being the cause of something are both transitive
relations. But that does not make them relations of identity.
Still, we must remember that Parfit is not arguing for the
reduction of personal identity to relation R, i.e.
psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity,
with the right kind of cause; for the possibility of fission
has shown the futility of this project. Rather, he is arguing
that relation R is what ought to matter, not personal identity.
Looking past the difficulties we have found with relation R,
we can now address the question of whether this relation is
what ought to matter.
What then are Parfit's reasons for proclaiming the
importance of relation R? The reasons for the importance of the
first component of the relation, i.e. psychological
connectedness, are given when Parfit is arguing against the
view that psychological continuity is all that matters. Parfit
starts by saying 'we cannot defensibly claim that it would not
matter if there were no connectedness' (p.301). And this may
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well be so. For it seems that some connectedness in some
circumstances is important; as, for example, when we are acting
on a certain intention. But this is a far weaker claim than his
original one: that what matters is strong connectedness.
There is an important difference here; for it does seem we can
defensibly claim that it would not matter if there were no
strong connectedness. Of course, in Parfit's view, a person
who is not strongly connected with his earlier selves would not
be the same person as those earlier selves, but since identity
is not what matters this cannot be a relevant consideration.
Parfit's first argument for the importance of
connectedness asks us to 'consider the importance of memory.
If our lives have been worth living, most of us highly value
our ability to remember many of our past experiences' (p.301 ) .
But just how highly we are supposed to value such memories is
thrown into question when we compare this with Parfit's
previous claim that he would rather suffer amnesia than
undergo surgery that gave him an obnoxious character (p.208).
With this we see that memories are not to be valued, at least
by Parfit, more highly than a pleasant character. Further,
Parfit's assertion about the value of memory is patently not a
consideration of the importance of memory; it is a
consideration of the importance of the ability to remember past
experiences of a life 'worth living". And this is a
distinction which needs to be drawn; for it is a debatable
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point whether many of the people suffering from alcoholism,
depression, suicidal thoughts, and chronic boredom - not to
mention the poverty-ridden masses of the third world - would
say they had lives worth living.(12) Maybe what Parfit ought
to have said is that the ability to remember our past
experiences is a necessary though not sufficient condition of
having a worthwhile life. 8ut if we accept what he says about
preferring amnesia to an obnoxious character, then it seems
that memory is not even a necessary condition. For the life of
an amnesiac is being presented as being at least more
worthwhile than that of an obnoxious character.
The second reason given for the importance of
psychological connectedness concerns the importance of the
continuity of our desires and intentions. Here Parfit remarks
that he would greatly regret both the loss of his love towards
certain people and the replacement of strong desires which he
has to achieve certain aims. This is because 'I must care more
now about the achievements of what I now care about. Since
I care more about the fulfillment of these present desires, I
would regret losing these desires, and acquiring new ones'
(p.301). But this sort of clinging to present desires at the
expense of different future ones rules out the possibility of
growth and evolution. Thus a child may have strong desires to
stay with his mother or play with his toys. He would therefore
care strongly about the fulfilment of these desires and deeply
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regret their loss. Clearly, however, if the child is to grow
out of his childhood, he must be able to eventually give up
these desires and acquire some new ones. And of course someone
need not be a child to have desires or intentions which it
would be best for him to eventually replace. Parfit's view on
the importance of the continuity of present desires and
intentions cannot accommodate the importance of growth or
change because he is forced to evaluate his desires and
intentions from his present perspective. But, as Williams has
asked, 'Why should I hinder my future projects from the
perspective of my present values rather than inhibit my present
projects from the perspective of my future values?'.( 13) It
could be replied that I cannot know what my future values will
be. But this is not always true: even children seem to know
that one day they must give up certain attachments and move on
to being a grown-up . Besides, we certainly do not have to know
what our future desires or values will be to know that we will
no doubt acquire some, and, consequently, that they may well
replace our present ones. Knowing this, we would also know the
folly of desperately clinging to our present desires or
regretting their loss.
Another difficulty arises for Parfit's account because it
is always possible that I may care strongly about the
fulfilment of my present desires, and yet not regret their
loss; indeed I might be overjoyed at finally ridding myself of
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them. This is because a person may have a countervailing but
less strong desire. Consider the case of someone who is ruled
by a passion for power and control over others. Such a person
might well be aware of the destructive nature of this desire
and long for release from its grasp. Yet, at the same time he
may feel himself powerless to change. A person in this
predicament is someone who cares strongly about the
satisfactions of his present desires - so far as he continues
compulsively to pursue them - but would nevertheless rejoice to
wake up one morning and find himself free of them.
And a similar situation could be imagined in the case of
love. Someone, for example, may be deeply in love, and yet,
because of the suffocating nature of the particular
relationship crave to be free of its bonds. He may, however,
feel too deeply entangled in the situation to be able to give
up his love. Still, were he to somehow shake free of his desire
it is altogether probable that he would experience great
relief. Something like this, I suspect, is the motive behind
many crimes of passion. The person in love may feel himself
too strongly drawn towards the one he loves to ever envisage
the possibility of escaping his own desire. A desperate
solution to this dilemma would be to murder his beloved.
The discussion of desire is an opportune place to question
Parfit's self-proclaimed affinites with Buddhism. First,
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although he tells us that Buddha would have agreed with
reductionism (p.273), only a superficial reading of the
Buddhist texts could support such an interpretation. If we
attend closely to the passages where the self is discussed
(which include the passages from which Parfit has drawn his
quotations), it is plain that Buddhism rejects not only the non-
reductionist view of the self but also the reductionist view.
This is because Buddhism rejects the notion of a self
altogether. We shall come back to this idea in our final
chapter. But even waiving this point, when it comes to what
Parfit sees as the central issue; i.e. what ought to matter to
me, it is evident that the Buddha would have firmly disagreed.
For the Buddha, desire is the germ of all suffering; and only
through the cessation of desire could we ever achieve what is
really important; that is, freedom from suffering. From a
Buddhist perspective, the importance that Parfit invests in the
continuance of his desires is little more than the deluded
attachment of someone who has not fully accepted the doctrine
of anatman or no-self. This is because desire, which is
always desire of something that I believe I lack, is based on
the delusive distinction between self and not-self. In the
words of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, 'When desire
becomes related to "the one who desires," then desire comes
into existence. If there is no one who desires, how then will
desire come into being?'.(14)
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Unfortunately, Parfit's third reason for the importance of
psychological connectedness, i.e. the importance of the
continuity of character, fares no better. Parfit allows that
continuity is here maintained if character changes in a
'natural' way, but claims that most of us value some aspects of
our character and would not want these to change.
The first point to note here is that since character is,
among other things, a constellation of desires and intentions,
our above criticism will apply here with equal force.
Secondly, we cannot help but wonder what counts as a
'natural way' for character to change. If one's character
changes because of a near-death experience, a mid-life crisis,
or falling deeply in love, has one's character changed in a
natural way? It would be peculiar to insist that the character
changes in these circumstances were unnatural; for it is just
experiences like these that do bring about character changes.
But if we were to allow that these changes are natural, then,
according to Parfit, we would have to maintain that in such
cases continuity is preserved. Obviously, however, it need not
be: people can come out of these experiences with fundamental
character changes. According to Erich Fromm, 'In very drastic
cases of character change one can speak even of genuine
conversions, which means a complete change in values,
expectations, and attitudes because something entirely new
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has occurred in the life of the converted person' (my
emphasis).(15)
A further problem with Parfit's claims about the
importance of character continuity is evident in his assertion
that most of us value some aspects of our character. For
although this may be true, valuing some aspects of our
character is not equivalent to valuing our character itself.
For, unlike memories, desires and intentions, character is a
constellation of interrelated psychological and behavioural
phenomena. Or, in the words of Fromm, it is an organized
system of passions. And valuing some aspects of a system is
wholly consistent with deprecating the system itself. What
Parfit needs to do in order to demonstrate that most of us
value the continuity of character is to show, not that there
are some bits or pieces of our character that we do not want to
change, but rather that we want our character itself not to
change. And this, I suggest, he cannot do.
What we have learned from these arguments is not why
psychological connectedness matters, but only why it matters to
Parfit. Consequently, his arguments turn out to be little more
than an espousal of conservative preferences. Parfit does not
want things to change. He wants his memories, desires, and
intentions to persist and would deeply regret their giving way
to other ones. If his character is to change he would prefer
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it did so in a natural way (whatever that means). This
'personal preference' nature of his arguments comes out clearly
in his assertion that 'More generally, I want my life to have
certain kinds of overall unity. I do not want it to be very
episodic, with continual fluctuations in my desires and
concerns' (p.301).
But what if we are not conservatives? What if we prefer a
life that is full of episodes and shifting desires, a life
where memories and the past are of little concern to us? Or
what if we simply do not care one way or the other? To such
people Parfit has nothing to say. One might feel the urge to
complain here that anyone leading this sort of life is plainly
maladjusted or is at least living a life that no-one would
seriously choose to follow. But this would be little more than
an ethnocentric judgement of Western middle-class culture. In
Hindu thought the life of the wandering yogin - someone who has
discarded his attachments to the past and is unconcerned about
the future - is put forward as the ideal. Also, in 8uddhist
writings we are told that 'the noble one is he for whom past,
future, and present are as nothing; he has nothing and grasps
after nothing'.(16)








on R is to
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ensure that R, like identity, will be transitive. And it is
because of its ability to secure transitivity for relation R
that psychological continuity ought to matter to us. But this
is a sad confusion. For the whole point of Parfit's work on
personal identity is to convince us that personal identity is
not what matters. If identity really does not matter, why
bother introducing the relation of psychological continuity
whose only discoverable virtue is that, being transitive, it
supposedly represents the relation of identity? To do so is
paramount to asserting that what matters about x is that it has
the same property as something which does not matter. And yet,
were Parfit not to appeal to the transitivity of psychological
continuity he would have nothing left with which to recommend
it. For there is no other apparent reason why the existence of
someone who is psychologically continuous with me ought to
matter more to me than the existence of someone who is not.
The last component of relation R is the causal
ness
requirement, i.e. psychological connected and/or
/\
psychological continuity have the right kind of cause. The
importance of this requirement, as we have noted, is that it
guards against the occurrence of such things as delusive
memories in the chain of psychological connectedness. Problems
appear, however, when Parfit asserts that the right kind of
cause could be any cause. Parfit's reason for proposing that
the right kind of cause could be any cause, as we have stated,
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is to permit the existence of relation R even in those cases
where connectedness and continuity are acquired in abnormal
ways, as for example in person replication. But in permitting
this he has re-introduced the possibility of delusive memories
finding their way into the chain of connectedness. Consider
again my apparent memory of turning a snake loose in the house.
apparent
If the cause of thisAmemory was not the actual incident of my
releasing a snake, but rather my mother's mentioning of the
apparent
incident, then my memory is delusive. It is delusive because
A
it lacks the right kind of cause. If we allow, however, that
the right kind of cause could be any cause, then we must
likewise allow that my mother's reminiscences are the right
kind of cause; for they are, at least, any cause. And if we
grant this, then it seems we are barred forever from being able
to distinguish delusive memories from veridical ones.
Our conclusion here can only be that relation R does not,
after all, really matter. Having arrived at this conclusion we
now have a clearer picture of where Parfit went wrong. Parfit's
error, it seems, was that in trying to argue for how I ought to
view my fission, or what ought to matter to me, he failed to
base his view on the nature of human experience. He looked
rather to the old Butlerian model of strict and philosophical
identity and, by appealing to a psychological imitation of this
view, tried to force experience into its mould: he tried to
pour new wine into old bottles; needless to say the wine went
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sour.
The psychological theory ultimately fails, it seems,
because it cannot explain what it was invented to explain;
namely the sense of identity. Without thinking too deeply into
the matter we might feel the psychological theory is our best
choice if we want to explain what is at the heart of personal
identity: the sense that we are suppose to have of being
continuing and distinct persons. But if we reflect a bit
further we see that the very nature and functioning of memory,
which is the central element in the theory, bars it as a
plausible candidate for this office. This is because the sense
of identity is supposed to be something of which we are
intimately and continuously aware. But memory - especially
memory of the self - is a state we only lapse into on discreet
occasions. If we were forever full of memories, we would never
have the chance to experience the events to which our memories
would later refer. In other words we would not have anything to
remember. Further, a memory is not a homogeneous moment which
reveals itself all at once to consciousness. Rather it is an
intermittent unravelling of past experiences which breaks and
stops, is infiltrated by present concerns, future projects, and
the stillness of the moment. In such a coming and going where
could there abide a continuous sense of self? At last giving up
the attempt to construe our existence as continuous character
and memory paths or overlapping chains of strong connectedness,
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we can begin to see in ourselves something akin to those
Buddhist sages mentioned in the Dhammapada: 'They live in
emptiness, in the unmarked, in freedom; difficult it is to
trace their course, like that of birds in the air'.(17)
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE BODILY THEORY AND THE THEORY OF THE BODY
Because of the problems encountered with both the strict
theory and the psychological theory, one may feel inclined to
view the human body as constituting the essence of personal
identity. For if there is no indefinable self to be the carrier
of our experiences, and if there is no principle of identity to
be gleaned from the nature of our psychology, all is not lost;
for at least we have a body. But what is it about having a body
that might dispose us to think it a plausible candidate for the
basis of personal identity? The answer seems plain: the body is
a physical object which, as long as it exists, is spatio-
temporally continuous throughout the different moments of its
existence. In consequence, myself of today can be said to be
the same person as myself of twelve years ago so far as my body
of today is spatio-temporally continuous with my body of twelve
years ago. Exponents of this view are not, of course, denying
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that over time a person's body will or may undergo various
changes; rather they are claiming that so long as these changes
occur within a body which maintains a spatio-temporal
continuity, then the identity of the person whose body it is
will be ensured.
The bodily theory of personal identity therefore equates
personal identity with what Locke calls the identity of man.
And Locke, as we have seen, considers this equation to be a
confusion. Locke's distinction between the two types of
identity is brought out in his story of the prince and the
cobbler. Here, it will be recalled, Locke imagines the
consciousness of a prince being transferred to the body of a
cobbler. Were this to happen, Locke feels that the identity of
the subsequent person would still be that of the prince even
though the identity of the man or body would remain that of the
cobbler. Hence, personal identity cannot be the same thing as
bodily identity.
This example, as would be expected, has met with numerous
protests. Williams, for instance, tells us we should not take
the possibility of bodily transfer for granted and that there
are even 'logical limits' concerning what we would be willing
to say about these cases. Considering the suggestion that an
emperor's personality could be transferred to the body of a
peasant while the peasant's personality could be transferred to
- 131 -
the body of the emperor, Williams points to the difficulties in
understanding what this could mean. For instance, what has
become of the bodily function of the voice: 'How would the
peasant's gruff blasphemies be uttered in the emperor's
cultivated tones, or the emperor's witticisms in the peasant's
growl?' Or again, maybe the emperor's face is just not the sort
of face that could form peasant-like grimaces; and equally,
maybe the peasant's face lacks the lineaments necessary to
produce the emperor's royal smile. And these inabilities,
Williams feels, are not just empirical; 'such expressions on
these features could be unthinkable'.( 1 ) Williams sees these
considerations as bearing on the issue of bodily transfer in
two ways. First, it shows that although it may seem that the
idea of bodily transfer makes sense, there are many cases in
which it is not conceivable. Secondly, it shows that when we
think of distinguishing an individual's personality from his
body, we are not sure what we are meant to be distinguishing
from what.
This attempt of Williams' to discredit the notion of
bodily transfer does not seem very convincing. It may seem too
obvious of a reply to remind Williams of George Bernard Shaw's
Pygmalion where a peasant does come to speak in cultivated
tones, but I cannot think of what other sort of reply would be
necessary here. For Williams' argument seems to consist of
little more than the flat denial of the possibility of speech
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therapy. But if speech therapy is a possibility, then we must
admit that even a peasant could acquire cultivated tones. And
if a peasant could do this, then certainly he could also
project blasphemies in these newly acquired tones. Likewise I
find nothing inconceivable about royal witticisms being emitted
in a peasant's growl (Do peasants really growl?). Wit after all
is the ability to manipulate language in an unexpected and
humorous way, not the ability to elocute in certain tones. And
since we have no difficulty imagining that because the emperor
has contracted a throat problem he must now produce his
witticisms gruffly, we likewise should have no difficulty
conceiving of the emperor's witticisms being uttered in the
rough voice of the peasant. Concerning his remarks about facial
expressions, I agree with Williams that certain expressions on
certain features could be unthinkable. But this does not prove
what he thinks it does. For it is not unthinkable that by
suffering a stroke, surgery, or what have you, the emperor
could come to lose his ability to produce his old royal smile.
And if it would not be said on this account that the emperor
has lost his identity, then it cannot be held that the
peasant's inability to smile royally has much bearing on
whether or not his body has taken on the emperor's personality.
And this applies mutatis mutandis to the problem of the
emperor's face being unable to make peasant-like expressions.
Our reply to Williams then must be that he has not shown
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that bodily transfer is in many cases inconceivable. There may
yet remain some cases in which the limits of our conceptions
are strained, but it seems plain that whatever the cause of our
doubts in these instances, it could not be for considerations
of voice production and smiling.
As for Williams' further conclusion that in attempting to
distinguish between an individual's body and personality we are
not sure what we are to distinguish from what, this too seems
quite unfounded. When the emperor, who was at one time a
generous and out- going man, eventually becomes selfish and
withdrawn, most people, it seems, would be willing to say that
his personality has changed. Few, however, would want to say
that because of his newly gained selfishness and introversion
his body has changed. Of course, his selfishness will be
expressed and made known to us through the actions of his body
and the content of his speech, but it seems hardly correct to
describe the appearance of these new behaviours by saying his
body has changed. When we say that someone's body has changed
what we normally mean is that some physical feature of his body
such as posture, weight, shape, or colour has altered. These
physical changes may be the result or even the cause of certain
personality changes, but they are not to be equated with
personality changes.
A more cautious and sophisticated approach to the question
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of bodily transfer is offered by Penelhum in Survival and
Disembodied Existence.(2) Penelhum suggests that since we
have probably never come across a situation of putative bodily
transfer, just what we are to say in such circumstances does
not involve making explicit a decision we already hold
implicitly; it rather involves making a new decision. The
problem however is that in making this new decision we are
drawn in two different directions. For were we to come across a
cobbler who claimed to remember doing the things that the
prince had done, and a prince who claimed to remember doing
what the cobbler had done, our instincts, says Penelhum, would
incline us to say bodily transfer had taken place. And yet the
normal convention of requiring that a person's body be present
at the event he claims to remember indicates otherwise. And
this problem cannot be solved by merely overriding the bodily
requirement in favour*of the memory criterion. For according to
Penelhum, although memory is a criterion of identity - so far
as having X's memories deductively implies being X - the memory
criterion is parasitic on the bodily criterion. For in order to
decide whether someone's memory is real rather than delusive we
have to be able to apply certain physical tests. We have to be
able, for instance, to show whether someone's body was present
at the event he claims to remember. And if these tests turn up
negative, says Penelhum, we would be entitled to reject his
memory-claims.
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Penelhum, however, accepts that in the story of the prince
and the cobbler there is at least some body present at the
remembered events even if it is the wrong body. When this is
taken together with the fact that the memory-claims being made
are so systematic and consistent, Penelhum feels it is quite
permissible to say that bodily transfer has occurred. However,
in saying this we would have allowed for a weakening of the
priority of the bodily criterion over the memory criterion. The
two criteria would then be on par.
But we are not forced to accept this account of the story;
for there is another interpretation which enables us to retain
the primacy of the bodily criterion. This interpretation would
involve the introduction of a new concept which would allow us
to speak about one person being able to remember the past of
another, as for example, with someone who physically appears to
be the prince and yet claims to remember the various happenings
of the cobbler's past. The reason why we need a new concept,
says Penelhum, is because our present concept of remembering
does not extend to instances of one person's remembering
another person's past. Of course we allow that one person can
remember another's past so far as he was able to observe that
person in the past and thence recall it; but we do not allow
that one person can remember doing another's actions or having
someone else's experiences. To allow this, Penelhum tells us,
would be to 'pass the bounds of possible linguistic
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legislation'; for it would permit the making of statements
which would commit us to 'the possibility of some past action
or experience belonging uniquely to two different people, and
this is self-contradictory'.(3)
Penelhum therefore proposes the concept of retrocognition to
refer to those instances which, because of their accuracy, first-
person past-tense format, etc., appear to be memories, but
because of their connection to the wrong body cannot be
memories. The introduction of this concept, says Penelhum,
warrants us to maintain the primacy of the bodily criterion of
identity even in the presence of purported cases of bodily
transfer. Thus when faced with the tale of the prince and the
cobbler we are not driven to conclude that bodily transfer has
actually taken place, a conclusion which would force us into
the camp of the psychological theorists. We may choose instead
to retain the primacy of the bodily criterion and say that both
the prince and the cobbler retrocognize one another's pasts.
The introduction of the concept of retrocognition is an
attempt to save the primacy of the bodily criterion. But is the
bodily criterion really primary? The reason given in support of
this contention is that memories cannot be self-authenticating.
If a person's memories are to be genuine, then it must be that
the person's body was physically present at the event he claims
to remember. The concept of memory is therefore dependent on
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the concept of a physical body. It should not take us long to
see that this is essentially a bodily theorist's version of
Butler's critique of the memory theory. Butler, it will be
recalled, says that personal identity cannot be defined in
terms of memory, because memory presupposes personal identity.
Penelhum is saying the same thing. The difference is that for
Butler personal identity refers to the identity of an
indefinable self, while for Penelhum it refers to the body.
This is a major difference, but the principle of both arguments
is the same. Both claim that to distinguish a veridical memory
from a delusive one, we must be able to refer to persons
independently of memory. This, as was shown in the second
chapter, is false. There it was argued that the way to
demarcate a veridical memory is not by reference to a self
which was present at the remembered event, but rather by
reference to the causal history of the memory. For a veridical
memory can be explained in terms of a memory experience which
is causally connected to a veridical perception in accordance
with the principles of the psychology of memory. And just as
there is no need for a self to enter into this explanation, so
there is no need for the mention of a physical body.
At this point someone might want to object that although
the notion of the causal history of a memory may allow us to
skirt the obligation of making reference to a self, it does not
allow us to do the same with the body. This, it could be
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argued, is because one of the elements in the causal chain
which leads from perception to memory is the brain; and the
brain is at least part of the body.
The problem here is that it is not at all clear that the
causal history of a memory must make reference to the brain. In
the psychology of memory the mechanisms of memory transfer from
the sensory-buffer to short-term and long-term memory, the
duration of retention and rates of decay, the effects of
rehearsal on recall, and so on, are all given within a purely
psychological framework.
Secondly, although brains are indeed parts of bodies,
brain identity is not the same thing as body identity. This
can be seen by considering Shoemaker's example of two people
who have their brains transplanted into each other's bodies.
If Brown, who witnessed and remembered event E, later has his
brain removed and placed in the body of Robinson, which was
not present at event E, then were we to ask this resulting
person (Brownson) whether he remembered E, the answer most
likely would be Yes he did remember E. But were we to apply
Penelhum's test of checking whether the body of the individual
who claims to remember E was present when E transpired, we
would have to admit the results were negative; for the body of
Robinson (which now houses Brown's brain) was not present at
E. Of course the brain which has been newly installed in
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Robinson's body was present at E, but this can only be of
significance to the bodily theorist if he is really a brain
theorist; that is, if he is willing to hold that the identity
of a person goes with the brain, not with the body.
But why would anyone want to hold it is the brain which
governs the identity of the person? The answer, it seems, is
because the brain is the vehicle of memory and psychological
continuity. And yet to hold the brain is important on this
account is, in the end, to admit the primacy of the
psychological criterion.
We should note here that it is the possibility of brain
transplantation which has led Williams to rethink his views on
the fission of the self. In his early papers 'Personal Identity
and Individuation' and 'Bodily Continuity and Personal
Identity' Williams attacks the psychological theory on the
grounds that psychological continuity is not, like identity, a
one-one relation. In his example, both Charles and Robert could
be said to be psychologically continuous with Guy Fawkes; they
could not, however, both be identical with him. For in that
case they would be identical with each other; and two separate
persons cannot be identical. In the latter of these two papers
Williams admits that physical bodies are also vulnerable to the
possibility of reduplication. That is, just as we can imagine
the memories and character traits of one past person
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simultaneously being displayed by two present persons, so we
can also imagine a person 'splitting, amoeba-like, into two
simulacra of himself'.(4) Although some philosophers, such as
Quinton,(5) see this re-appearance of the possibility of
fission on the bodily plane as indicating a weakness with
Williams' argument against the psychological theory, Williams
himself claims there is a critical difference between
psychological and bodily fission. This is because although an
enquiry into the history of a person's psychological continuity
need not reveal that fission had taken place, i.e. that another
person with an exactly similar psychological continuity had
branched off from the person now under scrutiny, a similar
enquiry into the spatio-temporal continuity of a person's body
would be bound to reveal any bodily splitting and
reduplication. In this latter case, says Williams, the spatio-
temporal continuity of the body would have been interfered with
by the process of fission. It therefore would be wrong to
identify either of the resulting bodies with the original pre-
fission body. Consequently, the bodily theorist is not forced
to the absurd conclusion, as is the psychological theorist,
that the post-fission individuals are identical with each
other.
In his further paper, 'Are Persons Bodies?', Williams
admits that Shoemaker's operation provides a persuasive counter¬
example to the view that bodily identity is a necessary
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condition of personal identity. 'If judgements of personal
identity in such a case", says Williams, 'went the way of the
character- and memory-traits, as it seems thev reasonably
might. we would have here a divergence from bodily identity;
since clearly it would be absurd to suggest that what governs
the identity of the body is the identity of the brain' (my
emphasis).(6) One of the virtues of Shoemaker's example, we
are told, is that it avoids the problem of reduplication. For
since it cannot be that two separate individuals will at the
same time end up having Brown's brain and so be psychologically
continuous with Brown, so it cannot be that two separate
individuals will at the same time satisfy the conditions for
being identical with Brown. It would seem that the possibility
of brain bisection presents a problem here; but Williams
replies merely that the bisection of the brain is in principle
no different from the splitting of the body. And if a splitting
of the body constitutes a loss of bodily identity, then
likewise will the bisection of the brain amount to a loss of
brain identity. Consequently, even if the recipients of Brown's
hemispheres both display the memories and character-traits of
Brown, neither of them will be identical with Brown since
neither of them has precisely that object that was Brown's
brain.
We thus see a fundamental change in Williams' views on
personal identity. In his earlier papers all that could be said
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about someone who acquired the memories and character traits of
an earlier person was that he clairvoyantly or mysteriously
knew all about the earlier person. Consequently, personal
identity could not be ascribed on the basis of memories and
character-traits. In "Are Persons Bodies?', however, it is
allowed that ascriptions of personal identity might reasonably
go the way of memory and character traits. This change of views
would seem to be because of Williams' belief that the Shoemaker
case - which is said to be one persuasive counter-example to
the bodily theory - avoids the problem of reduplication.
But it now becomes apparent that Williams has fallen into
confusion. For if the ascription of personal identity goes the
way of memory and character-traits in the case of a
straightforward brain transplant, why cannot the ascription go
the same -wty in the case of a dual transplant of a bisected
brain? To answer that the hemispheres of the post-operative
individuals have suffered fission and so are no longer
identical with the pre-operative brain is a non seauitur. For
it has already been granted that personal identity is to be
ascribed according to memory and character-traits. So whether
the memory and character traits are produced by a fully intact
halves ctnc in 1(?rtf ^
brain or spatio-temporally discontinuous brain halves is really
A
beside the point. And since it is likely that the two persons
each fitted with a half of Brown's brain would both make the
same memory-claims and show the same character traits, it must
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be concluded that the Shoemaker case does not, as Williams
thinks it does, avoid the problem of reduplication.
It is curious that Williams resists the possibility of
fission in the case of brain transplants, and yet goes on to
allow it in what he says is a 'very natural extension" of
Shoemaker's example. The extension Williams has in mind is the
transfer of information between brains. Thus instead of
imagining the physical transfer of brains we might equally
imagine extracting the total information content from a brain,
encoding the information in a storage device, and later
returning it to the same or another brain. If this procedure
were carried out on someone, say for the purposes of brain
surgery, and the person were to recover all the memories he had
before the information removal, Williams feels 'we should not
dream of saying that he did not, at a later stage, really
remember' (p.79). He admits that, normally, causal claims which
go outside the body do not constitute genuine memories. Were I
to rely completely upon my diary to re-learn the experiences I
had some years ago, then just because of this reliance, I could
not be said to really remember those experiences. But in the
case of brain-state transfer Williams thinks things are
different. For the replacement of information, we are told, is
not 'as such, 'learning again''.
And with this the road is open to the problem of
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reduplication. For rather than returning the information to
only one brain, says Williams, we could just as easily feed the
information into numerous brains. If this were to happen, there
would then exist many individuals all of whom would have the
same memories and character traits, and consequently, all of
whom would be identical, both with the earlier person and with
each other.
Now, for the author of 'Personal Identity and
Individuation", and 'Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity'
this conclusion would have been enough to dismiss the claim
that personal identity could be preserved through brain-state
transfer. For in those papers it is insisted that identity is a
one-one relation. But in 'Are Persons Bodies?' we are told
there is a sense in which all the recipients of one person's
brain-state could be both identical with that person and with
each other. These persons would all be the same person in a
tvoe sense of 'same person': 'If the prototype person was a
Smith, all the resultants would be, significantly, Smiths:
and 'person' like other type-token words, will have a plural
differently applicable under two different principles of
counting - a room containing two Smiths and three Robinsons
will contain, in one sense, five, in another, two, persons'
(p.80) .
On this account there would be two senses of 'person':
» •«
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type- persons and instances of type-persons; that is, token-
persons. A type-person states Williams, would be something
like a class of bodies all of which exhibit the same total
brain-state, i.e. have the same memories, character-traits, and
so on. When using the type sense of 'person'it would make
perfect sense to say that today you had met the same person you
met yesterday even if the person you met yesterday has a
numerically distinct body and brain from the person you met
today. As long as the two bodies you had encountered had the
same total brain-state, then they would be the same type-
person. It is thus clear that, in the type sense, persons are
not bodies; for the identity of a type- person is not tied to
the identity of any particular body. However, Williams does not
feel that this necessarily means that token-persons are not
bodies. For any statements about personal identity which were
not reducible to statements about bodily identity, says
Williams, 'could be adequately represented in terms of bodies
belonging to the same or different person-types' (p.80).
But what raises our suspicions about this conclusion is
that if the identity of person-types diverges from bodily
identity, then any statement about personal identity which
makes use of the notion of person-types ipso facto cannot be
equivalent to statements about bodily identity. Of course,
what Williams says is that such non- reducible statements could
be represented in terms of bodies belonging to certain person
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types. But we should not be fooled by the presence of the word
'bodies'; for we still have to decide what person-type each
body will belong to; and here again we are forced to leave the
realm of bodily identity.
We ought now to ask whether the notion of a type-person
makes sense. This can best be done by returning to Williams'
assertion that if someone were to have brain information
removed and then later replaced, we should not dream of saying
afterwards that he did not really remember. The reason given
for this assertion is that although the causal route has gone
outside the person's body, and although this would normally
count against the memories being genuine, in the case of brain-
state transfer, the acquisition of memories is not 'as such,
"learning again'", as it would be in the case of, say, reading
a diary. It is this feature which allows memories acquired
through brain-state transfer to be genuine.
. -t
It is probably significant that in describing this
redeeming feature of brain-state transfer Williams qualifies
himself twice: first by the use of 'as such' and secondly by
putting quotation marks around 'learning again'. Why does he
not simply say that the replacement of information is,
straightforwardly, not learning again? The answer, it seems, is
because Williams himself is aware that the distinction between
brain-state transfer and learning is not all that clear.
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Consider his example of learning anew about one's past by
reading what one had written earlier in a diary. A person in
this situation is re-acquiring information that had at an
earlier time been placed in storage; that is, in writing. Thus
there is a sense in which a diary is also a brain-state
transfer device: it serves to record and transfer the brain-
state of the writer to that of the reader. Of course, the
transfer of information will not be as thoroughgoing as it
would with Williams' imagined device which records the entire
state of the brain, but I doubt that this is a philosophically
significant difference. What is important is that the device
succeed in having the person come to have the same memory
experiences prior to their having been placed in storage. There
is no reason in principle why a diary cannot fulfil this
function as well as Williams' machine. It is true that someone
who had come to know about his past by reading a diary might be
aware that he had gained his memory experiences in this
abnormal fashion and so remain somewhat sceptical or oddly
disposed towards them. But this is equally true of the brain-
state transfer patient.
Maybe Williams thinks there is something involved in the
act of reading the diary which is lacking in a case of brain-
state transfer; something which brings reading, but not brain-
state transfer, under the description of learning. What could
- 148 -
this be? If it is that the information acquired by reading is
acquired by the subject's purposely engaging in an activity,
while that acquired by brain-state transfer need not involve
any effort or intention on behalf of the subject, then we can
alter the example suitably. We can imagine that rather than
reading the diary himself someone else reads the diary to the
subject. Or again, he might simply be made to listen to a tape-
recorded reading of the diary. Or, better still, the contents
of the diary could be encoded into a machine which feeds
directly into the visual or auditory centres of the brain,
putting it into exactly the same state as it would be if the
subject had read or been read the diary. At what point do we
say that the subject is no longer 'learning again' but is now
actually remembering? This problem is one which Williams does
not bring himself to face.
. «
Just why Williams introduces the notion of a type-person
is further obscured by the fact that in the closing paragraphs
of 'Are Persons Bodies?' he himself offers something of an
argument against the idea. Here it is suggested that if someone
loved a token-person just because she was a certain type-
person, say, because she was a Mary Smith (i.e. one of the
possibly numerous brain-state transfer replicas of Mary Smith),
then it would be unclear that what he really loved was the
token-person. What he loves is the type Mary Smith. 'We can
see dimly what this would be like' says Williams:
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It would be like loving a work of art in some
reproducible medium. One might start comparing, as it
were, performances of the type; and wanting to be
near the person one loved would be like wanting very
much to hear some performance, even an indifferent
one, of Fiaaro - just as one will go to the scratch
provincial performance of Figaro rather than hear
no Figaro at all, so one would see the very run¬
down Mary Smith who was in the locality, rather than
see no Mary Smith at all.
Much of what we call loving a person would begin
to crack under this, and reflection on it may
encourage us not to undervalue the deeply body-based
situation we actually have. While in the present
situation of things to love a person is not exactly
the same as to love a body, perhaps to say that they
are basically the same is more grotesquely
misleading than it is a deep metaphysical error; and
if it does not sound very high-minded, the
alternatives that so briskly grow out of suspending
the present situation do not sound too spiritual,
either. (p.81)
Because of a (seemingly purposive) lack of decisive
statement, it is difficult to put our finger on what exactly
Williams is arguing for here. What he seems to be saying,
however, is that although it is not inconceivable that someone
could love a type-person (we can see dimly what it would be
like), such a love would not fit in with our normal concept of
love. This is because love is basically the love of a body,
i.e. a token-person.
If this is true, then it would appear to constitute
another argument for the bodily theory of identity. For if to
love a person is just to love a body, then it seems a person
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is just a body.
We must therefore turn our attention to the question of
what is involved in the notion of loving a person. But before
we set out on this exploration we first ought to clarify some
of the peculiarities surrounding the use of the word 'love'.
It is a cause for some wonder that in English the word
which we use to denote one of our deepest and most meaningful
experiences can also be used to describe our relation to
various activities or objects to which we are merely positively
disposed. Thus I may say both that I love someone and that I
love playing cards or love a certain vase. Despite the use
of the same word in each of these instances there is, however,
an important difference which separates the first use of the
word 'love' from the other two. For although in each example
love functions as a transitive verb, only in the first
example can it also function as an intransitive verb. Only when
I love someone can I be said to be in love. It is true we
can take the intransitive expression 'in love' and, making it
transitive, say such things as 'I am in love with this vase',
but in these cases - where what we claim to be in love with is
not a person - it is evident that "in love' is being used
metaphorically as a convenient hyperbole. The proof of this is
that when it is left in the intransitive form, as when I
declare simply 'I am in love', no one doubts that what I am in
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love with is a person.
Why then must it be a person with whom I am in love? Why
cannot I be, strictly speaking, in love with a vase? The most
obvious answer to this question is because only a person is
capable of loving me back. 8ut why should it matter to me that
that with which I am in love is capable of loving me back?
Plainly, because in being in love with another I want that
person to love me back. This is a point well made by Jean-Paul
Sartre when he says 'love is the demand to be loved'. (7) We
have to, however, be careful here. For being in love is not
iust the demand to be loved: I may demand to be loved and yet
not love the person on whom I place this demand. I may, for
example, want to be loved merely because it feeds my
narcissism. But in such an instance I am clearly not in love
with the person whom I want to love me. Further, although being
in love may be to want the one I love to love me back, this
still does not explain what love itself is. To understand what
being in love is we must therefore go straight to the
question of what love is.
This is naturally a momentous question, one which I cannot
hope to answer fully here. I think, however, we shall be on
the right track if we see that at the very core of love lies a
complex of desires involving the desire to be vulnerable
before another person in order that I may be nurtured or cared
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for by that person, and, at the same time, the desire to have
the other person vulnerable before me in order that I may
nurture or care for that person.
This account would be supported by Freud's observations
that the desires of the adult are to a large extent built up
from earlier infantile impulses.(8) For the desire to be
vulnerable before another in order that I might be cared for
would seem to be a desire to recreate the infant's state of
complete vulnerability before the care-giver. The reciprocal
desire to care for another would probably be a later
development coming from an identification with the care¬
giver . (9)
It might, however, be felt that invoking desires for
vulnerability is out of order here. Could not love be simply
the reciprocal desires to care and be cared for? The problem
with this is that once we remove the desires to care and be
cared for from their corresponding desires for vulnerability,
we shall be unable to explain the importance that we place on
intimacy and trust; both of which seem central to our idea of
love. For I can easily want to care and be cared for without
wanting to become intimate. I might, for example, want to care
for Mary because I feel sorry for her, and want her to care for
me because I feel sorry for myself. To be intimate with each
other, however, we must place our inner-most workings in each
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other's hands; that is, we must disclose ourselves to each
other and enter into a state of mutual emotional,
psychological, and physical vulnerability. Here too we see the
importance of trust. To engage in such a relationship we must
feel we are able to trust each other. While trust may bear some
relation to the notion of caring, it does not seem nearly as
central as it is to the notion of vulnerability. For while it
is understandable that I might want to care for someone, even
if I do not trust the person, it is not quite as understandable
that I would want to be vulnerable to someone I do not trust.
The analysis of love into a complex of simpler desires is
useful because it puts us in a position to explain various
other interpersonal orientations that seem intimately
affiliated with love. This can be achieved by eliminating or
altering different parts of the complex.
Thus dependency would be constituted by only half of the
complex of desires that make up love. What a dependent person
wants is to be vulnerable before someone who will care. He has
little desire to have the other person vulnerable before him.
And further, he does not want to care for the one who will
care for him. This lack of desire for a reciprocal relationship
also appears in the compliment of dependency; that is, in
paternalism. The paternalistic person is both dominant and
nurturing. He is dominant because he refuses to enter into a
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state of vulnerability or to be cared for, and he is nurturing
because he desires the other person's vulnerability in order
that he may show care towards that person.
Care, however, is only one way of responding to
vulnerability; one can also respond with hostility. Thus
someone might desire to have another person vulnerable before
him in order to harm or control that person. When this occurs
together with a lack of desire for any reciprocal relations,
then we have sadism. Because sadism is often thought to be
essentially the desire to inflict pain or harm on another
person, it might appear that the desire for the other person's
vulnerability is not basic to sadism. But it should be evident
that with sadism the desire to inflict pain is intimately
wedded with the desire for the other person to be vulnerable.
This would explain the importance the sadist places on
controlling another person; for to control a person is to have
that person vulnerable before the one who is in control. There
are, of course, those cases in which the desire to cause harm
appears unaccompanied by the corresponding desire for the
vulnerability of the other person. But when this takes place we
seem to have a case of necrophilia rather than of sadism. As
has been suggested by Fromm, the distinction between sadism and
necrophilia is the distinction between the desire to control
and the desire to destroy.(10) The necrophiliac's interests,
then, skirt round the issue of vulnerability. His concern,
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which may manifest itself as sexual desire for a corpse, lies
rather with injury and destruction. When seen from our theory
then, necrophilia turns out to be a less complex phenomenon
than does sadism.
In the same way that dependency is the complement of
paternalism, so is masochism the complement of sadism. For,
masochism, like sadism, is a mobilization of only part of the
complex of desires that make up love. But whereas the sadist
desires the vulnerability of another person, what the masochist
wants is to be vulnerable himself before another person.
Further, like the sadist, the masochist is one who rejects the
notion of care. He is not interested in being vulnerable in
order that he might be cared for; his vulnerability is engaged
in order that he may be harmed or Controlled.
It must be stressed that these interpersonal orientations,
including that of love, are ideals or prototypes which
different persons will normally approach only more or less. It
will more often be the case that someone may love another and
yet lean slightly more towards, say, a dependency orientation,
i.e. he will desire to be vulnerable in order that he may be
cared for more than he desires the other person to be
vulnerable or more than he desires to care for that person. Or,
again, although someone may display a predominantly
paternalistic orientation, his paternalism may nonetheless be
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coloured with shades of sadism. Just what it is that leads a
person to adopt more of one orientation rather than another
would then be an area of enquiry for the psychology of
individual differences.
We are now able to see what is wrong with Williams' claim
that to love a person is basically the same as to love a body.
For to love a person is to engage in a network of desires
which necessarily involves reference to more than just the
person's body. Firstly it involves reference to the person who
is doing the loving: one of the things that makes up my love
for another is, as we have seen, the desire to be vulnerable
before that person in order that I may be cared for. Secondly,
since to love is to want to be loved, then another component of
my loving someone is my wanting the person I love to have the
same desires towards me that I have towards her.
It is this reciprocal feature of love, this wanting to be
vulnerable myself, wanting to be loved back, etc., which allows
us to draw a fundamental distinction between loving a person
and loving an activity or object. For in loving a vase, for
example, I have no desires concerning the vase's desires; for I
know that vases do not have desires. And herein lies the error
of Williams' claim. To say that loving a person is the same,
even basically the same as loving a body is to put the love for
a person on par with the love for an object; for bodies, like
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vases, are physical objects. What makes loving a person
radically different from loving an object is that in the former
case I am 'in love', in the latter I am not.
None of this is to say that the body does not enter into
the concept of being in love; for an important dimension of
this form of love is sexual desire, and this is a desire
intimately concerned with the body. This, however, should not
present a problem for the theory of love just given. For sexual
desire, it seems, can be easily accommodated within the theory
as but one more way of mobilizing a complex of reciprocal
desires for vulnerability and care. As Maurice Friedman says in
his book on The Hidden Human Image. 'In attitude as well as
in physical fact sex means that posture of the ultimate baring
of one's self', or as he also says, a 'mutual baring'.(13)
Thus in sexually desiring someone one of the things a person
wants is to bare his body, especially the erogenous areas of
his body, to another person, while at the same time having the
other person's body similarly bared to him. But why does
someone desire this mutual baring of bodies? In order, it would
seem, to both caress and be caressed. This would explain why
sexual intercourse is often thought to be the epitome of the
sex act. For in sexual intercourse one of the things that
transpires is a mutual baring of and caressing of and by the
most sensitive and hence vulnerable bf the erogenous areas.
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It seems reasonable to argue that in desiring to bare
one's body in this way before another person one is, at the
same time, desiring to be vulnerable before that person. A
person in this state of total physical bareness is vulnerable
simply because he has nothing left to hide. He can no longer
pretend: his body is presented to the other person for all
that it is: nothing more, nothing less. And the same could be
said about the reciprocal desire for the baring of the other
person's body.
Likewise, just as the desire for the mutual baring of
bodies is a form of desire for mutual vulnerability, so is the
desire for mutual caressing a form of desire for mutual care.
For in desiring to care for another person one of the things
someone wants is to satisfy that person. And this is also true
for the desire to caress someone. One can of course attempt to
caress another in order to satisfy oneself rather than the
person one is attempting to caress, even as one can attempt to
care for another purely for one's own sake. But just as care
thus imposed does not amount to real care, so does the caress
thus attempted fall short of a real caress. To really caress,
rather than merely attempting to caress, the caress must be
done in response to the other person's receptivity, i.e. desire
for vulnerability. Only in this way is the attempted caress a
genuine caress rather than an intrusion or an assault. All of
this would apply mutatis mutandis to the reciprocal desire to
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be cared for.
The idea that sexuality is connected with the notion of
vulnerability finds expression, I think, in what
anthropologists call myths of vagina dentata and penis
aculeatus: that is, myths of the toothed vagina and the
stinging or stabbing penis. Thus in Hindu mythology we find
Siva, the god of destruction (and also the ithyphallic god),
often engaged in destroying demons with his phallus. Similarly,
other mythical beings use their vaginas in an attempt to kill,
swallow-up, or castrate their enemies. In one myth, for
example, a demon sneaks into Siva's abode: "Once inside, he
took the form of Parvati [Siva's consort] in order to deceive
Siva, and he placed teeth as sharp as thunderbolts inside her
vagina, for he was determined to kill Siva. When Siva saw him
he embraced him, thinking him to be Parvati'. Eventually,
however, Siva "recognized the magic form of the demon, and he
placed a thunderbolt in his own phallus and wounded the demon
with it, killing him'. (12) Surprisingly enough, a version
of the vagina dentata myth, namely, that some women can trap
a man's penis within their vagina, persists quite openly within
our own culture.(13)
That sexual desire plays an important role in our idea of
being in love should not however, lead us to infer that one
need be in love in order to have sexual desire. As is well
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known, sexual desire operates quite happily outside the domain
of love. The reason for this seems best explained by the fact
that since sexual desire is primarily concerned with the body,
it need not make reference (as love does) to another person's
desires. So although love is the demand to be loved, sexual
desire is not the demand to be sexually desired. I may want to
be sexually desired (especially if my sexual desire occurs
within the context of being in love), and being sexually
desired might even heighten my own sexual desires, but this
would not be basic to the structure of sexual desire in the way
that the desire to be loved is basic to the structure of love.
What this means is that to sexually desire another person it is
enough to desire to be bare for another person's caress and to
desire that person to be bare for my caress. That sexual
desire works in this unilateral fashion is well-supported by
the existence of sexual desires which, far from being directed
towards another person's desires, are not even directed towards
a person; as, for example, in the case of fetishes and
zoophilia .
At the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that the
reason why the body might seem a plausible candidate for the
basis of personal identity is because the body has spatio-
temporal continuity. On this account the identity of the person
would be fundamentally no different than that of a physical
object. Thus to ask whether a person of now is the same as a
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certain person of twelve years ago will, in principle, be no
different from asking whether a particular painting now hanging
above the mantel is one and the same as one that was placed
there twelve years ago. What determines whether the two
paintings are the same is if there exists a continuous path in
space and time which connects the earlier painting with the
later one. What determines whether the two persons are the same
is if there likewise exists a path in space and time which
connects the earlier person's body with the later person's
body.
There is, however, an important disanalogy here which
bodily theorists seem to have overlooked. For although there
is no particular painting which I experience in an essentially
different way from other paintings, there is one body which I
experience quite differently from other bodies. This is the
body I call mine. Because of this it will turn out that
although I might be able to apply the criterion of spatio-
temporal continuity to the bodies of other persons (for it was
only with a view to the bodies of other's that this account was
invented), when it comes to my own case no such criterion can
apply. As a consequence, the bodily theory of identity is one
which I can never use to give an account of my own identity.
And this, it seems, is a good enough reason for us to reject
it.
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To introduce the idea of a basic distinction between my
body and the bodies of others, let us examine a list given by
John Hospers. The features which distinguish my body from
others, says Hospers, are at least these:
(1) It is the only body I cannot get away from -
it is always there whenever I am conscious, and I can
never see it walking away in the distance. (2) I can
see it, unlike other bodies, only from certain
perspectives: I cannot see its face except in the
mirror, or the back of its head except in two or more
mirrors, and its chest and shoulders (for example)
always appear in about the same place in my visual
field, at about the same apparent distance. (3) It is
the only body of which I have kinesthetic and other
somatic sense experiences; of other bodies I can have
visual and tactile experiences, but not kinesthetic.
(4) Most important, it is the only body I can
directly control. I can decide to raise its arm (the
arm of the body I call mine), and the arm raises; the
act follows upon the decision. I cannot control any
other body in this way, but only indirectly via
command or physical force. I can also alter the
positions of things in the physical world, as in
moving a chess piece from this square to that, but I
can move these other things only by moving this body:
my influence on the outside world is always by means
of this body.(14)
Hospers is not, of course, saying that only in his case
will all of this be true; as if there were something
singularly unusual about his own body. Rather he is saying
that these propositions will be true for each person in the
case of each person's own body. Thus while it is true for me
that I can never see my body walking away in the distance, it
is also true for you that you can never see your body walking
away in the distance, and it is equally true for that person
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over there that he can never see his own body walking away in
the distance, and so on. A corollary of this is that what is
here true for each person of his own body will not be true of
his body when it is experienced by someone else. Thus although
_I cannot see my body walking away in the distance other
persons can have this experience of my body.
Unfortunately, Hospers does not attempt to integrate these
observations into a coherent theory of the body. He merely
lists them as peculiar but apparently unconnected features of
the body I call mine. It is understandable then that certain
difficulties and omissions occur within his otherwise
intriguing list.
We can start by noting something of an inconsistency
between (1) and (2). For (1) tells us that my body is the only
body I cannot get away from, and it is always there whenever I
am conscious. But (2) says that I can never see my face or
head, except with the use of mirrors. It seems, therefore, that
if (2) is true, then (1) cannot be completely true. For
according to (2) there are parts of my body that are, in one
sense, never there whenever I am conscious: my face and head
are never there for me as a direct visual experience.
Further, although Hospers has realized that my body is the
only one of which I can have kinaesthetic and other somatic
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experiences, and also that it is the only body through which I
can influence the world, he seems to have overlooked the fact
that it is the only body through which I can experience the
world. This is an important omission; for it is this fact that
helps to explain (2). The reason why I can see my body only
from certain perspectives is just because it is through that
same body that I must do the seeing. This is also why I cannot
see my face; for it is from my face that my organs of vision
scan the world. We should note, however, that although I cannot
see my entire face, I can, in certain instances, see parts of
it e.g., my nose, upper lip, and eyebrows. However, try as I
may, I cannot see those parts of my face which do the seeing;
that is, I cannot see my own eyes.
And this does not just hold for vision and the eyes, but
also for other sense modalities and their related parts of the
body. Thus what I perceive with my hand is not my hand itself
but rather the environs in which it is placed. When I submerge
my hand in a basin of water or pick up some sand, what I feel
is just the fluidity of the water or the abrasiveness of the
sand. Likewise, when I listen to a symphony what I hear is
music, not my eardrums. And the same is true of smell and
taste: when I smell and taste a glass of wine, what I smell and
taste is wine, not my olfactory receptors and tastebuds.
This does not mean that I cannot experience my sense-
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organs. I can, after all, use one sense-organ to explore
another. I can touch my eyes or look at my hands. And I can
even touch one part of my hand with another part of the same
hand. But it is important to see that even on these occasions
the sense-organ that is doing the sensing is not sensing
itself. So if I touch the tip of my left hand's little finger
with the tip of the same hand's thumb, what the tip of my
little finger is feeling is the tip of my thumb, and,
conversely, what the tip of my thumb is feeling is the tip of
my little finger. In neither case are the fingertips sensing
themselves. Similarly, even though it is conceivable that
someone could have both his eyes situated in such a way that
they might see each other, still neither eye would be seeing
itself.
Although this all seems to hav^ a bit of mystery to it -
How can I have eyes and yet never see them? - when we consider
I
the nature of perception, it is just what we should expect. For
it is this 'non-reflexivity' of the sense-organs which allows
us to perceive the world. Were my eyes to somehow see
themselves they would be 'clogged' so to speak, with their own
image and nothing else could 'get in'. Yet this very fact
requires us to acknowledge a phenomenology of the body from two
different perspectives: the body as it is from a first-person
perspective and the body as it is from a third-person
perspective. It must be emphasized, however, that this
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dichotomy of perspectives is not the same dichotomy which sets
apart 'the body as it is for the person to whom it belongs'
from 'the body as it is for those to whom it does not belong'.
For, as we have seen, I can in some ways take a third-person
perspective on my own body: I can look at my hand or touch
various parts of my body in the same way that I might look at
someone else's hand or touch someone else's body. In this
sense, the third-person perspective cuts across the distinction
between my body as I experience it and my experience of other
person's bodies.
With the first-person perspective, however, things are
different. From this perspective I cannot perceive the body of
another. For here the body is experienced as a point of view on
the world, not as a spatio-temporal object in the world. This
is why the hand which I look at, be it mine or someone else's,
is not a hand from the first-person perspective. It is merely
something on which I am taking a point of view. However, the
hand which allows me to feel the fluidity of the water, the
warmth of the air, or the texture of my other hand, is not a
hand that enters into my perception of the world; it is my
perception of the world. More precisely, it is my manual-
tactile perception of the world. Thus, from the first-person
perspective my body is a maze of centres of perception which
constitute my phenomenological point of view on the world.
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There is a possible objection here. For what are we to
make of the somatic sensations in my hand? What of the
kinaesthetic sensations of my fingers moving in relation to
one another? As Hospers points out it is of my body alone that
I receive kinaesthetic and other somatic experiences. And
these experiences are not, like other experiences of my hand,
available to others.
Moreover, although we have shown how I can perceive my
body and yet do so from a third-person perspective, here the
situation seems somewhat different. When, for example, I taste
my lips or smell my wrist, what I am doing is using one of my
sense-organs to explore another part of my body. But in
kinaesthetic and somatic sense experience I am not directing
any particular sense-organ upon any particular part of my body.
I seem merely to be receiving sensations from my body. I can of
course direct my attention to a certain area of my body.; but
even here there seems to be no clearly demarcated sense-organ
involved. Nor are the sensations thus attended to, except
perhaps in cases of illness, that clear and distinct.
All of this may tempt us to conclude that such experiences
of the body could not be from a third-person perspective. And
if this is so then it appears we have a counter-example to the
claim that the body of the first-person perspective is a point
of view on something other than itself. For in the case of
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kinaesthetic and somatic sense experience my body seems to be
a point of view on just itself.
We should start our reply by pointing out that although
kinaesthetic and somatic experiences are often classed
together, they are in fact fundamentally different sorts of
experiences. The criticism to which we are replying therefore
demands different responses in each case.
In the case of somatic experience even though it may be
true that I can have them of my body only, this does not mean
they are experiences of my body from the first-person
perspective. For as we have said it is not whose body it is
that determines from which perspective it will be viewed; it
is the manner in which it is perceived that is important. And
if we attend to our somatic sense experiences we will see that,
despite their being generally indistinct and not perceived by
any specific sense-organ, the perceptual story is not
altogether different from those instances in which we use one
of our sense-organs to observe another part of our body. In
both cases the object of our awareness is something we
contemplate from a distance, so to speak; it is something upon
which we take a point of view. Thus the fluttering in my
stomach or the throbbing in my leg is just as much something
upon which I can take a point of view as is my abdomen which I
touch or my leg which I see. Of course the somatic experiences
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I have of my body are quite different from the visual
experiences I have of my body, but the same is true for those
visual experiences when compared with the other sense
experiences I might have of my body.
Turning to kinaesthetic experience we discover a rather
different type of awareness. Although the term ' kinaesthesia'
literally means 'sensation of movement' there is a certain type
of awareness that we have when we are not moving that is much
the same as kinaesthetic awareness. What I am referring to is
the awareness of where my body-parts lie in relation to one
another, i.e. the spatial distribution of my body. When, for
example, I am seated in a chair I am aware that my hips are on
about the same level as my knees, that my body is folded in the
middle bringing my thighs into a certain angle with my chest,
that my head is thus and so a distance from my feet, and so
soft of proprioceptive
forth. What constitutes this awareness of my spatial
A
distribution is just an awareness that my body, being a system
of sense-organs, is a collection of points of view upon the
world. I know, for instance, that the point of view that is my
hand is above the point of view that is my foot. That is, I am
aware that the arm of the chair which my hand senses is above
the floor which my foot senses. I have all this awareness
without the sensation of movement. Were I, however, to get up
from the chair my sensation of movement would then be engaged.
But what could this sensation of movement be if not an
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awareness of the shifting of the spatial relations that my body-
parts bear to one another. When I rise from the chair my hips
gradually become higher than my knees, the angle between my
thighs and chest increases as does the distance between my head
and feet. There is nothing new that arrives in my consciousness
just in the instance that I start to move. In this sense, then,
kinaesthesia is only an awareness of the shifting spatial
distribution of the points of view that make up my body from
the first-person perspective.
It is also from this point of view that my body is a point
of action; that is, a point from which I can, as Hospers says,
alter positions of things in the physical world. But this is
not just one more peculiar fact about my body (and here we see
the relation between (2) and (4)). The reason why it is the
only body through which I can act is because it is the only
body which I can perceive in certain ways, i.e. from the first-
person perspective. When I throw a stone at a piece of wood
floating down-stream, I do not perceive my arm as I would
perceive your arm doing the same action. What I do is sense the
weight of the stone, note the speed and angle of the
driftwood's movement, and, keeping my eye on the target, let
fly the stone. That is, I must take a point of view on the
physical world in which I am acting. Were I to try to perform
this action while observing my arm or body from the third-
person perspective, viewing it as a physical object, the stone
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might well hit my foot before it hits the piece of wood.
What we are left with then is a body that cannot be
identified with any of the objects of perception. This, as we
have seen, is because the body from this perspective is the
point of view from which objects are perceived. We should not,
however, be led into thinking that a point of view has some
sort of existence which is independent of the objects upon
which it is a point of view. For a point of view refers to
nothing more than a certain perspectival ordering of things. It
is as if the physical world were a pool and my body were a
vortex in the middle of the pool. Because a vortex is literally
a hole in the water, the existence of the vortex is logically
dependent upon the. existence of the water. The vortex is just a
certain ordering or configuration of the water. Thus if we
consider what my eyes are for my own vision we see they are
merely the place around which all lines of perspective diverge;
they are the perspectival opposite of that point in the
distance to which things converge, i.e. the vanishing point.
Caution, however, is required here. For it is easy to
confuse the notion of a point of view as we have just given it
with the notion of something which, though not experienced as
an object for perception, is nonetheless experienced
'implicitly': as a mediator or something through which objects
appear to consciousness. This seems to be the error into which
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Sartre has inadvertantly fallen in his discussion of the body.
I say 'inadvertantly' because it is clear from Sartre's overall
phenomenological position that the body from the first-person
perspective cannot count even as an implicit object of
perception.
According to Sartre, although my body is a point of view
on which no point of view can be taken, it is nevertheless 'a
conscious structure of my consciousness' (p.329). Thus, the
body-for-me, as he calls it, belongs to the realms of
unreflective consciousness; that is, it is something of which I
am conscious without having to reflect upon it. Indeed, were I
to reflect upon it and so make it into an object upon which I
were to direct my attention, I would no longer experience it as
the body-for-me, but rather as the body-for-others, i.e. as the
body from the third-person perspective.
Sartre's idea that the body-for-me is something which is
grasped unreflectively means that it is perceived in a manner
not completely dissimilar to the gestalt notion of a ground. In
Sartre's exposition of the gestalt theory the field of
perception is organized in terms of figure and ground. The
figure is that part of my perceptual field upon which I direct
my attention while the ground is the undifferentiated mass of
experience upon which the figure appears. Thus the ground is
'that which is seen only in addition, that which is the object
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of a purely marginal attention' (p.10). This does not mean that
my consciousness of that which is the ground is a weaker
consciousness than my consciousness of the figure upon which I
direct my attention, but only that the ground of my perceptual
field is experienced as undifferentiated. Now the relation of
figure and ground is such that a new figure is forever rising
up from the ground to displace the present figure; in other
words the direction of our attention is always shifting. An
example of this process is given by Sartre in his account of
looking for his friend in the cafe. In surveying the cafe for
Pierre, says Sartre, 'each element of the setting, a person, a
table, a chair, attempts to isolate itself, to lift itself upon
the ground constituted by the totality of the other objects,
only to fall back once more into the undifferentiation of this
ground; it melts into the ground' (p.10).
Throughout this process of perception my body, like the
ground, is also grasped unreflectively. It is not, however,
grasped in the same unreflective way as the ground, i.e. as a
totality of undifferentiation. For the body-for-me, says
Sartre, is given only implicitly. It is what the world as
ground indicates. But in what way can I experience my body if
it is only indicated by something else? Sartre's answer is that
I experience it as that which is surpassed. In an analogy
given here he says that consciousness of the body is comparable
to consciousness of a sign: 'Now the consciousness of a sign
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exists, for otherwise we should not be able to understand its
meaning. But the sign is that which is surpassed toward
meaning, that which is never apprehended for itself, that
beyond which the look is perpetually directed' (p.330 ). In this
way then, though I experience the world through my body, in the
process of doing so I nonetheless (unreflectively) experience
my body. I experience it as something I neglect in order to
experience the world.
But where is the evidence for this supposed experience of
a body which is grasped unreflectively as surpassed? In the
process of perception the existence of our unreflective
consciousness of a ground is well supported. We need only turn
to our experience of the world to see that, as Sartre says, a
figure asserts itself on a ground of undifferentiation. 8ut
with the body things are quite different. When my sense-organs
experience the world it is plain that they neither reflectively
nor unreflectively experience themselves. It is true that, in a
sense, the ground of my different perceptual fields 'indicate'
my body so far as they indicate a point from which the world is
being viewed. But this point, as we have seen, refers to
nothing other than a certain perspectival ordering of the
objects of my perception. It is not something of which I am
conscious in addition to the ground. The sign analogy is,
unfortunately, of no help here. For although I may not
reflectively apprehend the sign when I am engaged in viewing it
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to understand its meaning, I can easily change this situation
and turn my gaze upon the sign qua physical object. That is,
rather than looking at the sign to realize its meaning I can
look at it in order to explore its physical features, say its
fount or its calligraphy. And this shift of attention is
carried out, significantly, within the same sense modality. But
there is no analogous situation with body- consciousness. When
I am visually apprehending the letter- opener in front of me I
cannot suddenly shift my attention to the visual apprehension
of my eyes; for there is nothing there that can be visually
apprehended. It is precisely because there is nothing there for
me to be conscious of that Sartre seems driven to argue, in
Kantian fashion, that I must have this unreflective experience
because something else is the case. Thus, after agreeing that
the senses cannot perceive themselves reflectively he goes on
to say 'Nevertheless, the senses are there. There is sight,
touch, hearing' (p.316). 8ut this does not show, as Sartre
seems to think it does, that there must be some unreflective
way in which the senses are there. The fact that the sense of
sight is there for me is nothing over and above the fact that
objects present themselves visually to me. And there is no
reason why my senses must unreflectively experience themselves
for this to be the case.
Having thus arrived at a theory of the body it now becomes
clear why the bodily theory of identity had to fail. For the
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bodily theory construes the body as a physical object that
persists through time and space; that is, as a body from the
third-person perspective. But the body from this perspective is
not the body 'in which I live", it is rather the body I examine
from the point of view of the body in which I live. But to live
in a body, or as we might more correctly say, to live a body,
is just to undergo the world from a particular point of view.
And here the notion of physical object identity can get no
foothold; for a point of view is not a physical object. It is
true that the point of view which is my body is defined in
terms of the physical objects on which it is a point of view.
In this case we could say with Sartre that 'my body is co¬
extensive with the world, spread out across all things'
(p.318). But such a thesis seems to go beyond what the bodily
theorists originally had in mind.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NO SELF TO BE FOUND
Having safely navigated our way between the Scylla of the
strict view and the Charybdis of the reductionist views, we
must now set out to explore the no-self theory of personal
identity. This final leg of our journey, however, will not be
without its own hazards; for other problems still lie in our
way. One such obstacle is the failure of many philosophers to
distinguish between reductionism and the no-self view. The
reasons for this error are perhaps understandable. For there
is a sense in which the two theories are in agreement. Both
theories, for example, reject the notion of a substantival self
which somehow exists beyond the bounds of experience. The
difference, however, is that while the reductionist accounts
then go on to resurrect the self and, consequently, its
identity, in terms of putative psychological relations or
confused theories of the body, the no-self theory lets the self
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lie where it has fallen. This is because the no-self theory is
not a theory about the self at all. It is rather a rejection
of all such theories as inherently untenable. And since
reductionism is just one more theory about the self, it too
must be untenable. In explaining the distinction between these
two theories it is instructive to turn to the philosophy of
mind where we find a similar distinction being employed. Here
a distinction is often drawn between reductive materialism and
eliminative materialism. Both these theories are in agreement
so far as they reject the existence of mental phenomena. But
while the former attempts to do so by showing how the notion of
the mental can be reduced to the physical - i.e. those things
called minds are really just brains - the latter rejects the
notion of the mental as fundamentally confused, and so hopes to
eliminate the idea of the mental altogether. The eliminative
materialist would argue that although the reductive materialist
is right to reject the idea of the mental, he is wrong to think
he can reconstruct the mental in terms of the physical. This
is because, it is argued, discourse about things like
intentionality and awareness is simply irreducible to discourse
about things like neurological states. Importing this
distinction in the discussion of personal identity, we could
then say that the no-self theory is an eliminative rather than
a reductive theory of personal identity. The no-self critique
of the reductive theory of identity would then be that the
concept of self and personal identity cannot be reduced to our
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ideas about psychology or bodies and, therefore, that such
concepts have to be eliminated. We must, however, not push the
analogy too far. For although some eliminative materialists
see the elimination of the theory of the mental as implying an
elimination of mental language, an analogous implication does
not hold for the no-self theory. That is, within the no-self
theory we can, as I shall argue presently, eliminate the notion
of the self and its identity, and yet on pragmatic grounds
continue to permit the use of the language of personal
identity.
A further but related point that divides reductionsim from
the no-self theory is that since reductionism seeks to give an
account of personal identity - a notion which has its roots
deep in the soil of the strict theory - then it has already
accepted a certain view into which it must now force the
structure of human existence. This, as we have seen, cannot
but lead to distorted accounts of how we undergo our
consciousness and our bodies. The no-self theory, on the other
hand, has no such prior commitments. And in this sense it is
more phenomenologically based than are the reductionist
theories. To borrow Husserl's phrase, it goes back to the
things themselves. That is, it starts with an examination of
experience rather than with an attachment to the project of how
to account for personal identity. This does not mean of course
that the no-self theory need not face the issue of why someone
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might come to believe in his own identity. For if there is no
such -thing as personal identity then it is essential that we
can offer some other account of why someone might be led to
think there is.
it is just this sort of approach to the problem of
personal identity that is found in the writings of the most
important no-self theorist, David Hume. As we pointed out at
the beginning of this study, Hume was the first Western
philosopher to unmask the confusions attending our idea of
personal identity and subsequently to reject the idea as a
fiction. It will be worth our while therefore to conduct a
detailed examination of his position. The problem, however, is
there is much disagreement about how we are to interpret Hume
on this point. On the one hand there are some commentators who,
while agreeing that Hume does reject the idea of personal
identity, go on to proclaim that his account is deeply confused
and inconsistent with what he says elsewhere. On the other hand
there are those who argue that his account is quite consistent,
but only because he did not really reject the notion of
personal identity but only a particular version of that
notion. It shall be my contention in what follows that both
these accounts are wrong. The latter is wrong because it fails
to accept what Hume clearly says, namely, that identity of the
self is a fiction. The former is wrong because it finds
confusion and inconsistency where, if we are fair to Hume,
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there is none. This is not to say that Hume is completely
clear and exhaustive in his treatment of personal identity, but
only that within his writings we have the makings of a solution
to the problem of personal identity.
What then is Hume's position? If we attend to the section
"Of personal identity' in Book I of A Treatise of Human
Nature (1740) an answer is immediately forthcoming. Hume
starts by pointing out that although some philosophers believe
we are continuously aware of something we call the self, when
we look to our experience there is nothing to substantiate this
belief. We are never, says Hume, aware of any constant
invariable impression that could answer to the name of self.
What we experience rather is a continuous flow of perceptions
that replace one another in rapid succession. 'When I enter
most intimately into what I call mvself' . says Hume, 'I
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat
or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I
never catch mvself at any time without a perception, and
never can observe any thing but the perception'.(1 ) Within
the mind, he continues, these perceptions 'successively make
their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an
infinite variety of postures and situations' (p. 253). And
there is nothing to the mind but these perceptions. There is
consequently never any simplicity within the mind at one time
nor identity at two different times. Nor, says, Hume, do we
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have any idea of a self; for every real idea must be derived
from some one impression: 'but self or person is not any one
impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas
are supposed to have reference' (p. 251).
With this much said against the notion of personal
identity, Hume turns to the question of why we have such a
proclivity to ascribe identity to our successive perceptions.
Prefacing his reply to this question, Hume points out that a
distinction must first be made between personal identity as it
regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our
passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (p. 253). His
concern here, he says, is with the former. He then starts his
answer by distinguishing between the ideas of identity and
diversity. In the former case we have the idea of an object
that persists invariable and uninterrupted through a particular
span of time. It is this that comprises our idea of identity.
In the case of diversity we have the idea of several different
objects existing in succession, and connected together by a
close relation' (p. 253). Now although these two ideas are
plainly distinct, it is certain, says Hume, that in our 'common
way of thinking' we generally confound them. That is, we often
claim that an object at one time is identical with an object at
another time, when in fact the two are little more than a
succession of different objects connected by a close relation.
To justify these absurd ascriptions of identity we either come
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up with the notion of a substantival self by feigning the
continued existence of our perceptions, or we imagine the
existence of something mysterious which binds our many
perceptions together. Even where we do not do this we at least
have a propensity to do so. We can see then, says Hume, that
because we often assert the existence of such fictions, the
problem of personal identity is not merely a verbal dispute. It
is natural to ask therefore what it is that induces us to
mistakenly attribute identity to something while, being a
succession of objects, is really an instance of diversity. Hume
feels the answer must lie in the workings of the imagination.
Consider for instance a mass of matter whose parts are
contiguous and connected. This mass will maintain its identity
provided it suffers no alteration. If, however, it does suffer
such an alteration, and we continue to ascribe identity to it,
then it is evident that we are only imagining it to maintain
its identity. The reasons why we do this, says Hume, is
becuase 'the passage of thought from the object before the
change to the object after it, is so smooth and easy, that we
scarce perceive the transition, and are apt to imagine, that
'tis nothing but a continu'd survey of the same object' (p.
256). This is especially true when the alteration is either
relatively small or when it occurs gradually and insensibly.
From here Hume goes on to consider the various other ways
in which we ascribe identity to objects which are 'variable and
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interrupted. Thus, another 'artifice' which induces the
imagination to allow the ascription of identity to a changing
object, comes from our observing how its parts refer to each
other, and, in combination, to some common purpose.
Consequently, 'a ship, of which a considerable part has been
chang'd by frequent reparations, is still consider'd as the
same; nor does the difference of the materials hinder us from
ascribing an identity to it'(p. 257). This is because the
common purpose of the changing parts allows the imagination to
glide easily over the succession of related objects.
Our propensity to ascribe identity in such instances is
rendered even stronger when we add a 'sympathy of parts' to the
common end of the parts; that is when the changing parts of an
object are not only related by the purpose which they share in
common, but also by the reciprocal causal relations which they
bear to one another. This is true, says Hume, of all plants
and animals. The effect of this relation is such that although
it is agreed that in the course of a few years all organisms
will suffer a total change of their substances, 'yet we still
attribute identity to them'. Thus, 'an oak, that grows from a
small plant to a large tree, is still the same oak; tho' there
be not one particle of matter, or figure of its parts the
same. An infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat, sometimes
lean, without any change in his identity' (p.257).
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In addition to this it is often the case that we confuse
the notions of specific and numerical identity. Hume gives the
example of a man who claims to hear the same noise at
different times despite the fact that it is continually
interrupted. Because the noise is thus interrupted there can
be nothing about it, save its cause, which is numerically the
same. What the man hears is a noise whose occurrences have
only a specific identity. Similarly, says Hume, 'it may be
said without breach of propriety of language, that such a
church which was formerly of brick, fell to ruin, and that the
parish rebuilt the same church of free-stone, and according to
modern architecture'. In this situation there is nothing the
same about the two churches other than their relation to the
parish, 'yet this alone is sufficient to make us denominate
them the same'(p. 258).
A further influence on the imagination is our expectations
about a particular object. Thus although we normally allow a
changing object to maintain its identity only if it changes
gradually, we do make exceptions where our expectations are
otherwise. As a consequence, since we expect a river to be
continually undergoing a change of its parts, we do not allow
this to affect its identity.
Hume has now laid the ground for his account of
personal identity. For the identity of the mind, like
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that of plants, animals, repaired ships, and rebuilt
churches, says Hume, is only a fictitious identity.
It must therefore be similarly explicable in terms of
the workings of the imagination.
It might be objected here that the analogy does not hold
because the parts of the mind are connected in a way that is
not true of the parts of plants and animals. However, Hume
points out that whether contemporary or successive, all our
perceptions are distinct existences. That is, none of our
perceptions is bound to another by the necessary relation of
identity: they are all distinct and different. And, as Hume
has argued in an earlier section, there is no necessary
connection between distinct existences. From here it follows
that "identity is nothing really belonging to these different
perceptions and uniting them together; but is a mere quality,
which we attribute to them, because of the union of their
ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them" (p. 260).
And the only qualities that are capable of uniting perceptions
in the imagination are the relations of resemblance,
causation, and contiguity. When we consider which of these
relations is responsible for allowing our imagination to unify
the successive perceptions of a person's mind, we must,
however, dispense with the relation of contiguity which, in
this case, has little effect. We are thus left with resemblance
and causation, and it is to these relations that Hume now
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turns his attention.
Dealing first with resemblance, Hume points out that
memory is the natural vehicle for bestowing this relation upon
our perceptions. For memory is no other than the ability to
make images of past perceptions reappear. "And as an image
necessarily resembles its object, must not the frequent placing
of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey
the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make
the whole seem like the continuance of one object?'(pp. 260-
261). Thus, says Hume, since memory is responsible for creating
the relations of resemblance between our perceptions, it not
only discovers but also produces our identity. The opposite,
however, is true when we consider the role memory plays in
causation. For if we consider that the mind is a system of
different perceptions all of which are joined together by
causal relations, then it is evident that, form this point of
view, memory is responsible more for the discovery of identity
than for its production. For although memory enables us to
acquire the notion of cause and effect, the relation itself is
capable of existing beyond the operations of our memory. We
can easily see, therefore, how the chain of cause and effect,
and thus our personal identity, can be extended to times which
we no longer remember. To someone who claims that memory must
be the basis of identity, Hume asks whether he can recall the
events of certain days long past: 'Or will he affirm, because
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he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the
present self is not the same person with the self of that
time; and by that means overturn all the most established
notions of personal identity?"(p. 262).
It is within the discussion of causation that Hume draws
his analogy between the self and a republic. For a republic
consists of persons who both are united by various legal ties
and produce other persons who, in turn, continue the existence
of the same republic, 'and as the same individual republic may
not only change its members, but also its laws and
constituions; in a like manner the same person may vary his
character and disposition, as well as his impressions and
ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he
endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation
of causation' (p261).
Hume concludes his account with the important remark that
all 'nice and subtile' questions concerning personal identity
are best considered as grammatical rather than philosophical
difficulties. Thus, except where the notion of a fictional
entity or principle is involved, all disputes about personal
identity are merely verbal disputes and can never be possibly
decided.
A hurried reading of this section of the Treatise might
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well lead one to conclude that Hume is confused; for there are
some apparent inconsistencies. These difficultes, however,
are resolved by keeping in mind the scope of Hume's project
and not allowing his claims to be taken out of context. Let
us start our appraisal of Hume by dealing with a criticism
raised by one of his commentators. In a paper called 'Hume on
Personal Identity" Penelhum argues that Hume's account is an
immense blunder, 'an excellent example of how complex and far-
reaching the consequences of a mistake in linguistic analysis
or conceptual investigation can be'. (2) According to
Penelhum, Hume's fatal mistake is to think that one object
cannot have many parts. This is false, claims Penelhum,
because whether or not an object has parts will depend upon
what sort of object it is. A melody, for example, is still one
melody even though it consists of a succession of notes. A
related mistake, we are told, is Hume's muddling of the
distinction between the numerical and specific senses of
identity. To remain the same through a period of time is to
remain the same in a specific sense: to be exactly the same as
one was at an earlier time. For an object to change, however,
it must remain numerically the same; for it must be one and the
same object which is doing the changing.
Unfortunately for Penelhum, Hume makes it quite plain that
he does allow for one object to have many parts, and he even
allows that the parts may undergo certain changes without
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affecting the identity of the whole:
Suppose any mass of matter, of which the parts
are contiguous and connected, to be plac d before us;
'tis plain we must attribute a perfect identity to
this mass, provided all the parts continue
uninterruptedly and invariably the same, whatever the
motion or change of place we may observe either in
the whole or in any of the parts.(p.255 )
What Hume does not allow is that an object can maintain
its identity with a coming and going of its parts. It might
seem, however, that this is all Penelhum needs to have his
point go through. For what is a melody but one thing which is
a succession of other things? And if this is so then Hume would
appear to be wrong in holding that a succession of objects
cannot be one object.
This, however, will not sustain Penelhum's objection. For
if a melody is an object, it is a different sort of object than
are the objects that Hume is concerned with. A melody, by
definition, is a temporal sequence of musical notes: it is
something whose existence is necessarily spread out over time.
It is therefore logically incapable of existing instantaneously
in the specious present. But there are no such logical
restrictions on the existence of trees, ships, churches, or
persons. We can easily imagine a tree, for instance, which
suddenly pops into existence only to immediately disappear.
And we can also imagine, it would seem, a person who exists but
- 192 -
for a second. It is true that trees and persons as a matter of
fact tend to exist for varying durations of time, but I see
nothing logically incoherent about their existing merely in the
specious present. Indeed it is just because our idea of a
person does allow for the momentary existence of a person that
we are able to ask questions about personal identity in the
first place. For only once we have allowed this can we raise
the question of whether a person existing at this particular
instance is the same as an earlier person existing at an
earlier instance. We cannot, however, ask the same question
about a melody; for melodies do not exist at particular
instances, only their notes do.
So Penelhum's alleged counter-example of one melody that
contains several parts is quite acceptable to Hume. It is
acceptable, first, because Hume never denied that one object
cannot consist of several parts, and secondly, because even
though a melody is a succession of parts, this is a necessary
feature of a melody in a way that it is not a necessary
feature of a person.
What about Hume's purported muddling of the numerical and
specific senses of identity? This would be a strange error for
Hume to make since, as Penelhum is aware, Hume himself draws
this very distinction in the course of his argument. But,
according to Penelhum, Hume has made this mistake just so far
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as he thinks that for something to remain the same it must not
change. For an object to remain unchanged is for it to remain
the same in the specific sense. But for an object to change
through time it must remain the same in the numerical sense.
Of course, says Penelhum, an object can lose its identity by
changing, but only if the object is by definition an unchanging
thing.
It should not be too difficult to see what is wrong here.
Consider Hume's example of a ship that has its parts gradually
replaced. It is possible that eventually none of the parts of
the original ship remain. And yet the ship of today might be
exactly similar to the earlier ship. We can express this
relationship by saying the two ships have a specific identity;
that is, they exactly resemble each other. It would be false,
however, to say that the two ships have a numerical identity;
for there is nothing about them that is numerically the
same. In contrast to this, Penelhum argues that the only
reason for saying that something has lost its identity (i.e.
has become another thing) is if it is by definition an
unchanging thing. Since nothing in the definition of a ship
seems to rule out the possibility of the ship's repairing its
parts, then even though the ship of today shares not one plank
or bolt in common with the earlier ship, the two are
nonetheless numerically identical, i.e. one and the same ship.
But were we to accept this scenario we would immediately be
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faced with a difficulty. For how could we distinguish between
the situation where a ship has persisted without changing any
of its parts, and the very different situation where it has
changed all its parts? The natural way for us to mark this
distinction would be to say that in the former case the ship of
today is exactly one and the same as the earlier ship, while in
the latter case it only resembles the earlier ship. That is,
in the first case the two ships are numerically identical, but
in the second case they are only specifically identical. But on
Penelhum's account we cannot draw this distinction because
there is no distinction to be drawn. Both cases have equal
claim to being instances of numerical identity. And yet it is
obvious that there is an important distinction to be made
here. In the case of the unaltered ship what we have is a ship
that is identical in the strongest sense with the earlier
ship. In the case where the ship suffers a total change of its
parts it can be the same as the earlier ship only in a weaker
sense. And this distinction, which is natural to make, is
merely the distinction between numerical and specific
identity. Hume's account of identity allows us to make this
distinction, Penelhum's does not. It seems therefore that it
is Penelhum who has muddled things.
We should not, however, be led to conclude that the
distinction between numerical and specific identity is central
to Hume's discussion. For Hume is not really interested in
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specific identity and only introduces the distinction by way
of showing how we might come to ascribe (numerical) identity
where there is none. One such way - and there are other ways
- is to confound the ideas of numerical and specific identity
and to claim that two successive objects are numerically
identical when they are only specifically identical.
Despite the peripheral significance of the distinction,
some people see this distinction as lying at the heart of
Hume's thesis. Thus, in an attempt to save Hume from an
'outrageously paradoxical' conclusion (i.e. that the belief in
one's identity is absurd) James Noxon (3) argues that Hume's
real purpose is to show how identity terms can be meaningfully
applied to persons once the numerical/specific distinction is
made clear. The reason why there might be a paradox in Hume,
we are told, is because Hume appears to be saying two
incompatible things at once. To support this claim Noxon
quotes Hume's statement that 'the identity, which we ascribe
to the mind of man, is only a fictious one, and of a like kind
with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal
bodies'(p . 259 ) . Noxon then contrasts this with other of
Hume's statements which, we are told, clearly imply that the
accepts judgements of identity in such cases. One example
cited is Hume's assertion that 'An oak, that grows from a
small plant to a large tree, is still the same oak; tho' there
be not one particle of matter, or figure of its parts the
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same. An infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat,
sometimes lean, without any change in his identity'(p. 257).
Another such example is Hume's remarks about someone who
supports the memory theory: 'Or will he affirm because he has
entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the present
self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by
that means, overturn all the most establish'd notions of
personal identity?' (p. 262).
This inconsistency is resolved, says Noxon, by noting the
different senses of identity that Hume is using. When Hume
denies that persons, plants, or animals have identity through
time, all he is denying is that they have a numerical identity,
he is not denying that they may have a specific identity.
This is why he can quite consistently go on to claim that a
seedling which becomes an oak is still the same plant, and an
infant which becomes a man does not thereby lose his identity;
for here the words 'same' and 'identity' are only being used in
their specific sense. Noxon is quite convinced that Hume finds
no absurdity in identifying a present object, whose nature it
is to change, with an earlier object. Such identifications,
claims Noxon, are based on 'points of resemblance evaluated in
light of general knowledge of the changes which things of a
certain sort undergo during a certain period of time'.(4)
What Hume is attacking, we are told, is only the view that the
indentifications which apply to a succession of related objects
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depend on the persistence of a single unaltered feature. To
hold this view is to confuse the conditions that allow for the
ascription of specific identity with those that allow for the
ascription of numerical identity. Consequently, Hume's attack
on the identity of the self is only to be seen as an attack on
its claim to numerical identity; that is, on the self's claim
to being a persisting entity that remains unaltered throughout
the duration of its existence. And this is quite in accord
with Hume's main purpose which is to show that the self does
maintain its specific identity through time; i.e. that the
present self is exactly similar with the earlier self.
Although this interpretation of Hume may help to avoid the
conclusion that Noxon finds so unacceptable, it does not
actually fit with'what Hume says. It does not take seriously
Hume's explicit assertion that the identity of persons, like
that of other successions of related objects, is a fictitious
one. What Noxon would have us believe is that Hume means only
that the numerical identity of such things is fictitious.
Hume's tacit claim, according to Noxon, is that what persons,
plants, animals, and rebuilt churches really have is a
specific identity. But this is an unfounded reading of
Hume. For not only does Hume refer to the notion of specific
identity only in passing, but nowhere does he mention or even
imply that the real identity of thiese variable and interrupted
things is a specific identity. If we turn to the quotations
- 198 -
cited as support for this view, we can see the error
immediately. When Hume says that a seedling which becomes a
large tree is still the same oak, and that an infant which
becomes a man is still the same individual he cannot be
referring to specific identity; for it is evidently false to
say that a seedling is exactly similar (i.e. specifically
identical) to a hundred- foot tree, and just as false to say
that an infant is exactly similar to an adult. There may be
some vague similarities in either case, but not enough to
justify a claim to specific identity. Noxon seems aware of
this problem and tries to avoid it by asserting that specific
identifications are based on 'points of resemblance evaluated
in light of general knowledge of the changes which things of a
certain sort undergo'. But I am not even sure if I know what
this means. How is the knowledge that a seedling will change
into a large oak supposed to aid us in evaluating points of
resemblance between the two? For regardless of our knowledge of
arboreal ontogeny the fact remains that a sprouting acorn bears
little or no resemblance to a massive oak.
Further, it seems clear that Hume, in his examples, is
intent on denying similarity rather than affirming it. Not
only does the tree have no particles of matter in common with
the seedling, but even the 'figure of its parts' is
different. Likewise, the infant not only grows into an adult,
but is 'sometimes fat, sometimes lean'. Noxon could always
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protest here that the tree remains exactly similar to the
seedling so far as it is still an oak. But Hume says more
than the tree is still a_n oak, he says it is still the same
oak. And this strongly suggests that he is not here using
'same' in its specific sense. If he only meant that the
seedling is as much an oak as the tree (a pointless thing to
say), there would have been no need for the insertion of the
words 'the same' before 'oak'.
But does this not leave us with a problem? For if Hume is
not here referring to the specific identity of the oak, then,
we might think, he must be referring to its numerical identity;
but as we have just noted the tree is said to have not one
particle in common with the seedling which means, for Hume, the
two cannot be numerically identical. The solution to this
problem is to see that Hume is not referring to the tree' s
identity in any sense: he is referring to our attribution of
identity to the tree (that is, our attribution of numerical
identity). This is evident from the line which immediately
precedes his example of the tree. Hume remarks here 'tho'
everyone must allow, that in a very few years both vegetables
and animals endure a total change, yet we still attribute
identity to them, while their form, size and substance are
entirely alter'd (p. 257). The reference to the growing oak
and the growing man are merely illustrative examples of a
changing plant and a changing animal to which we attribute
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identity. Since, however, there can be no identity where the
form, size and substance of a thing has entirely altered, the
identity which we attribute in such cases can only be a
fictitious one; that is, it is the work of the imagination, not
a property belonging to the object, or better, to the
successsion of objects to which we attribute it. And this is
not just true for plants and animals but for all things which
are variable and interrupted, e.g. repaired ships, rebuilt
churches, rivers, republics, and persons. So when Hume
discusses 'the identity ' of such things, he is only discussing
how we come to attribute identity to them, not their actual
identity.
The only reason we might think that Hume is making
positive statements about the actual identity of things is if
we fail to notice the structure of his overall argument and to
focus only on specific remarks. If we view the section 'Of
personal identity' as a whole we will see that in the first
four paragraphs Hume discusses the actual identity of the self
and categorically rejects the notion as untenable. He does,
however, feel that we have a natural propensity to ascribe
identity to ourselves, and it is to an explanation of this
propensity that Hume devotes the rest of his discussion. This
division in the text is also attended, for the most part, by a
division in the type of language that Hume uses to discuss
identity. In the first part Hume speaks in a categorical way.
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Thus it is claimed, for example, that 'there is no impression
constant and invariable'(p. 251), 'there is no such idea [of
the self]'(p. 252). 'I never catch myself at any time without a
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception
(p. 252), 'I always stumble on some particular perception or
other' (p. 252), and finally, 'there is properly no
simplicity in [the mind] at one time, nor identity in
different' (p. 253). However, when we come to the second part
of the discussion, the language becomes more psychological than
categorical. That is, Hume's concern here is more with how we
imagine, suppose, ascribe, or attribute, identity rather than
with the actual identity of things. And so the second part
begins by asking 'What then gives us so great a propension to
ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to
suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted
existence thro' the whole course of our live*?' (p.253; my
emphasis)'. This psychological language continues, for the
most part, throughout this latter half: the repaired ship 'is
still consider'd as the same; nor does the difference of the
materials hinder us from ascribing an identity to it'(p.
257); although plants and animals undergo a total change 'yet
we still attribute identity to them' (p. 257); a man who
hears an intermittent noise ' savs. it is still the same
noise' (p. 258); and because an earlier church is demolished
before its successor appears we do not think of them as being
different 'and for that reason are less scrupulous in
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calling them the same" (p. 258; my emphasis throughout the
last four quotations). Likewise, when Hume says we can extend
our identity beyond our memories his discussion makes it plain
that he is only talking about 'the most established notions
of personal identity' (p. 262; my emphasis), that is, what is
commonly believed to be true about personal identity, and not
about personal identity itself.
This use of psychological language to discuss the supposed
identity of interrupted and variable objects should keep us
alert to the fact that Hume is here discussing only the origin
of our belief in such identity, and not the actual identity of
what is really an instance of diversity. Once we see this we
should not be worried by Hume's occasional use of categorical
statements in what is overtly a discussion of psychology. Thus
when, in the second part of the text, Hume states that a
seedling which becomes a tree 'is still the same oak', all that
is before this makes it plain that he can only mean that it is
still called the same oak, or it is still supposed to be
the same oak, or some such thing, not that it is actually still
the same oak. Likewise, when he says that the infant becomes a
man 'without any change in his identity', all he can mean is
'without our attributing any change to his identity'.
There will be those, no doubt, who will charge that I am
riding roughshod over what Hume says and am twisting the text
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to suit my own purposes. But if this is true, then my critics
must explain why Hume says that although the addition or
removal of even an inconsiderable amount of a mass of matter
'absolutely destroys the identity of the whole, strictly
speaking; yet as we seldom think so accurately, we scruple not
to pronounce a mass of matter the same, where we find so
trivial an alteration' (p. 256). For in saying this Hume has
not only given the reasons why growing plants and humans cannot
maintain their identity oyer time (they are continually losing
and gaining amounts of matter), but he also explains why we
scruple not to pronounce them the same (we find their moment to
moment alterations too trivial to note). Of course over many
years the alterations that a seedling has undergone will no
longer be trivial, ' but where the change is produc'd
gradually and insensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it
the same effect [i.e. the loss of its identity]'(p. 256).
This is also how we should understand Hume's famous
comparison between the mind and a republic. Much commotion
has arisen over the fact that Hume here makes an apparently
categorical statement. A republic or commonwealth, states
Hume, consists of both legal ties and the coming and going of
persons who keep alive the same republic. And just as the same
republic continues despite a change in its laws and persons,
'in a like manner the same person may vary his character and
disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without
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losing his identity' (p. 261).
Penelhum remarks that this passage 'does not, taken out of
context, sound like the account of an alleged mistake at all,
but it is quite clear from everything that has led up to it
that it is'.(5) His stand on this point, however, is
challenged by Lawrence Ashley and Michael Stack in their paper
on 'Hume's Theory of the Self and its Identity'.(6) Like
Noxon, Ashley and Stack believe that Hume does want to endorse
a particular notion of identity. They argue for this reading
of Hume not, however, by distinguishing between numerical and
specific identity but by alleging that Hume is employing the
two concepts of perfect and imperfect identity. Consequently,
they say, when Hume states that persons, like republics, can
vary their parts without losing their identity, he is in fact
making a positive claim about the identity of a variable and
interrupted thing. It is just that the identity Hume is here
referring to is an imperfect identity, an identity that is
only more or less and so is compatible with an object's
undergoing alteration. The identity of variable and
interrupted objects that Hume dismisses as fictitious is
perfect identity, which is only applicable in cases of the
invariable and uninterrupted.
But what is the evidence for Hume's drawing a distinction
between perfect and imperfect identity? In support of their
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claims, Ashley and Stack point to the following passage:
'Since this interruption [in the case of some small change]
makes an object cease to appear the same, it must be the
uninterrupted progress of the thought which constitutes the
imperfect identityfp. 256). They then say 'suppose we take
this phrase "imperfect identity" at its face value' by which
they mean 'imperfect identity is correctly attributable in
cases where the progress of thought is uninterrupted when we
reflect on a succession of objects related in certain ways.
(This statement does not imply that there is no identity for
objects never perceived.)'.(7)
But this is more an instance of sleight-of-hand than it is
of taking something at face value. Where does Hume say in the
above passage (or anywhere else for that matter) that
imperfect identity is correctly attributable when the
progress of thought is uninterrupted? What Hume says is that
imperfect 'identity is constituted by the uninterrupted
progress of thought. And this shows that the identity being
referred to, whether it is modified by the word 'imperfect' or
not, is a product of the mind, something we imagine, suppose,
or ascribe, and not something that is an actual property of
successive objects. By substituting the phrase 'correctly
attributable' for 'constituted' Ashley and Stack have changed
what was meant to be a psychological statement into a
categorical one. Their apprehension that Hume's statement is a
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psychological one, and their desire that it should not be, is
made evident in their parenthetical remark: 'this statement
does not imply that there is no identity for objects never
perceived'. For although their rewording of Hume may not
carry this implication, Hume's own wording clearly does. To
say, for example, that it is the trees which constitute the
forest is to imply that were there no trees then there would
be no forest. And likewise, to say that it is the
uninterrupted progress of thought that constitutes the
identity of successive objects is to imply that were there no
uninterrupted progress of thought then there would be no
identity of successive objects.
Further, we cannot help but notice that the term
'imperfect identity' occurs only once in the section on
personal identity, and this alone would suggest that Hume is
using it stylistically as a form of elegant variation for
'imagined identity' or 'supposed identity', rather than to mark
a real distinction between two forms of identity. By the same
token, although Hume uses 'perfect' and 'perfectly' to
occasionally modify 'identity' and 'identical' respectively, it
is apparent that they are not being employed metaphysically,
but merely as a form of emphasis. This is supported by the
fact that he uses the same modifiers to indicate emphasis in
other contexts. He says, for instance, that should both his
perceptions and body disappear he would be a 'perfect non-
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entity' (p. 252), or 'to explain it perfectly" personal
identity must be compared to the identity of plants and animals
(p. 253), or again, that he finds an argument 'perfectly
decisive ' (p. 259).
Coming back to Hume's comparison between the identity of a
republic and the identity of a person, we see then that he
cannot be referring to something called imperfect identity.
And since such things as republics and persons are nothing but
successions of related objects, and since successions of
related objects are instances of diversity not identity, the
identity that Hume is here referring to is only an imagined
identity which is constituted by the uninterrupted progress of
thought.
It is important to be aware of the place in Hume's account
where this comparison appears. Towards the end of the
psychological part of the discussion, after concluding that
identity does not really belong to our different perceptions
'but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because
of the union of their ideas [i.e. copies of perceptions] in the
imagination, when we reflect upon them' (p. 260), Hume goes on
to say that the qualities responsible for such a union must be
resemblance and causation. He then discusses both these
relations in turn, and it is during his review of the latter
relation that he presents his analogy between a republic and a
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person. For just as a republic is a series of persons who are
united by the relation of legality, so is a person a series of
impressions and ideas linked together by the relation of
causation. And although Hume here makes the apparently
categorical statement that a person may vary his parts without
losing his identity, he immediately qualifies this with an
important explanatory remark: 'whatever changes he endures,
his several parts are still connected by the relation of
causation' (p. 262). That is, his parts are still connected by
one of the relations responsible for our imagining the
existence of identity where there is none.
Does this mean that Penelhum is right in asserting that
for Hume it is a mistake to attribute identity to such things
as republics and persons? Yes, Hume is quite clear about
this. He says in several places that the attribution of
identity to instances of diversity is both a mistake and an
absurdity (see especially pp. 254-255). But we must be
careful here; for its being a mistake does not imply what
Penelhum thinks it does.
After noting Hume's claim that we are making a mistake in
referring to a person over time as the same person, Penelhum
remarks that 'a little effort of imagination is enough to
indicate just how much chaos would result from adopting Hume's
diagnosis as the source of a prescription and using a
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different proper name whenever we noticed the slightest change,
even in ourselves (or rather in the separate people that we
would be from minute to minute)'. And if this is a mistake,
continues Fenelhum, it is one whose correction 'would require
a complete overhaul of the concepts and syntax of our
language'.(8)
Yet there is no reason to think that the correct
prescription for Hume's diagnosis need be using a different
proper name every time we notice a change in someone or
something. Indeed, Hume even says that a rebuilt church, which
we only imagine to be the same as an earlier one, can still be
called the same as its predecessor 'without breach of the
propriety of language'(p. 258). He does not, unfortunately,
elaborate on this. However at the end of the section of
personal identity something is said that suggests how it might
be permissible to call two things the same which in fact are
only imagined to be the same. Here Hume states that all
disputes about the identity of successive objects 'are merely
verbal, except so far as the relation of parts give rise to
some fiction or imaginary (i.e. mysterious] principle of
union'(p. 262). Thus if two persons are arguing about whether
or not an earlier church is the same as its rebuilt
predecessor, and neither of them is asserting the existence of
a fictional entity or principle of union which somehow unites
the two churches, then their dispute will be merely about how
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the word 'same' is to be used in these circumstances. That is,
they will not be disputing about an actual identity but only
abut the linguistic conventions surrounding our use of identity
terms. If we imagine that our disputants finally agree that
our linguistic conventions permit us to call the two churches
the same (a conclusion to which Hume would give his assent),
then we can see why it is permissible to call two things the
same which are in fact different. This is because there are
two levels at which the notion of identity can be employed: one
which deals with questions about identity at the metaphysical
or ultimate level, and one which deals with them at the verbal
or conventional level.
It is disappointing that Hume does not have more to say
about the two levels of 'disputes'. For it is with such an
account that we are able to explain why it is acceptable for
us to continue to talk in terms of selves and personal
identity despite the fact that there are no such things. We
can, however, arrive at a fuller understanding of what the two-
level account involves by turning to another version of the no-
self theory.
At certain points in our inquiry we have had the chance to
refer to various Buddhist pronouncements on the problem of
personal identity. And here too it seems Buddhist theory can
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offer some insights. For at the very heart of this theory lies
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the doctrine of the two levels of truth. Although the different
schools of Buddhist thought disagree on the exact nature of the
distinction to be drawn between the two truths, there are
enough similarities - at least in the early Hinayana Schools -
for us to give a general account. This will be useful to our
project because it will allow us both to see what Hume might
have been getting at, and also to acquire more munitions with
which to fend off this attack on the no-self theory. I hasten
to add, however, that I am not here attempting a scholarly
exposition of Buddhist thought; for my present interests are
confined to an exposition of the no-self theory of personal
identity. It is just that Buddhism has some valuable
contributions to make here. There are of course problems
involved in the cross-cultural discussion of ideas; Hume and
the Buddha, after all, lived their lives in very different
social and historical contexts. And yet I do not think these
difficulties need detain us; for when we go to the texts where
Buddhists thinkers are grappling with the problem of personal
identity we find their concerns are essentially the same as
Hume's.
In the earliest texts of Buddhism, the Pali Canon (about
500 B.C.), we come across a distinction drawn between two types
of discourse: those of direct meaning and those of indirect
meaning. The former type of discourse is said to be one whose
meaning is plain while the latter type needs to have its
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meaning inferred with reference to the former. In the
discourses of indirect meaning words are used which apparently
refer to persisting entities such as a self or an I which,
according to the Buddha, are merely 'expressions, turns of
speech, designations which the Tathagata [i.e. the Buddha]
makes use of without being led astray by them".(9) That is,
although we may use words like 'self' and 'I', we should not be
led into thinking that they actually refer to something, for
they are but grammatical devices. This non-denoting aspect of
these expressions is something which must be inferred in light
of the discourses of direct meaning. In this latter type of
discourse the non-existence of anything permanent or enduring,
such as the self or I, is asserted and the misleading features
of language - those features which lead us astray into the
belief in an I - are made explicit. Here there is no need for
inference since the meaning of such discourse is plain.
As it happens, however, we are apt to confuse the two
types of discourse: 'there are these two who misrepresent the
Tathagata. Which two? He who represents a discourse of
indirect meaning as a discourse of direct meaning and he who
represents a discourse of direct meaning as a discourse of
indirect meaning'.(10) Although the Pali Canon does not
elaborate here we can easily see what sorts of errors are being
referred to. On the one hand we might think that someone who
is using the words 'self', 'I', or 'Buddha' (which are mere
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turns of speech) is in fact denoting a particular entity. Or,
on the other hand, we might think that someone who is denying
the existence of the self cannot really mean what he is saying
and so we might be tempted to infer a further meaning which
would still allow the existence of the self. We might, for
instance, think that the person making this claim is only
denying the existence of a certain type of self.
The discussion of the two types of discourse is continued
in the various Buddhist commentaries on the Pali Canon, and
here we are introduced to the related ideas of two levels of
truth. In one commentary it is stated that all 'Buddhas [i.e.
enlightened beings] have two types of speech; conventional and
ultimate. Thus 'being', 'man', 'person', [the proper names]
'Tissa', 'Naga' are used as conventional speech. 'Categories',
'elements', 'sense-bases' are used as ultimate speech'. Because
of this division in speech we are told that the Buddha
'declared two truths; the conventional and ultimate, there is
no third. Words (used by) mutual agreement are true because of
Worldly convention; words of ultimate meaning are true because
of the existence of elements'.(11) Although the various
elements are said to be the constituents of which everything
else, including what we call the self, is made, it is not
because the elements are more basic than the self that the self
is said not to ultimately exist. It is simply because there is
nothing in the world, not even an assemblage of the elements,
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that can be identified with the self. Although the Buddha
cites various characteristics that something must have if it is
to be considered a self, the most important is that of
permanence or identity over time. But when we look to our
experience there is nothing but impermanence: our bodies,
feelings, and thoughts are forever coming and going. In this
sense the Buddha is in complete agreement with Hume: where
there is diversity there can be no identity. None of this,
however, implies that statements which make use of words like
'self', 'I', 'you', 'Tisa', or 'Buddha', are false or
nonsensical at every level of discourse. For they can be true
at the conventional level; which means they can be true because
of their being used in accordance with mutual agreement, i.e.
linguistic convention.
A good illustration of how this distinction is to be drawn
. <
is given in a well-known passage from the The Questions of
King Menander (about 100 A.D.).(12) In this dialogue the
Indo-Greek king Menander puts various questions about the
nature of the self to the Buddhist monk Nagasena. At the
opening of the dialogue Menander asks 'How is your reverence
known, and what is your name?' The somewhat provocative answer
given to the King is 'I'm known as Nagasena, your Majesty,
that's what my fellow monks call me. But though my parents may
have given me such a name . . .it's only a generally understood
term, a practical designation. There is no question of a
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permanent individual implied in the use of the word'. Menander
is quite astonished by this reply and eventually asks 'if your
fellow monks call you Nagasena, what then is Nagasena?' He asks
whether Nagasena is any part of the body or the mind, or
whether he is all of these things taken together or whether he
is anything apart from them. To all of this Nagasena replies
merely 'No, your Majesty'. Menander then exclaims triumphantly
'then for all my asking I find no Nagasena. Nagasena is a mere
sound! Surely what your Reverence has said is false!' But
Nagasena is not to be so swiftly dealt with and, in good
Socratic fashion, replies by himself asking a question: 'Your
Majesty, how did you come here - on foot, or in a vehicle?' 'In
a chariot', says Menander. Nagasena then asks what the chariot
is, whether it is the pole, axle, wheels, frame, reins, or
yoke, or whether it is all these taken together or again
whether it is something other than the separate parts. Menander
replies here in the negative. With this Nagasena fires back at
the King his own reasoning: 'Then for all my asking, your
Majesty, I can find no chariot. The chariot is merely a
sound. What then is the chariot? Surely what your Majesty has
said is false! There is no chariot!" Menander protests that he
has not said anything false; '.it's on account of all these
various components the pole, axle, wheels, and so on, that the
vehicle is called a chariot. It's just a generally understood
term, a practical designation'. Nagasena's rejoinder is to
praise Menander for this remark and to point out the same holds
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true of himself. For it is because of his various components
that he is known by the practical designation 'Nagasena'.
However, he adds, in the ultimate sense there is no person to
( lv
whom the name refers.
j-'.JW
It is easy to mistake this passage, as some people have
done, for a statement of reductionism. 8ut the text clearly
disallows this interpretation. The reductionist view would be
that the person of Nagasena can be reduced without remainder to
his various impersonal constituents. But when the King asks if
Nagasena is all of the parts of his body and mind taken
together, Nagasena answers 'No'. This is because Nagasena
rejects any notion of a person that exists in the ultimate
sense: a person is not ultimately something other than his
parts (the strict theory), nor is a person ultimately the sum
of his parts (the reductionist theory). This does not mean
however that the word 'Nagasena' is a mere sound; for it is
more than that: it is a generally understood term whose proper
use is determined by mutual agreements concerning how, when,
and where it is to be used. Or, as Nagasena says, it is
because of his various components that he is known as
'Nagasena', even though 'Nagasena' does not refer to anything.
It is crucial to see, however, that in relegating such
terms to the realms of conventional discourse, Buddhism is not
proposing a conventionalist theory of personal identity. That
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is, for Buddhism, a person's identity is not something to be
ultimately decided by convention. For to hold this position
would be to commit the very error against which the Pali Canon
warns us, i.e. to represent a discourse of indirect meaning as
a discourse of direct meaning. It would be to conflate the
levels of truth and think that questions at the ultimate level
can be answered by agreements at the conventional level.
We are now able to see why the no-self theory does not
imply that our language is in need of an overhaul. For it is
quite consistent with the non-existence of the self or I that
we continue to employ the words 'self' and 'I' in their
practical everyday usage, provided we do not mistake them for
denoting some particular entity at the ultimate level, or, as
Hume would say, feign the existence of a fiction. This is why,
contrary to what many of Hume's critics think, Hume's own use
of the first-person pronoun does not undermine his theory. In
Hume's statement 'when I enter most intimately into what I call
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception . . .
and never can observe anything but the perception' (p. 252),
the word 'I' is being used at the conventional level: it is
merely a generally understood term whose proper use is
determined by mutual agreements. We should not therefore think
that in using the first-person pronoun Hume has committed
himself to the existence of a self at the ultimate level.
- 218 -
Some will no doubt find it paradoxical that we can use
personal language correctly when there is nothing to which
these terms ultimately refer. It was reasoning akin to this,
it seems, that led Descartes to his famous proclamation 'I
think, therefore I am". I must exist, reasoned Descartes,
because even when I doubt that I exist there is still an I that
is doing the doubting. 8ut Descartes has become led astray by
his own language; for there is no need for the 'I' in "I think'
or 'I doubt" to refer to anything. What Descartes was aware
of, as both Hume and the Buddha would agree, was just thinking,
not an I that was doing the thinking. Consequently Descartes
might have just as well said (and should have said if his
concern was with ultimate rather than conventional truth)
'there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts'. And such a
deduction, if we may call it that, does not suffice to prove
the existence of an I.
A possible response here would be to say that although
there need be no reference to an I when we use the nounal sense
of 'thinking' or 'thoughts', when the verbal sense 'I think' is
employed then plainly there must be some reference to a
subject; for what is it that thinks. To this it can be replied
that although the term 'think' does require a subject this is
little more than a grammatical requirement. And so we might
just as well employ a non-referring grammatical subject rather
than the misleading term 'I'. This is a point that is
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recognized by George Christoph Lichtenberg who says about
Descartes' dictum, 'We should say, "It thinks", just as we say
"It thunders". Even to say coqito is too much if we translate
it with "I think". To assume the "I" to postulate it, is a
practical need'.(13) Thus since the use of the verbal sense
"thunders' also requires the introduction of a subject, we
bring in the word 'it' and say 'it thunders'. But this does
not mean that the grammatical subject 'it' here refers to
anything' All we are saying when we say 'it thunders' is "there
is thunder'. Consequently, since the requirement that the word
'thinks' has a subject is also a convention of grammar, or as
we might say with Lichtenberg, a practical need, we could
likewise employ 'it' to serve this purpose. We could say 'it
thinks, therefore there are thoughts' and the appearance of
'it' here would no more imply a reference to an actual subject
than would 'it' in 'it thunders'.(K)
There remains, however, a further problem which needs our
attention. It was mentioned earlier that one of the criticisms
levelled at Hume is that his account of personal identity is
inconsistent with what he says elsewhere. The passages which
are supposed to contradict the view of the section on personal
identity come from Book II of the Treatise wherein Hume
discusses the nature of the passions or emotions.(15)
Because Hume refers here to the importance of the role played
by the self as the object of such passions as pride and
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humility, some writers have been quick to accuse him of
contradicting his earlier claims about the self. Thus Norman
Kemp Smith cites the following passages from Book II as being
incompatible with Hume's claims from Book I:
"Tis evident, that the idea, or rather
impression of ourselves is always intimately present
with us, and that our consciousness gives us so
lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not
possible to imagine, that any thing can in this
particular go beyond it. (p.317)
The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves
and any object, the more easily does the imagination
make the transition, and convey to the related idea,
the vivacity of conception, with which we always form
the idea of our own person.(p.318) (16)
Kemp Smith suggests that the reason why Hume so freely
makes use o.f the idea of the self in Book II when he has just
dismissed the notion in Book I is because Book II was written
before 8ook I, and, consequently, by the time Hume had got
around to writing Book I he had forgotten what he had said in
Book 11.(17) Before we accept this picture of a bizzarely
absent-minded Hume it seems we should look at what is actually
being said about the self in Book II. And what we find in the
opening pages of Book II is this: ''Tis evident, that pride and
humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the same object.
This object is the self, or that succession of related ideas
and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and
consciousness'. And a few lines later we are told about 'that
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connected succession of perceptions, which we call self' (p.
277). These hardly seem like the words of someone who is
totally incognizant of the view expressed in the section on
personal identity. Indeed by taking the time to insert these
descriptions of the self in Book II it seems that Hume is
anxious to remind us of the conclusions reached in Book I. And
so, when Hume says in Book II that an awareness of ourselves is
always intimately present to us we should understand this in
terms of what was said in Book I; namely, that to enter
intimately into what is called the self is just to encounter
various impressions. That is, what is always intimately
present to us is just those particular perceptions whose
succession we call the self (the fact that Hume uses the word
'intimately' in both the passages from Book I and Book II also
suggests that he is intent on discussing the same notion of the
self in both places).
Still there is an apparent problem here. And this is
highlighted by the fact that Hume often speaks in Book II of
our idea or impression of the self as though it were something
which occurs instantaneously within our awareness, a singular
perception which we experience as the object of pride and
humility. But as Hume has told us there is no impression or
idea of the self; there is only the smooth and uninterrupted
progress of thought within our imagination. But how is it that
a smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought could appear
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instantaneously within awareness? The notion of an
uninterrupted progress is a temporal notion; it is something
*
that occurs over an extended period of time. Accordingly, it
is difficult to see how such a train of perceptions could be an
object to which we could, in an instance, direct our emotions.
I doubt, however, that this is a major difficulty. Hume
himself is aware that a different account is needed to deal
with those occasions, such as in certain emotional states,
where we suddenly come across the object of what we call self-
awareness. He says, we have noted, that in order to discover
what is responsible for the tendency to believe in personal
identity a distinction must be drawn between 'personal
identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it
regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves' (p.
253). Personal identity of the first sort is his professed
concern in Book I while in Book II it is the latter sort. The
problem is that Hume never explains just how we are to
understand the relation between the two sorts of personal
identity. He obviously wants the personal identity that
concerns the passions to be basically the same as that which
the imagination constructs. This is evident from the
descriptions of the self given in his discussions of the
passions. And yet his theory seems to require that the object
of the passions be capable of appearing to awareness in a way
that does not render it a succession.
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The way to deal with this problem is to see that when we
enter a psychological or emotional state that seems to depend
on an instantaneous awareness of self, what we are doing is
not reflecting on a succession of related ideas (which could
not be done at any one instance), rather we are latching on to
a particular collection of some of these ideas which, by
virtue of their being related, can instantaneously present
themselves in a condensed form to our awareness. It is with
this discovery of a constructed or condensed self-image, as we
shall call it, that we are now brought back to a point set
aside earlier.
In the second chapter we saw that although McTaggart
claimed we know the self by direct acquaintance, he was
nevertheless alive to the possibility that the establishment of
self-perception would not be enough to prove that a self
existed, but only that something was perceived as being a self.
McTaggart's suspicion that we might perceive something which we
mistakenly believe to be ourself is borne out by an examination
of our states of self-awareness. We can start by noting what
was said in Chapter One, namely, that although we do experience
occasions of self-awareness there are numerous instances in
which it is plain that we have no awareness of anything that
can be considered a self. The examples cited, such as reading
and day-dreaming, are cases where I become immersed in the
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activity to the point that there is n-o room in consciousness
for the awareness of an I. Here there is just the experience
of the activity: the gradual unfolding of the novel or the
spinning of the day-dream. It is of course possible for me to
shift my awareness to a point where I am aware that I am
reading or day-dreaming, but then I am no longer immersed in
the activity. It is important to see, however, that when I am
thus not immersed then my experience of the activity is
drastically altered. This is because in entering a state of
self-awareness I undergo a 'giving-up' or a 'forsaking' of the
activity in which I was previously engaged. My reading gets
left behind as I conjure up the I to which I now direct my
attention. Here the act of reading loses its sense of
spontaneity; it becomes something I must struggle with,
something impeded by the new awareness that it is I who am
doing the reading. The act of self- awareness is thus a
reflective and complicated act which involves both a stepping
back from the flow of experience and the introduction of a
further element (or rather collation of elements) into that
experience. It is in this sense then that self- awareness can
be called a secondary phenomenon; for the object of self-
awareness is not part of the basic fabric of experience, rather
it is something which experience itself fabricates and then
takes as its object. It is consequently understandable that
self-awareness, with its complicated and reflective qualities,
is but an infrequent visitor to consciousness.
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This view of the secondariness of self-awareness is
supported, I think, by what we know about the ontogeny of
consciousness. The developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan,
for example, delineates a sequence of four psychological
functions which lead up to but do not imply the emergence of
self-awareness. According to Kagan, the first function to
appear which comes close to implying the existence of
consciousness is recognition memory. This makes its appearance
in the first eight months of life and is displayed in the
ability to discriminate between familiar and novel stimuli. A
few months later there apppears the functions of retrieval and
inference, by which Kagan means "the retrieval of schemata
without any cues in the immediate field and the generation of
inferences following the relating of those schemata to present
experience' . ( 1 8 ) These functions are demonstrated by a child
who looks persistently for a toy he just saw hidden a moment
earlier. Here the child maintains a schemata of the hiding of
the toy and infers that the toy must still exist somewhere.
The fourth function, which emerges at about, sixteen months,
constitutes the child's ability to monitor, select, and
control the other functions. This function is the awareness of
one's potentiality for action and, for Kagan, comes closest to
our notion of consciousness.
The difficulty, however, appears with the emergence of the
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fifth function, namely, the awareness of self as an entity with
characteristics. This is a difficulty because although the
function of self-awareness seems to depend on the appearance of
the earlier functions, nothing in the earlier functions implies
that self-awareness need emerge: 'To explain why a 30-month-old
declares, laughingly, "I'm a baby", as she crawls on the floor
and sucks on a bottle, requires more than an awareness of one's
ability to act. This behaviour presupposes not only a schema
for one's actions but also a schema for the self as an object
with variations in attribute "(19). Consequently, says Kagan,
some new processes must be introduced into the developmental
sequence if the self- awareness function is to make its
entrance. But just what this must involve Kagan cannot say; it
remains, we are told, part of an ancient enigma.
However, it is not too difficult to see that an answer to
this 'enigma' is already contained within the account. We need
only observe that Kagan's schema for the self as an object with
variations is just what we have called the constructed self-
image. That is, it is a collation of earlier experiences which
presents itself in a condensed form to our awareness. Once we
spell out the schema for the self in this way we can see that
the process needed to generate it is not altogether dissimilar
from the process which generates the fourth function, i.e. the
awareness of the potentiality for action. The child arrives at
his action-schema by directing his awareness on his own
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abilities, that is, by monitoring, selecting, and controlling
the more primitive functions of recognition memory, retrieval,
and inference. Once the child has acquired the capacity thus
to direct his awareness, it is but a small step for him to then
turn his awareness on some of the perceptions which constitute
the successsion of related ideas and so arrive at a schema for
the self. However, although the self-schema will contain
components not to be found in other schemata, the components of
other schemata will nevertheless be discoverable within the
self-schema. This is what Kagan means, I take it, by saying
that the function of self-awareness depends on the earlier
functions. Thus the infant's awareness of being a baby will
require more than an awareness of the ability to act, but will
still involve such an awareness. This is because to have the
awareness "I'm a baby' is, among other things, to be aware that
one acts like a baby; and even a 30-month old will know that
• ■*
crawling on the floor and sucking on a bottle are things that
are (normally) only done by babies. The reason, however, why
self-awareness will include more than the child's awareness of
his ability to act is because in addition to acting, the child
also is acted upon by others, has an idea of his own
appearance, experiences emotions, and so on; all of which are
condensed into the object of self-awareness. Thus self-
awareness is a secondary phenomenon on the ontogenic theory
because it does not involve the acquisition of a new ability:
it is merely the deployment of an earlier function upon a wider
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range of objects.
Having established that self-awareness is both a
complicated and rare occurrence, we can now move on to the
phenomenology of the constructed self-image. For in laying
bare its structure we will see that although it is the object
of what we call self-awareness, it is constituted by nothing
more than a collection of transient images.
One of the central features of the constructed self-image
is that it is a condensation of related experiences. It is
this feature that helps it to masquerade as being a self; for
being a condensation of our experience it appears both as a
singular thing (though as we shall see this need not be so)
and, at the same time, as something which contains our
experiences. Since the experiences of which it is composed may
be taken from the different times of our life, we can also see
how the constructed self-image might, in an instance, convey
something of the notion of identity over time; that is, present
itself as something that has persisted throughout our lives.
The psychological process of condensing several
experiences into a single image or idea is not unique to the
structure of self-awareness. On the contrary, it is a process
commonplace in much of our psychology. Thus when I call up an
image of my friend Mary I am not presented with a single
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portrait, as it were, of Mary. What I find is several
different images of Mary which have been collated and super¬
imposed upon one another. I may, for example, have an image of
her hair in the wind, which at the same time incorporates the
movement of her dress. This composition may be further blended
with an image of her face which is at once a frontal view and a
profile which in turn may allow the blueness of her eyes to
merge with the turquoise of her ear-rings. In the same
instance this will all be bathed in emotional qualities which
will reveal the feelings I have for Mary. Such images are of
course transient with certain of their parts being introduced,
expelled, and replaced in an instance. However, as long as I
dwell on the image of Mary there will continue to be an
indistinct network of constituent images, the older of which
are forever dying away while new relations take their place. A
similar process of condensation also seems to take place in the
construction of dream images; and here, because of what Freud
has called primary process or the unrestrained character of
hypnagogic cognition, the resultant complex may incorporate
numerous diverse elements that are held together by only the
remotest of connections.(20) We may, for example, encounter
someone in our dreams who displays the characteristics of
several different people at once: in one way he is our
childhood playmate, in another way he is our old school¬
teacher, while in yet a third way he is someone who we saw only
yesterday. It is as if we were looking at one of those anatomy
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text-books which depicts the different organ-systems on a
series of overlapping transparent pages. On the bottom page is
a skeletal-system, on the next page is the nervous-system, then
comes circulatory-systern, and so on. The end result is a single
image of the human body in which the different organ- systems
are nevertheless discernable.
The constructed self-image is put together in much the
same way as other condensed images. When I enter a state of
self-awareness, the I that is summoned before my consciousness
is not a simple entity that infixes itself changelessly in my
mind. It is rather a composite of various fading images which
will have some reference to how I see and feel about myself. I
may, for example, have an image of my face as it appeared to me
in the mirror this morning which is nevertheless infused with
features of previous images of my face. Thus although my eyes
and lips might appear to me as they did today, my cheeks and
the shape of my face might seem more like those of myself of
twelve years ago. Or again it might include features of how I
would imagine myself to look in twenty years. This composite
image of my face might itself be superimposed on some familiar
scene, say the beach where I often go for walks. Here the
sand- dunes might be incorporated into the cheeks and the
rising of the waves into the forming of a smile. And all of
this will be presented in a suffusion of affective tones which
will exhibit the emotional evaluations I have of myself. Like
- 231 -
other of our condensed images, the self-image will have but an
ephemeral existence; the constituent images continuously
dissolving as new associations make their way into the
complex. Just what are the constitutents of the constructed
self-image will naturally be different for each person, since
each person will see himself in a different way. While for one
person it may consist mainly of idealized images of his
physical appearance, for another it may be a mixture of certain
sensations or emotions, while for a third it may be images of
how others respond to him. To verify that this is so one need
only ask different persons to describe what it is they are
aware of when they are aware of themselves. It will then be
seen that such images vary quite markedly. Further, it also
seems to be that although some people have a relatively
consistent image of themselves over time (they have always seen
themselves as a whirling complex of emotions), others do not
(they now see themselves as more of a physical entity than they
did five years ago). This diversity of self-images would help
to explain both why there is no unified common-sense notion of
the self and why there is no commonplace conviction about one's
identity over time.
I just said that the constructed self-image need not exist
as a singular thing; that is, at any one moment it is possible
for a person to have more than one constructed self-image. And
this much seems to follow both from what has been said about
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the possible inconsistences in the self-image over time, and
from the nature of the psychological mechanism of
condensation. For in the first place, if one can construct two
or more different images of oneself at different times, then
the stage is set for the possibility of constructing as many
different self-images at the same time. It might be objected
that consciousness could not operate in this divided way, but
such a complaint must depend on the doctrine of the unity of
consciousness, a doctrine whose truth we have had grounds to
question throughout this study.
Further, because the constructed self-image is a
condensation of related ideas, it seems likely that certain of
our ideas which normally appear when we think of ourselves are
such that they bear little relation to other ideas that also
appear in the same instance. Consequently, any attempt at
condensing these ideas into a composite idea will tend to
fail. Now in most cases the solution to this dilemma will be
to somehow represss one of the inconsistent experiences or at
least deny it entry into the constructed self-image; that is,
not allow it to be an element in the state of self-awareness.
The problem, however, is that some of these offending
experiences may present themselves as too salient or meaningful
to accept banishment from the self-image. What we have then
is an experience or group of experiences that is at once pulled
into and yet expelled from the self-image. Under these
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conditions it is quite conceivable that the exiled experiences
might set up their own camp in which they too could fly the
flag of the self-image. There would then exist two or more
groupings of experience, each of which would present itself as
the appropriate object of self-awareness. To enter a state of
self-awareness in these circumstances would be to have one's
awareness divide itself between two objects competing for the
same phenomenological status. In understanding how this could
occur in consciousness we must not think of the constructed
self-image as an object to which I direct my attention in the
same way that I might direct a beam of light upon a plane in
the sky. For if we use this analogy we will be tempted to see
the constructed self-image and my consciousness of it as if
they were two separate entities, the latter of which somehow
engulfs the former. We will then imagine that to have two or
more simultaneous self-images will involve little more than
having one instance of consciousness which simultaneously,
engulfs more than one thing; much like one beam of light might
illuminate two planes. But in reality the constructed self-
image just i_s an instance of consciousness. For when I enter
into a state of self-awareness what happens is this: my
consciousness throws itself into a certain configuration that
is structured in the form of a condensed self-image which
permeates or diffuses over my world at that instance. In this
situation we can begin to see how parts of my experience, which
are neither assimilable nor repressible, might fissure
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themselves off to become a separate sphere of consciousness.
A person in this state might then begin to experience
himself as two distinct persons. Something like this could well
play a role in the genesis of the type of dissociative
condition known as multiple personality. Here the problem of
having more than one self-image would be dealt with by
producing a schism in awareness which would subsequently be
attended by the appearance of two or more personalities, each
of which would be matched to the appropriate self-image. I am
not saying of course that the constructed self-image is to be
identified with the personality, but only that whatever sort of
image we have of ourselves will tend to relate to both the way
we behave and to the way we think, and, as a consequence, that
having two or more radically distinct self-images will tend to
correlate with having two or more radically distinct
personalities .
We now have to ask what it is that leads someone into
perceiving the constructed self-image as being a self. And
here again the work of Buddhist philosophers is most
enlightening. According to Buddhist theory what we call a
person is really just an aggregation of the five khandhas or
elements. These are physical form, perceptions, feelings,
motives, and consciousness. But none of these elements whether
considered separately or in combination can rightly be
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identified with the self, for they lack the various qualities
which we attribute to the self.(2 I) This, however, does not
stop someone from mistakenly identifying himself with one or
other of the elements, and indeed this is a ubiquitous
confusion from which Buddhism hopes to set us free. But what is
it that leads a person to this mistaken identification? To
answer this we need to refer back to our previous discussion of
the conventional and ultimate levels of truth. There we saw
that although personal names and personal pronouns do not at
the ultimate level refer to anything, at the conventional level
it is quite acceptable to use such expressions for pragmatic
reasons. Thus the Buddha uses the language of the self as
convenient designations without being led astray by them. The
problem is that, unlike the Buddha, many of us do get led
astray by the expressions we use; that is, in failing to notice
we are using langauge at the level of convention, we end up
thinking there must be something to which the words 'I' or
'self' refer. And so we turn our gaze inward (because this is
where the self is supposed to exist) and coming upon one or
other of the elements, or a collection of the elements, hasten
to identify it with our self. Buddhism underlines the
importance that language plays here by making a didactic use of
the Pali word ahamkara which can mean both 'the utterance of
"I" and 'I-maker'.(21) That the same word has both meanings
helps to suggest a connection between the two meanings; not
only that the language of the self leads to the fabrication of
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a self but also that a fabricated self leads to a misconstrual
of the language of the self. Here then we see the cyclical
nature of the trap in which the straying language-user is
caught. In uttering 'I' he is led to misident.ify an element in
his experiences as the self. Having affected this delusory
identification he then goes on to make similar utterances firm
in the belief that these utterances ultimately refer to his
self. For Buddhism, it is thus we come to weave the first
threads of an ever-expanding veil of delusion. For in
believing that we have a self we are easily led to other
experiences which depend on this illusory self. Pride and
humility, for example, can only get their foothold if there is
something which we perceive to be the self and to which we can
relate the causes of our pride or humility. I cannot be proud
of my successes or humiliated by my failures unless I believe
there is an I to whom these successes and failures belong.
This is why on Buddhist theory , the giving up of the belief in
the self - which we must do if we are to be free from delusion
- is also attended by the cessation of pride, humility,
embarrassment, envy, and other self-orientated (and hence
delusive) emotions.
The Buddhist method for over-coming the delusion of self
is to engage in sustained meditation; a practise which may be
described as pure self-analysis or intensive inward-gazing.
Through this technique the supposed internal self comes to be
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seen for what it is: a mere collection of transient elements.
This realization loosens the grip of the belief in self and so
dissolves the constructed self-image back into the elements
from which it came. Because we can find ourselves so firmly
held by the delusion of self, the point at which we are able to
break free from its grasp is often described in Buddhist
literature as a mystical sense of liberation; a state in which
the boundaries between self and not-self crumble before our
eyes. A striking account of this experience is given by the
Japanese Zen Master Sakei-on Sasaki:
One day I wiped out all the notions from my
mind. I gave up all desire. I discarded all the
words with which I thought and stayed in quietude. I
felt a little queer - as if I were being carried into
something, or as if I were touching some power
unknown to me . . . and Ztt! I entered. I lost the
boundary of my physical body. I had my skin, of
course, but I felt like I was standing in the centre
of the cosmos. I spoke, but my words lost their
meaning. I saw people coming towards me, but all were
the same man. All were myself! I had never known
this world. I had believed that I was created, but
now I must change my opinion: I was never created; I
was the cosmos; no individual Mr Sasaki existed.(23)
We are at last in a position to see how Hume's idea of
personal identity as it regards the imagination is related to
the notion of the constructed self-image, or personal identity
as it regards the passions. When I come to believe that I am
the same person I was twelve years ago it is because of the
smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought that is produced
in my imagination when I reflect on the succession of related
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ideas. This is the imaginary self which is contemplated over
time and whose identity is fictitious. When, on the other hand,
I believe that I am perceiving my self in an instance of self-
awareness, such as when I experience a self-orientated emotion,
what is happening is my awareness is being directed upon an
object which is merely a condensed version of extracts from the
succession of related ideas. This is the constructed self-
image which is a rare and secondary aspect of consciousness.
In either case what I come upon is merely a collection of
experiences: in either case there is no self to be found.
This brings us to the end of our enquiry. Before we
conclude, however, let us pause to survey the distance over
which we have come. At the opening of this study I suggested
that the problem of personal identity, which a problem of
identity over time, is essentially an empirical problem anek
thus is to be approached through an examination of experience.
Holding to this principle we have witnessed a common theme re-
emerging throughtout these pages. This is the theme of the
refusal of experience to allow itself to be swept up in the net
of personal identity. Being aware of this, the strict
theorists were forced to postulate a self whose identity
somehow existed beyond the realms of experience. This was what
Butler was trying to do when he claimed that consciousness of
personal identity presupposed and therefore could not
constitute personal identity. This move was destined to fail
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however because it depended on the false assumption that the
only way to distinguish between a delusive and veridical memory
is by reference to the one and the same person who had the
memory. This assumption is wrong, first, because the way to
distinguish between the two sorts of memories is by an appeal
to their causal histories, not to the person who had them, and,
secondly, because there is nothing in my memories to testify
that they were experiences had by me i.e. by one and the same
indefinable self who is now experiencing them. For on the
strict theory I am, as Reid puts it, neither thought, feeling,
nor action, but rather something which thinks, feels, and
acts. And yet when I examine my memories all I can find is
thoughts, feelings, and actions, never this other something
which is supposed to be their author. But if this self fails
to make an appearance in my memories, then we are left without
any explanation of how it is my memories testify that they were
had by me.
Unable to support its claims by an appeal to experience it
was not surprising that the strict theory moved on to a more a.
priori form of argument. Thus we found McTaggart claiming
that since no description of any fact about myself implied that
the description referred to me, then our knowledge of the self
.could not be knowledge by description but must be knowledge by
direct acquaintence. The problem however is it does not follow
from the fact that we do not know the self by description that
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we must know it by acquaintance; for there is another
possibility, namely, that we do not know the self at all. And
since it is this last possibility that receives the support of
experience, then it is plain that McTaggart's argument is of no
avail. This is also why Madell's argument from the imagination
had to run aground. Madell claimed that because I could
imagine myself possessing a totally different set of properties
than the ones I now have, I must be something other than my
properties. But this, like all the other arguments for the
strict theory, ignores the fact that I have no awareness of a
self in the first place. And if I have no awareness of a self
which now possesses certain properties, how could I begin to
imagine it possessing other properties?
Finding no satisfaction with the strict theory we turned
to Locke's memory theory and its offspring the psychological
theory. By arguing that the self is constructed out of
experience with its identity constituted by various
psychological relations these accounts ma'de some definite
advances on the strict theory. Williams, however, uncovered a
serious flaw in the psychological theory when he showed that it
was possible for two present individuals to be psychologically
continuous with one earlier person. For since two present
persons cannot be identical with one past person - a relation
which, if it held, would make them identical with each other -
then it seems that psychological continuity cannot here be the
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basis of personal identity. And if it cannot be the basis of
identity in the situation where there are two present persons
who display psychological continuity with a past person, then
there is no reason to think it can be the basis of identity
where only one person displays it. Williams' conclusion was
that, in the absence of bodily continuity, the most we could
say about someone who claimed to remember being an earlier
person is that he did not really remember being the earlier
person, but only mysteriously or clairvoyently knew all about
him. And here the argument might have rested had it not be for
Wiggins' observation about the possibility of bisecting one
person's brain and transplanting it into two separate bodies.
For in this case the two resulting persons' claims to remember
being the same earlier person would evidently not be an
instance of clairvoyance. This possibility, however, raises
its own problem. For now we must ask what has happened to the
person whose consciousness has become thus bifurcated.
It was Parfit who attempt to address this issue by
claiming that the various possible outcomes of Wiggins'
operation were merely different descriptions of the same
outcome. Thus the question of importance was not which
description we ought to choose, but rather what ought to matter
to me in a case of my fission. Parfit's answer was that what
ought to matter is relation R: psychological connectedness
and/or psychological continuity with the right kind of cause.
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Since this relation persists through fission then I ought to
regard my fission as being near as good as survival (despite
the fact that it is best described as dying). This account of
the matter, unfortunately, turned out to be deeply confused.
For not only was it wrong to call the possible outcomes merely
different descriptions of the same event, but the existence of
relation R was seen to be dubious: consciousness does not
consist of overlapping chains of strong connectedness. Why
Parfit thought it does is just because he was basing his theory
on the old Butlerian account (which is why he also had to
invoke the transitive notion of psychological continuity)
rather than on the nature of experience.
From here our investigations took us to the bodily theory.
Exponents of this view claimed that personal identity is
constituted by the spatio-temporal continuity of a person's
body. The obvious counter-example was the possibility of
bodily transfer. Penelhum attempted to meet this objection by
arguing that although it is permissible to say that bodily
transfer could occur, i.e. that the identity of the individual
who has undergone such a transfer would be determined by the
memory criterion and not bodily criterion. We need not accept
this conclusion. For we could introduce the concept of
retrocognition which would allow us to say that one person
could remember having the past of another person. In this way
we could stick to the primacy of the bodily criterion and
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maintain that the identity of a person who has undergone bodily
transfer is to be decided not by the person's memories, but by
whose body the person has. This is because we can now
redescribe the memories of the victim of bodily transfer as an
instance of retrocognition of someone else's past. Although
this was a notable attempt, the reason it was bound to go
astray was simply because it relied on Butler's unacceptable
idea that the only way to distinguish betwen veridical and
delusive memories is by prior reference to a person, which for
Penelhum meant reference to a body.
Williams contributed to the discussion by introducing the
further possibility of brain-state transfer, i.e., the
possibility that the information content of one person's brain
might be transferred to the brain of one or more different
persons. Persons who shared the same total brain-state, and
thus memories and character traits, would be identical, said
Williams, in the type sense, though not in the token sense
of person. Token-persons, or particular instances of type-
persons, are still bodies because any statements about them
which could not be reduced to statements about bodies could
still be made in terms of bodies belonging to certain person-
types. But the problem with this procedure was just that if we
need to refer to type-persons (i.e. non-bodily based persons)
in our statements about token-persons, then the idea of token-
persons is parasitic on the idea of type-persons and hence
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even token-persons are not bodies. Williams thought he could
buttress his position by claiming that to love a person was
basically the same as loving a body. But this proved to be
false because to be in love with someone is to enter into a
complex of reciprocal desires; that is, my love for another
must make reference to the other person's desires towards me.
The final reason for the failure of the bodily theory was
that it only considers the body from the third-person
perspective; i.e. as a spatio-temporally continuous object.
But this is plainly not how we experience our own bodies, which
appear to us from the first-person perspective as a point of
view on the world. Consequently, the bodily theory of identity
is one which I can never apply in my own case. And this alone
is enough for us to reject it.
This brought us to an examination of the no-self theory
which, I argued, is an eliminativist rather than a reductionist
view of personal identity. It was in the work of Hume that we
found an exposition of this view. However, to fully understand
his positon we had to defend him not only against his critics
but also against those of his apologists who tried to construe
him as a reductionist. This required, among other things, an
appeal to the Buddhist doctrine of the two levels of truth
which, it is arguable, was already implicit in Hume's theory.
However, to account for the possibility of what are perceived
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as instanteous states of self-awareness we had to make a
separate phenomenological enquiry into the nature of the
constructed self-image. We then saw how, through a
misunderstanding of the pragmatics of language, someone might
come to mistakenly identify himself with the constructed self-
image. Because the constructed self-image turned out to be a
condensation of what Hume calls a succession of related ideas
reflected upon in the imagination, we were able here to bring
personal identity regarding the imagination into relation with
that regarding the emotions.
I hope that with these arguments I have presented a
reasonable case for the rejection of the idea of personal
identity. There remain of course questions about what sort of
influence the no-self theory will have on our ethical views.
For if there is no self, is it permissible for us to continue
to employ the apparently kindred notions of praise and blame,
responsibility, and so on? For who is it we are praising and
blaming? And if the no-self theory cannot accommodate such
basic ethical notions, then does this not provide grounds for
the theory's dismissal? Although a full consideration of these
problems lies beyond the scope of this study, I think we can
already see the direction from which they must be approached.
In the second chapter, for instance, I referred to Butler's
claim that if the strict theory were not true, then a person
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should no more care about what will befall himself tomorrow
than he would care about what will befall someone else; the
implication being that since a person does care more about
his own future than about that of another, the strict theory
must be true. My response to this was to point out the fallacy
in arguing from how people behave to the truth of the beliefs
which lie behind their behaviour. Thus just as someone's
believing in ghosts or behaving as if ghosts exist does not
prove the existence of ghosts, in a like manner a person's
behaving as if he has a persisting self does not prove he does.
This criticism applies with equal force to the claim that
because someone has ethical beliefs which apparently
implicate the existence of the self, the self must exist. For
it is obvious that a person's attachment to certain ethical
views can be for reasons which are quite independant. of those
views. It seems, therefore, we should not take our supposed
ethical intuitions as sacrosanct and proceed to erect a theory
of personal identity that kowtows to those intuitons. Not only
does such a procedure have to rely on the dubious assumption
that there is a universally accepted set of ethical intuitions,
but it also has to find a self where there is none. We would
do better, I suggest, to first establish what we can about
personal identity and then, in light of these findings, proceed
to reconstruct our ethical theory. But this is the subject for
a further study.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by J. A. Selby-
Bigge (Oxford, 1978), p. 525. Further references are to this
edition and are included in the text. Unless stated otherwise,
all italics within this and subsequent quotes are Hume's.
2. in The Philosophical Review. LXIV, 1955, p. 571.
3. "Senses of Identity in Hume's Treatise' . Dialogue:
Canadian Philosophical Review, VIII, 19B9, pp. 367-384.
4. Noxon, pp. 372-373.
5. Penelhum, p. 578.
6. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review. Ill, 1968, pp.
239-254 .
7. Ashley and Stack, pp. 244-245.
8. Penelhum, p. 578.
9. Quoted in K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge (London, 1963), p. 319.
10. To arrive at this translation I have compared both
Jayatilleke's translation (p. 361) and that of the same passage
by F. J. Woodward in The Book of the Gradual Savings (Angutta-
Nikava) or more-numbered Suttas (London, 1932), 1, p. 54.
11. Quoted in Steven Collins' Selfless Persons: Imagery
and thought in Theravada Buddhism (Cambridge, 1982), p. 154.
12. In Sources of Indian Tradition, edited by Wm.
Theodore de Bary, 1 (New York, 1958) pp. 103-105. The
following translation comes mainly from this edition. However,
the editor omits the important final remark made by Nagasena.
This line, which I have included, can be found in The Sacred
Books of the Buddhists, XXII, Milinda's Questions. I,
translated by I. 8. Horner, M. A., (London, 1963), pp. 37-38.
13. Quoted in J. P. Stern, Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of
Scattered Occasions (London, 1963), p. 270.
14. Stern does not seem to me to be aware of this point in
his discussion of Lichtenberg. See p. 270.
15. There are also the so-called 'second thoughts' in the
Appendix to the Treatise (pp. 633-636 ) where Hume seems to
express doubts about the truth of his account of personal
- 248 -
identity. I follow Norman Kemp Smith, however, in thinking
that the passage in question is in fact a reaffirmation of his
principles and his only doubts are with his theory's ability to
account for states of self-awareness. This, as will be seen is
not a difficulty for a more expanded version of Hume's
account. For Kemp Smith's remarks on the Appendix see his The
Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and
Central Doctrines (London, 1941), pp. 553-560.
16. Kemp Smith, p. 171.
17. Kemp Smith, p. vi.
18. The Second Year: The Emergence of Self-Awareness
(Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1981), pp. 148-149.
19. Kagan, p. 149.
20. For a discussion of primary process see The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works. 5, The
Interpretation of Dreams, edited by J. Strachey (London,
1964), pp. 588-609.
21. For the Dialogue in which this argument is given see
The Collection of the Middle-Length Savings (Maiihima
Nikava). I, translated by I. B. Horner, M. A. (London, 1957),
section 233.
22. See J. A. B. van Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhaya II',
Journal of the American Oriental Society. LXXVII, 1957.
23. 'The Transcendental World', Zen Notes . 1, 5 (New
York, 1 954 ) , p. 12.
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